August 01, 2013
Whether
in the street or in parliament, Islamist parties and movements have relied on
one key strength for their successes in the immediate post-Arab Spring
period—their cohesion and unity. But this could be endangered in the wake of
Mohamed Morsi's ouster from the Egyptian presidency. Brotherhood offshoots
throughout the region have tried to distance themselves from the governing
methods of the "mother" organization in order to weather the storm.
Although there has been a tendency to fixate on the Brotherhood’s governance
style as the main culprit for its downfall, other fundamental issues threaten
the movement’s unity, its future, and that of its offshoots.
Predictably,
Islamist parties associated with the Muslim Brotherhood in the region reacted
with condemnation and consternation to the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in
Egypt. But, they were mostly careful to disassociate themselves from the
Egyptian Brotherhood's uncompromising style of leadership (rushing in a new
Islamist constitution and monopolizing power around Mohamed Morsi). "We in
Tunisia," stressed Rachid Ghannouchi, leader of Ennahda, "have
offered compromises in terms of the constitution so that it will represent all
Tunisians.” He went on to add: “We live under a national unity government and
there are three heads of authority each of which is affiliated with a large and
well-known party and all take part in the rule." Party leaders also like
to recall last February: when thousands marched in the streets of Tunis to
protest against the government, it took only a few days for the Islamist party
to replace the prime minister and relinquish the most sensitive ministries to
consensual technocrats. Similarly, the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood's spokesman bluntly asserted that the Egyptian Brotherhood had
made "a mistake." "Egypt was a sinking boat and you can't come
and change it the way you are doing; I believe that we have to work within a
coalition." Likewise in Morocco, the leader of the ruling Justice and
Development Party (PJD), Abdelilah Benkirane, stressed that "we [PJD] have nothing to do
with the Muslim Brotherhood."
But what
these groups fail to see is that style of governance alone is not responsible
for the Brotherhood's downfall in Egypt. Other fundamental factors—which affect
the group’s other branches as well—are to blame. Among these is a failure
to promote younger and more pragmatic leaders; as a result, old-guard-type
dogmatic figures prevail. In Egypt, young
Brotherhood activists were disgruntled by what they
regarded as the excessive interference of their old guard leaders in composing
the leadership of the Freedom and Justice Party (FJP). Because they also
focus on party loyalty, most Brotherhood affiliates in the region are similarly
led by members who have been in charge for decades. For instance, within
Ennahda and the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, the leadership distrusts younger
members and those who have not been jailed or tortured. This has often led to
the departure of talented young members from some Brotherhood branches.
Another
factor is the lack of separation between their outreach efforts (also known as
proselytizing activities or da‘wa) and their role as political actors. In Egypt,
the proximity between the Brotherhood and the FJP led many
to see them as one and the same, to the extent that there was no
differentiation between the effects of Morsi’s policies on the FJP and their
impact on the Brotherhood. A clearer separation between the Brotherhood's
socio-religious wing and its political wing could resolve the dilemma it has
been facing regarding who should be the ultimate source of authority on
politics. It would also clarify to the electorate who—between the Egyptian
Brotherhood's Mohammed Badie and the President Mohamed Morsi, or between
Ennahda's Rachid Ghannouchi and Tunisian Prime Minister Ali Laarayedh—really
holds the reins of power within the party and in the country.
Both of
these issues are part of a wider debate taking place within many of the
offshoots. It pits the younger generations against the leadership as they seek
to promote a pragmatic approach via the establishment of a party independent
from the Brotherhood and unhampered by the old guard. This also means a shift
away from a decades-old modus operandi suited for a clandestine organization to
an open structure based on transparency and internal democracy. Moroccan and
Jordanian Islamists opened up the door of reform by setting up the Justice and
Development Party (PJD) and the Islamic Action Front (IAF), respectively. But
while the former acts as an independent political force, the latter still seems
to be under the oversight of the local Brotherhood branch. In Syria, for
instance, the recently
created National
Party for Justice and the Constitution (NPJC), known as Wahad, or
"One" in Arabic, is made up roughly of 30% Muslim Brothers, 40%
independent Islamists and 30% national figures1—suggesting that other Brotherhood offshoots
might be heading in that direction.
Most
Brotherhood movements in the region are deeply heterogeneous, comprising a wide
spectrum of views on issues of ideological, generational, and regional
representation at the leadership level. The lack of deep reforms that reflect
progress in some Brotherhood organizations has already led to divisions over
the past two years. This was, for example, what pushed Abdelfattah Mourou and
Abdel Moneim Aboul Fotouh, two prominent moderate Islamists, to split respectively from Ennahda and the
Egyptian Brotherhood in 2011. At the same time in Syria, a group of younger
Muslim Brothers who did not feel represented by the leadership of the local
Brotherhood branch split and created the National Action Group (NAG), which is
an active component within Syrian opposition bodies. So far, however, and
despite these symbolic departures, the bulk of the membership of Brotherhood
organizations around the region has remained loyal to the current
leaderships.
Conceivably,
however, the current debate among Islamist ranks as to whether violence is a
justifiable response to Morsi’s overthrow could become a wedge issue. The
question of resorting to violence is a recurring theme, and in the mid-1980s
caused a split within the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood. Although the factions
later reconciled, tension remains. Similarly in Tunisia, successive attempts by
a splinter group to unseat the Bourguiba and Ben Ali regimes in the late 1980s
and early 1990s caused a rift within the organization. It is precisely the
memory of these splits that might soon fuel internal controversy when statements
condoning political violence are made by party members and leaders. This time,
however, if internal reform is not embraced, the split could be more than
just temporary, given the range of other topics on which members internally
disagree.
Raphaël Lefèvre is visiting fellow at the Carnegie Middle East
Center. He is the author of Ashes of Hama: the Muslim Brotherhood in Syria (London,
Hurst, 2013).
This article is reprinted with
permission from Sada. It can be accessed
online at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/07/30/falling-out-among-brothers/ggtv