August 23, 2013
A Salafi
jihadi organization—self dubbed “the Salafi Jihadi Current”—has recently
proclaimed ‘war’ on the Egyptian armed forces in support of Mohamed Morsi.
Another Islamist group, Ansar Al-Sharia, has declared that it is a duty for
Egyptian Muslims to gather weapons and undergo military training to prepare for
the next potential confrontation in Egypt. Despite such extreme declarations
made by shadowy groups, it is unlikely that Egypt will witness a return to the
violent insurgency that plagued the country in the 1990s.
The
landscape of Egypt's militant and former militant organizations has evolved
significantly since the 1990s. Thus, the continued presence of actors that were
in the past involved in a protracted conflict with the state does not, in and
of itself, provide an accurate prediction for the direction that Egypt could
take. Tellingly, one of the movements that used to be at the forefront of the
violent opposition to the regime in Egypt, Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya (“Islamic
Group”), is in a fundamentally different situation today; it is highly unlikely
that the group will use violence again in the near future.
Politically,
the group currently leads the Construction and Development Party, which has
proven its political maturity and moderation in its positions for the past two
years. Building on their rejection of violence, which resulted from the group's
ideological revisions of the past decade, leaders of the group have
demonstrated their understanding of Egypt's political scene after the 2011
revolution. For example, not only did they condemn the call for violence from
the supporters of Salafi devotee Hazem Abu Ismail after the latter's
disqualification in last year's presidential elections, they also refused to
lend him or Mohamed Morsi their political support at the time, preferring to
back the more comprehensive platform of moderate candidate Aboul Fotouh.
Organizationally,
the group is a mere shadow of its 1980s self, when it enjoyed large popularity
across the country. Its limited popularity and strained resources today
seriously hinders a repetition of the contentious relationship with the state
that prevailed in the 1990s. Back then, Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya’s popularity as
a rebellious movement and the sympathy it enjoyed promoted it as an alternative
to the authoritarian state and encouraged many youths from the
lumpenproletariat to join it. In return, it facilitated a cycle of violence
with the security services that neither its leadership in prison nor abroad
desired at the time. The new generation of Egyptian militants has rejected
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya altogether—as confirmed by the leadership of the group,
whose mufti, Sheikh Abd Al-Akhr Hamad, acknowledges that it has failed to reach
out to the new generation, whom he contends have been socialized by “Sheikh
Google.” The group returning to its
belligerent past is therefore highly improbable according to these new
ideological, political, and organizational realities.
Likewise,
Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya’s main competitor in the 1990s, Egyptian Islamic Jihad,
is in no better shape. While pundits have often pointed out the vehement
preaching of some of its former leaders and members after the 2011 revolution,
they have not always successfully presented an accurate understanding of the
group or of its abilities to trigger an armed insurrection in present
circumstances. In reality, the large majority of its members has rejected any
use of violence after the revolution and has, for the most part, only been
concerned about the murky future of the group and its political survival. Even
if recent events prompt them to alter their views on the legitimacy of
violence, their resources and networks are even weaker than Al-Gama’a
Al-Islamiyya’s, and their pool of supporters is severely limited. Some Egyptian
Islamic Jihad leaders, including Osama Qassem, Ali Farag, and Magdi Salem,
recognize that they too have failed to forge the new generation of Egyptian
militants. On account of weak networks, no popular support, and little
resources, the Islamic Jihad does not have the ability to launch or sustain
armed attacks.
Nevertheless,
it is true that some of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad’s former leaders have been
more vocal since 2011, symbolizing a threatening Salafi jihadi trend in Cairo,
calling for jihad and waving Al-Qaeda flags. In doing so, they have managed to
attract many young Salafi jihadi militants. However, despite the hardline
positions of some of its leaders, the Salafi jihadi current becoming the next
insurgency in Egypt remains at best a remote prospect for several reasons. Most
importantly, internal theological and personal divisions have plagued this
movement since its emergence. The shared creed of its members, for instance on
the rejection of democracy and the political process, has not sufficed to
overcome ongoing rifts for the past two years. For example, the multiple cases
of mutual excommunication cases among the group’s sympathizers epitomizes the
nature of this current and illustrates its internal failure to unite its
members or create inclusive networks and structures that would allow for the
group’s further development.
In the
absence of a structured organization or developed networks, the Salafi jihadi
trend in Egypt is consequently likely to stay under the radar and await further
developments. Many of its members already have made their presence discreet.
During the ongoing crisis, they are likely to use the military coup to
propagate their message among sympathizing Salafis and denounce what they see
as illusory hopes of implementing Islamic law through engagement with the
democratic process.
Under the
current circumstances, an insurrection led by a well-organized armed group is
therefore highly unlikely. However, the absence of structured militant
organizations does not exclude the sporadic use of armed violence, which could
set off a new violent confrontation. The clashes that have been witnessed since
the military coup could unleash an uncontrolled spiral of violence. In similar
circumstances in the past, the use of force by various actors led to cycles of
violence that progressively legitimized the use of armed violence against
political opponents. This further led to the emergence of ‘entrepreneurs’ of
violence who fueled and proliferated the conflict.
The
current chaotic situation could also allow Islamist militants—who are more
prone to adopting violent views even if they have not used violence until
now—to promote their own agendas and use their antipathy toward the army as a
possible justification to target the armed forces with violent attacks. Some
members of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad have already expressed their anger, a few
months ago, at Mohamed Morsi for his failure to prosecute well-known officers
of the security services who were complicit in the use of torture against their
members. A deterioration of the security situation could provide a cover to
settle old scores.
Finally,
the opposition or the army could arrive at the view that they have a blank
check from the population to suppress Islamist movements and exclude them from
the political process; this development alone could trigger a violent reaction
among Islamist supporters who fear potentially facing the same repression they
experienced under past regimes.
This article is reprinted with
permission from Sada. It can be accessed
online at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/08/13/another-violent-islamist-insurgency-in-egypt/gi60
Jerome Drevon is a PhD candidate
in International Relations at Durham University. The article is based on
interviews with members of radical groups in Egypt.