September 05, 2013
While
Morsi made many mistakes that provoked a disillusioned and increasingly
impoverished population to challenge his legitimacy, the rapidly deteriorating
security situation in Sinai may have been the main impetus for his ouster. His
refusal to employ heavy-handed tactics to stop the increasing flow of arms and
militants into Sinai—and his seeming disinterest in avenging the deaths of
Egyptian soldiers—led the Egyptian military to join the ranks of his
detractors. With the tacit support of their wary Israeli and American military
counterparts, the Egyptian armed forces took matters into their own hands to
protect what they deemed was Egypt’s top national security priority.
Preserving
security in the Sinai Peninsula, particularly the eastern border with Israel,
is an integral component of Egypt’s treaty obligations. As a result, Egyptian
security forces during the Mubarak era employed a zero tolerance approach
against anyone they suspected of terrorism, including indigenous Bedouin
historically abused by the state and lacking recourse to the judiciary.
Although the state’s heavy-handed tactics are intended for alleged militants
who seek to support violent attacks against Israel from Gaza, Egypt’s Bedouin
often faced the brunt of these tactics. The state’s neglect of the region
through inadequate allocation of state resources towards the most basic
services has forced some Bedouin tribes to resort to serving as escorts in the
smuggling industry as a means of economic survival. As a consequence, Bedouin
were presumed to be criminals and traffickers, resulting in collective punishment through arbitrary arrest and
detention, followed by military trials pursuant to the three-decade-long
emergency law.
Shortly
after the 2011 revolution, an influx of anti-aircraft and anti-tank missiles from
Libya into Sinai began worsening the situation; this continued throughout Morsi’s presidency. Some
arms found their way into Gaza via underground tunnels, while others stayed in Sinai under the control of extremist groups
who viewed the Morsi regime’s Islamic interpretations as too lax. Along with arms came militants from abroad
with various political objectives ranging fromstaging attacks on Israel to
attacking Egyptian armed forces as part of their efforts to establish
an Islamic emirate in Sinai.
Morsi’s
response brought to the forefront his shift in foreign policy and national
security—a shift that left the United States and its key regional ally, Israel,
apprehensive about their geopolitical interests in
the region. As the Morsi regime’s relations with Hamas strengthened, smuggling
of goods and weapons from Sinai to Gaza intensified, thereby alarming Israel. Moreover, reports of self-proclaimed
jihadis from abroad regrouping in Sinai—with access to military grade arms
smuggled in from Libya and Sudan—suggested the early stages of a longer-term
problem for
the United States’ global counterterrorism strategy.
Meanwhile,
Morsi’s softer approach to dealing with the kidnappings and killings of
Egyptian soldiers in the Sinai through mediation with tribal chiefs, rather
than the standard military response, made him appear naïve and unfit to rule in
the eyes of his military. In stark contrast to the hardline stance of Mubarak, Morsi
tasked his regime with holding meetings with tribal elders to hear their
complaints and their ideas on how to end the bloodshed in the Sinai and the
Rafah crossing. Government representatives employed the unconventional tactic
of encouraging an intellectual and jurisprudential revision of the
interpretations of religious doctrine by extremists, who issued fatwas to
authorize killing innocent people. In November 2012, Morsi rejected outright
General el-Sisi’s request to crack down on alleged terrorists in Sinai, reportedly stating, “I don’t want Muslims to shed the
blood of fellow Muslims.”
The
military interpreted Morsi’s softer approach as evidence of his conflicted loyalties: between his sympathies with
extremist Islamist groups—notwithstanding his rejection of their use of
violence—and his obligations as President to preserve security in Sinai.
Suspicions arose as to whether Morsi and his Muslim Brotherhood backers had
ulterior plans for Sinai, perhaps in line with an external ideology that seeks
a pan-Islamic alliance across the Middle East—rather than pursuing Egypt’s
national security interests as laid out under the Camp David peace treaty.
Thus, Morsi’s policies in Sinai provided the military an opportunity to grant
the opposition explicit support in their efforts to oust him from the
presidency.
Although
Morsi eventually employed more aggressive tactics in Sinai—after it became
evident that mediations failed to co-opt extremist Islamist groups—it was too
little too late. Military leaders were in back door discussions with Morsi’s political
opposition—even as he was authorizing the flooding of smuggling tunnels between
Sinai and Gaza, bolstering cross-border interceptions of arms and migrants, and arresting
anyone suspected of participating in illegal trafficking. Although the time and
manner may not have yet been determined, the military had decided that Morsi was unfit to rule.
The
past two years have offered many lessons for Egyptians, who are slowly coming
out of the fog of decades of dictatorship. From prioritizing the economy to
learning how to build consensus in a burgeoning political space, future leaders
have much to take stock of as they reflect on Morsi’s fate. But perhaps the
most important lesson for future civilian presidents is to prioritize Sinai
within Egypt’s national security agenda. That is, if Egypt’s military ever
cedes power back to a civilian government.
This article is reprinted with permission from
Sada. It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/08/20/sinai-s-role-in-morsi-s-ouster/gjdr
Sahar Aziz is an associate professor at Texas A&M University
School of Law, where she teaches national security and Middle East law. She is
also a member of the Egyptian American Rule of Law Association and a fellow at
the Institute for Social Policy and Understanding.