November 03, 2013
Will Egypt’s
political scene remain as violent and hollow as it is now—violence on a popular
level that portends fighting, the extent of which no one can predict, and
hollowness on an elites level that portends the exclusion and discarding of
some of the wise, who might otherwise be able to extract the nation from its
crisis?
There are
two factions attempting to impose a solution on the crisis: one that prefers
the Muslim Brotherhood’s survival over the survival of Egypt; another that
prefers the vanquishing of the Brotherhood, even if that leads to Egypt’s
destruction. Both factions participated, during the month of Ramadan, in political
and ethical vice; both ‘fasted’ from prioritizing the interests of a nation.
Instead, they moaned from injury. Egyptian elites had all imagined that they were
pious enough to be compelled to reconsider the mistakes of their governance and
refrain from shocking practices. Elites had also imagined that they were highly
committed to the principles of liberalism, be they tolerance of the other,
equality of citizens, and the realization of a nation of law—only to abandon
these principles at the first juncture. Two fig leaves have fallen, those of
religion and liberalism.
At the
same time, some of the leadership in political Islam resorted to investing in
party discipline. Such Islamists perpetuated a “receive-and-obey” approach,
pushing youth to commit acts characterized by a great deal of violence, and
exposing them to undue risk out of a martyr-based rhetoric that confused jihad, or striving against the enemy,
with the divergence of opinion among compatriots. The opposing faction’s
elites, on the other hand, worked to consolidate hatred between supporters of
the two, driving a wedge between the factions, and generalizing blame for the
mistakes of the leadership. The cost is that a reconciliation process is even
more difficult.
The
Brotherhood has no doubt failed miserably in the administration of the state.
The Brothers engaged in exclusionary practices, undertook unnecessary battles
with numerous strata of Egyptian society, and, for the first time in their
history entered into a confrontation with the people—or at least the majority
of people—as opposed to being limited strictly to the ruler. Still, there
remains a pressing question: Hasn’t the result of this practical experiment
been enough? Enough for the Brotherhood, whose irresponsible actions on the
Egyptian street increased the hostility directed at them? And enough for the
other faction, who, unless motivated by the desire for revenge, had no need to
direct more blows to a group that had already proved itself incapable of
administering the state?
A number
of exceptional personalities have accepted a leadership positions at a time
when public offices are a liability. The
practice of intellectual terrorism and blackmail directed at these
personalities, simply because they suggested initiatives for resolving the
crisis and avoiding bloodshed, is astounding. It would seem to indicate that revenge
on the Brotherhood comes before the country’s interests, and before its safety
and integrity. It also demonstrates that there is an inability among many to
organize their priorities, and that the appetite for revenge supersedes the
nobility of justice; that controlling institutions in the short term is
preferred to stability in the long run, and lastly, that there is an
inclination towards reactionary and reckless action. Brotherhoodization of the
state’s apparatuses may not have succeeded. Will the same remain true when it
comes to Brotherhoodization of the liberals?
In some
circles of elites, the matter has escalated to the ‘moral assassination’ of a
number of personalities who have played a patriotic role, reaching its apex
when personalities such as Mohamed ElBaradei were accused of treachery by the
very same people who fought alongside him in the same ‘trench.’ That some would
even accuse him of being part of a Brotherhood sleeper cell is no longer
inconceivable. The issue, however, was not limited only to ElBaradei, but
included a number of other respected personalities like Amr Hamzawy who was
accused by one member of the media—in a futile attempt to characterize him as a
remnant of Mubarak's regime—of being Gamal Mubarak's friend.
It is a
strange thing when the political elite, along with some media outlets, attacks
political initiatives, not as a result of their objection to the content of the
initiatives but for the sake of refusing them, as though the suggestion of
initiatives to resolve a national crisis is itself an act of treason. It
becomes even stranger, when an attack such as that against the ‘Third Square’
initiative is launched—an initiative that did not espouse violence, so far as I
am aware—without so much as an attempt to understand what this Square was
calling for. All this represents a chain of rigidity in prescribing the
conditions of a possible resolution, and the refusal of any suggestion, without
even knowing what ideas it may contain, that would neutralize, or even appear
to neutralize that particular resolution. Everyone is contributing to charting a
course of fascist ideology, and Egyptian society is rapidly sliding down it.
The only things agreed upon by the two sides is a preference that both sides
lose, rather than that they both win.
Instead
of searching for a framework within which both sides can emerge as winners (if
only relatively), each faction is striving to ensure that the other loses
everything, even at the cost of emerging themselves from the battle
empty-handed. It may be useful that we not limit ourselves to diagnosing the case,
without analyzing the trauma. It may
also be useful to delve deeply into understanding these practices, in light of
the prevailing values, which are not adequately supported in the raising and
upbringing of child (forgiveness, respect for the other, objectiveness, relying
on facts as opposed to impressions, and precision in ascertaining verified information). The disappearance of these values results in
deviant practices, which contribute to the inability to reach a consensus, and,
in turn leads to a deeply complicated political scene.
In order
that my message not appear unfounded, I would ask my readers to allow me to
share with them the results derived from a global poll, carried out in Egypt in
2008— that included a question about the values on which Egyptians raise their
children. In it, the values of forgiveness, tolerance of the other, imagination
and inventiveness came in at a relatively low ranking, while the value of obedience
came in relatively highly ranked (in Egyptian society as compared to others).
Perhaps we should not look towards the negative phenomena revealed by the
political scene, without exploring the cultural and societal reasons underlying
it, so that we might change our reality, if only over the long term. This would
lead us to a conclusion that, in essence, that we need a cultural revolution to
re-establish the human values that govern Egyptian society.
Magued Osman is the CEO and
managing director of the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research, Baseera.
This article originally appeared in Al-Shorouk.