November 24, 2013
For so long, Egyptians were complacent and passive. They
were described by many historians and scholars, such as Nazih Ayubi, of the
University of Exeter, and Gamal Hamdan, author of The Personality of Egypt, as a tolerant, risk-averse people who
loved settling down in their agrarian communities beside the Nile.
Egyptians, as the world knows, are no longer settling down.
In 2011, they rose up in the January 25 Revolution to end the thirty-year rule
of President Hosni Mubarak. Another wave of the Revolution erupted last June
30, due to the failed governing practices and the alienating policies of
Mubarak’s successor, Mohammed Morsi. Millions took to the streets once again,
declaring their opposition to Muslim Brotherhood rule and calling for expedited
presidential elections.
After just a few days, the armed forces intervened and
declared its support for the people’s demands. For the second time in less than
three years, an Egyptian ruler was ousted and placed in prison. The military
called on the head of the Supreme Constitutional Court to step in as interim
president. Overthrowing a government that was headed by the first
democratically elected president, and the configuration of another, did not
occur smoothly. Strong resistance by Muslim Brotherhood supporters and by
proponents of political Islam resulted in demonstrations and strikes all over
Egypt. The turmoil reached a tragic peak when security forces cleared
demonstrators from the Rabaa El-Adawiya and Nahda square protests in Cairo,
resulting in hundreds of deaths and injuries.
These events led to a long debate about whether what
happened was a new Revolution, a second wave of the Revolution, or a military
coup d’etat. Different political scientists, historians, international experts
and even foreign governments took sides with either one view or the other. Even
within Egyptian families, brothers and sisters, cousins and siblings stopped
speaking to one another, as proponents of opposing views stuck to their side of
the puzzling struggle. Only a few, it seems, managed to come to an
understanding that it is not ‘either/or,’ and that perhaps we need to add new
terms and concepts to our political science dictionaries.
When there are massive citizen movements and demands, which
are then supported by the armed forces and lead in turn to a civilian
government, it may be a new phenomenon. Only time will tell how the story will
unfold, and only history—depending on who gets to write the history books—will
perhaps reveal the true intentions of the different parties involved.
At present, what is of major concern to the Egyptian citizen
is a need to realize the January 25 demands for better quality of life,
freedom, human dignity and social justice. People on the street, who may not be
politicized, are worried about the rising inflation rate, the difficulty of
finding a job, the deteriorating health and educational services, and the
general difficulty of making ends meet.
There are two main prerequisites for achieving the demands
of the Revolution: first, security on the streets, and second, the ability to
listen to one another, accept differences in opinions and reach a compromise
for the common good. The two prerequisites are interrelated and overlapping. If
we cannot have dialogue, if we cannot talk to one another and we remain
polarized, then violence and lack of security will predominate, and vice versa.
With more violence, people become even more polarized, and the security
situation deteriorates with negative ramifications on the economic situation
and citizens’ quality of life.
This is not a preacher’s call for peace and harmony, but
rather a note that we need to deal with the root causes of our problems and
come up with sustainable solutions for the benefit of all. Undoubtedly, this
will require a reconciliation process, perhaps one that is unique to Egypt and
its circumstances. But there are models that are worth examining.
After its long history of apartheid and racial injustice,
South Africa established a reconciliation process that worked on integrating
all society members, black and white, oppressors and oppressed. The process
incorporated many elements and was by no means assured of success. A key factor
was the high quality of leadership exhibited by principal figures, notably
Nelson Mandela, leader of the African National Congress, and F.W. De Klerk, the
white president who opened the door to a democratic transition by releasing
Mandela from prison. Other important elements were the inclusion of all major
parties in negotiations for a new constitution, and the commitment of these
groups to the rule of law during the political transition. The Truth and
Reconciliation Commission established in 1995 after the abolition of apartheid
rule required the transgressors who were proven guilty, and who confessed to
their crimes and transgressions, to request amnesty in a public hearing.
No system is perfect, but if the South Africans have
succeeded to a large extent in overcoming such a major hurdle in their
transition to democracy, why can’t Egyptians? It does not have to be a replica
of other countries’ experiences, but we can come up with our own mechanism for
airing grievances, ensuring transparency and implementing transitional justice.
The goal is a greater degree of democracy and the protection of the society’s
cohesion. We remain hopeful for a better future.
Laila El Baradei is
the acting dean of the School of Global Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in
Cairo.