Issue #6, Fall 2007

Restore Trust in America’s Leadership

No foreign policy decision since America’s retreat into isolationism in the 1930s has done more to harm American and global security than the Iraq war. The invasion and incompetently executed occupation have devastated Iraq and unleashed a civil war that has killed tens of thousands and displaced millions. Iraq has become a recruiting cause and training ground for a new generation of terrorists–young men bent on the suicidal destruction of Americans and Iraqis alike. The balance of power within the Middle East has shifted dramatically in favor of the most radical and extremist elements in the region–led by a newly confident Iran. But what has made the war a blunder of truly historic proportions is that it has cost America the trust of its friends and allies around the world–a trust that since 1945 has been instrumental in translating America’s economic and military power into global influence and leadership.

The overarching challenge confronting the United States after Iraq, therefore, is to restore trust in American leadership. The world needs good reason to once again place its confidence in America’s power, policy, and purposes. That will require broad changes in how Washington conducts foreign policy, especially in its willingness to listen to others and practice what it preaches. But to succeed in rebuilding trust, Washington must first contain the problems that the Iraq war has unleashed: the rising violence inside Iraq, the renewed confidence of a newly ambitious Iran, and the ideological gains made by the jihadist terrorist network. Before we build a new house, we have to put out the fire burning down the old one. If we don’t, whatever rebuilt trust we enjoy elsewhere will be moot in the Middle East: Even a well-behaved Washington that is once again trusted by friends and allies around the world will have trouble attracting followers if the region spirals into greater instability and violence.

The first and most immediate task facing the United States in the Middle East is to minimize bloodshed within Iraq, provide help to those caught in the crossfire, and prevent instability within the country from spilling across its borders. As much as Americans might wish otherwise, the departure of American soldiers and Marines will likely trigger more fighting, at least in the short term. The flame of sectarian and ethnic warfare has been lit. As the sad histories of the Balkans, Afghanistan, Rwanda, and Sudan show, fires like these are difficult to extinguish and often produce staggering death tolls. Trying to prevent that outcome is not only a moral obligation, but a strategic necessity: American interests can only be harmed if we leave behind an Iraq that collapses into the sort of communal violence that wracked Lebanon in the 1980s and Bosnia in the 1990s.

To avoid that nightmare, any U.S. troop withdrawal must be accompanied by a major, Dayton-like effort that would bring all the parties to the table to negotiate a settlement on key political issues: sharing oil revenue, distributing power between the central government and local political entities, and ensuring a monopoly over the means of violence by abolishing militias–within a fixed timetable (say, one month). At the same time, Washington must be prepared to do everything to help Iraqis caught in the full-scale civil war that will ensue should the peace effort fail; American and other international forces still in the country could establish safe havens inside Iraq to provide security, shelter, and safe transit abroad for those who want to leave.

Washington will also need to take steps to keep Iraq’s problems within its borders. Talk that Iraq’s troubles will trigger a regional war is overblown; none of the half-dozen civil wars the Middle East has witnessed over the past half-century led to a regional conflagration. But obvious flashpoints exist. Therefore, Washington will need to maintain substantial troops in northern Iraq to reassure the Turks and deter the Kurds from declaring independence. Elsewhere, the United States will need to use diplomatic tools–as well as the continued presence of troops in the Gulf region–to persuade Iraq’s neighbors to limit their efforts to manipulate the Iraqi civil war to their own ends.

The second challenge the United States faces is to contain Iran’s ambitions and redirect its aspirations. Four years after U.S. troops entered Baghdad, Tehran has emerged the big winner. Saddam Hussein is dead, the limits of American power have been revealed, and Iran’s co-religionists dominate Iraq’s government. It is not surprising, then, that Iran is keen to flex its muscles. The problem is that the government of Mahmoud Ahmadinejad seeks regional domination, intends to acquire nuclear weapons, and supports terrorists.

The Bush Administration’s policy of working with European allies to press for U.N. sanctions against Iran needs to continue. Iran should pay a price for breaking its obligations under the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty. But a policy based solely on coercion is guaranteed to fail. Too many countries–led by China and Russia–want economic relations with Tehran for isolation to work. Military strikes are unlikely to end Iran’s nuclear program. They will, however, enrage Iranians, who can easily retaliate against U.S. interests in the region.

As distasteful as it is, then, the United States has to complement its policy of sticks by offering Tehran some substantial carrots. First, there needs to be an unconditional offer to reestablish full diplomatic relations. If the United States could restore diplomatic ties with the Soviet Union 15 years after the October Revolution, it can restore them with Iran 28 years after the Islamic Revolution. Second, Washington should offer to normalize economic ties if Tehran limits its nuclear program and halts support for terrorist groups. Such an offer won’t succeed in buying off Ahmadinejad. Rather, its purpose would be to exploit divisions within Iran and encourage the opposition. The Administration’s open hostility to Iran has enabled Ahmadinejad to deflect domestic criticism of his government’s many missteps and to silence pro-American voices. Supplementing the closed fist with an open hand can help reverse that dynamic.

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Issue #6, Fall 2007
 
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Mike M.:

You argue that "The first and most immediate task facing the United States in the Middle East is to minimize bloodshed within Iraq." While I agree that's an important goal, is it really the first and foremost goal? For many of us, the first and foremost goal is the removal of US troops from harm's way, in the quickest way possible. Bringing our troops to safety has the added benefit of reducing the amount of money wasted on an occupation. I'd say your goal would come third and would better be described as "What can we do to minimize bloodshed now that we're gone?" We should do our best at that, but our troops should not be expected to ever return.



You say we have a moral obligation to the Iraqi people. Sure. But the American government also has a moral obligation to the American people. The obligation of the American government to the American people must be met first. You can't talk about the obligations that the American people have regarding Iraq without reference to the context of the Iraq war. A lot of Americans rightly feel misled both in the sense of being lied to and in the sense of being led badly. Given that, Americans have a right to call for an end of the occupation as priority one with everything else as secondary to that. Any moral obligation that America has towards Iraq can be dealt with after the troops come home.

Sep 10, 2007, 9:01 AM
tecumseh:

Der Krieg ist Kaput!!! It's time to quit throwing good (borrowed) money after bad and put the imperial neo-con project to bed forever! If we have a "moral obligation" it's to stop killing Iraqis and stop creating refugees. Violently or otherwise, the Iraqis must be allowed to resolve their own problems. Declare victory and get out now-- this will guarantee that we at least will do no more harm. As an added bonus, we will save a bundle of money and contain the exponentially rising opportunity costs of the War and Occupation. The U.S. Empire is no longer sustainable and is doomed to crash like subprime mortgages. Maybe ending the insipid perpetual wars of Moron W. Bush could even save the U.S. dollar from collapse (if we're lucky). On the other hand, maybe the contributors to "Democracy" revel in the prospect of, inter alia, America's poor children crashing into Third- World status in a vain attempt to sustain Der Krieg. But SCHIP can only fund 3 or 4 months worth of Amerika's Imperial Adventures, so again, how is the game to be extended? How long will Chinese and Japanese central banks continue to fund Amerika's Empire? One thing is certain: Amerika's kept classes will not allow an increase in their taxes to fund the Empire and it's perpetual wars. Eventually, as Fred Astaire once said, something's gotta give!

Dec 9, 2007, 2:42 AM

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