December 19, 2012
The
nature and speed of events in Egypt continue to take precedence in my mind over
all other significant -- even historic -- political dynamics across the region,
including noteworthy developments in Syria, Kuwait, Tunisia, Libya, Yemen,
Bahrain and others. The first round of the constitutional referendum last week
was a perfect microcosm of everything Egyptian -- it was majestic in scale,
profound in meaning and consequence, erratic and messy in implementation,
unpredictable in outcome, and entertaining in every respect. Four critical
aspects of the first round stand out.
First
is the continued weak political performance of the Muslim Brotherhood in
office. They seem to have panicked and resorted to thuggery at the highest and
lowest levels of national politics, which are presidential action and street
fighting. By trying to ram through a widely contested and rather crude draft
constitution the Muslim Brotherhood has revealed some of its structural
weaknesses and political immaturity. Astoundingly, President Mohammed Morsi and
his colleagues in the Islamist movements have simultaneously deeply damaged the
credibility of their movement among many in the country, and also momentarily
weakened the standing and power of the Egyptian presidency.
This
child-like, tantrum-based performance clarifies many aspects of the Muslim
Brotherhood, and therefore weakens it in future political contests. This is not
new, as its support among the public has been dropping steadily from its high
point in late 2011, when it won around 38% of votes in the parliamentary
election. The referendum aftermath will probably see the Muslim Brotherhood’s
support shrink to its core supporters, perhaps around 25% or so of the
population.
Second,
many opposition, progressive, nationalist and secular parties in Egypt have
started to work together to offer voters a credible alternative to the
Islamists (both the Muslim Brotherhood and the more hardline Salafists). The
National Salvation Front that groups some of the leading opposition, mostly
non-Islamist, political forces achieved several significant milestones at once
in the past three weeks: they combined their forces into a single movement, at least
for now; politically and on the streets, they took a hard public position
against the constitutional draft, the rushed referendum and Morsi’s decree that
gave him unchallenged presidential powers; they forced the president to rescind
his power-grabbing decree; and they mobilized their supporters to vote against
the draft constitution in large numbers.
All of
these actions indicate that we are starting to see the creation of a political
system in Egypt that includes four main organized groups: the Muslim
Brotherhood, the Salafists, the secular opposition, and the old guard
Mubarak-National Democratic Party supporters and silent majority-type middle
class and lower income Egyptians who have yet to regroup and coalesce into a
single force. This will make the upcoming parliamentary elections much more
closely contested, and may see the Muslim Brotherhood lose its plurality.
Third,
Egypt is nearing or even starting to cross a threshold in the role of the armed
forces in public life, much sooner than may have been expected. The effective
non-role of the military that stayed in the background and repeated its desire
to work only in the realm of preserving national security is significant and
augurs well for the continued development of a rule of law-based pluralistic
democracy in Egypt. This may be a temporary mirage, but my guess is that it is
a real reflection of the new social contract that allows the military to
preserve its perks and economic activity, and control of the defense ministry,
if it stays out of direct politics.
Fourth,
the narrow majority of 57 percent “yes” ballots in the first round, combined
with the intense contestation taking place and the very public protests of the
referendum process by many judges, all indicate that this is only the beginning
of a much more complex and drawn out political process. The deep divisions in
the country and the need to adopt a constitution that garners a much larger
national consensus suggest that the referendum in fact marks the beginning of
the process to define a credible constitution, rather than its
culmination.
Many
Egyptians voted “yes” because they want to move on with the process of
completing their national political and democratic reconfiguration, regardless
of flaws in the draft they were offered. Because of the flawed content and
procedure of this referendum, Egyptians will now slowly and democratically
refine their national consensus on key issues that remain vague in the current
constitutional draft, related to personal liberties, the role of religion and
the military in state affairs, protection of minorities and other key matters.
These
historic developments in the past three weeks may mark this as the most
important single moment in the political transformation of the past two years
in Egypt (following the transfer of military rule to the elected civilian
authorities last summer) because of three critical things at once: This moment
started to redress some of the exaggerated pro-Islamist imbalances that defined
2011-12, it gave birth to a more balanced political infrastructure, and it
moved the country towards the constitutional anchorage it needs to continue the
process of normal state-building.
Rami
G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares
Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American
University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon. You can follow him @ramikhouri.
Copyright
© 2012 Rami G. Khouri -- distributed by Agence Global