January 05, 2013
After three days in Amman enjoying a New Year’s
break with friends, talking politics with a wide range of Jordanians and other
analysts, and reading every parliamentary election poster in sight, I am
convinced that if you want to visit only one country to gain insights into the
many forces that are shaping our region, Jordan is the country to visit. This
is because every single important political, religious, economic, ideological,
cultural and civic element from across the Arab world is present and active in
the country -- including pan-Arab nationalists, narrow Jordanian state
nationalists, Muslim Brotherhood mainstream Islamists, more hard-line
Salafists, tribal and ethnic forces, private sector globalists, civil society
and human rights activists, a deep security and intelligence system, a
parliament with limited credibility, thugs who beat up demonstrators, Arabs who
engage or shun coexistence with Israel, monarchists and republicans, vocal
youth activists, digital dynamism, refugees from other countries, severe
economic stress and social disparities, fervent social entrepreneurs, Arab and
foreign powers that meddle in local affairs, constitutional adjustments, a few
home-grown terrorists, and a coffee shop and café culture jamboree.
The country also is passing through what is
probably a defining moment in its history since its establishment 90 years ago
in the wake of World War One. All the elements that shape and define the
well-being of the state are now in motion and will either reconfigure the country
politically and economically or see the existing system persist with increasing
tensions and vulnerabilities. Jordan is not facing an existential threat and
the monarchy is not going anywhere; the majority of Jordanians complains
vigorously, but they get on with their lives and look to a better future
through gradual, real reforms and better economic conditions. Nevertheless, the
monarchy -- along with its key support systems of the political-corporate
elite, the security services, and foreign donors -- is certainly facing its
most serious challenge ever, even more serious than the plots of the 1950s and
60s or the brief clash with Palestinian guerrillas in 1970.
This is because Jordan’s problem today is that
three critical groups in the country have been slowly losing faith in the
capacity of the ruling elite to manage the country efficiently and equitably,
and they are speaking out to demand significant changes in the political and
economic management systems. These groups are the tens of thousands of Islamists
who tend to be disproportionately of Palestinian origin and live in a few large
urban areas; the marginalized rural Transjordanians in places like Tafileh and
Maan, who dangerously mirror the same sentiments of vulnerability and fear that
we saw in rural Tunisia, Egypt and Syria in early 2011; and -- perhaps the most
troubling danger sign that the regime must grasp soon -- the thousands of
educated, dynamic, creative and loyal young professionals from both East and
West Bank lineage who have been disappointed by the lack of political reform
and economic advances during the last dozen years of King Abdullah II’s reign.
The result of the economic disparities and the
parallel political discontent that ripple through the country is mainly evident
in a newfound willingness by young and adult alike to speak their mind in
public, including most notably crossing former red lines: criticizing aspects
of the royal family’s rule and the security services’ involvement in many
aspects of people’s lives. Critics and many independent analysts see the king
as out of touch and unresponsive, while others close to the monarchy offer much
counter-evidence to show that the king regularly meets with locals across the
country to be sure he understands the criticisms against him; this includes a
series of ongoing small gatherings with the demonstrators who take to the
street to challenge him to make real constitutional reforms that dilute the
monarchy’s powers.
The king and some elements in the ruling elite have
grasped the nature of citizens’ discontent, and are exploring the most
realistic and credible way to respond to populist demands. But they have yet to
find the key to moving the political system forward into a new balance of power
and responsibility between the parliament, the monarchy, the judiciary and the
cabinet.
The security system hovers above them all as the
ultimate guarantor of state stability, but even the security agencies are
facing unprecedented calls by some citizens to refrain from interfering in
areas that are not deep security issues (i.e., education, media, and social
media) and even to have security budgets scrutinized by the elected parliament.
So this is a good month for the visitor who might
visit Jordan to gain insights into sentiments across much of the Arab world,
because the parliamentary elections at the end of January have generated public
discussions that highlight the very deep demands for reform -- while
simultaneously clarifying the weaknesses and constraints that still hamper the
Jordanian system’s capacity to undertake real reforms.
Reform demands and obstacles in Jordan
If, as I noted earlier, Jordan is the one country
that best captures the many contradictory political, social, religious and
cultural sentiments that swirl throughout the Arab World, now is the best time
to visit Jordan as these sentiments are expressed in public during the
month-long run-up to the parliamentary elections at the end of January. Despite
the fact that the Islamic Action Front (Muslim Brotherhood party) and others
are boycotting the elections, I found myself on a visit to Amman last week
captivated by slogans and messages on the thousands electioneering posters on
almost every tree and electricity pole of the main cities.
The slogans provide a fascinating window into the
minds of candidates, and through them into the mindsets of the citizenry,
judging by how candidates emphasize issues that they believe voters care about.
My unscientific analysis of the candidates’ slogans reveals a few dominant
themes that capture the mood in Jordan, and probably in other Arab countries.
These include: affirming the citizen’s right to speak out and shape national
policies; a massive demand for (unspecified) “reform” and “change”; a desire
for Jordanian national unity and cohesion; greater freedom, democracy and
dignity; citizen rights; social justice; women’s rights; a free media; fighting
corruption; supporting the Palestine issue; and a prevalent call for citizens
to participate in elections and public life if they want to bring about real
change.
So why has no Arab country been able to implement
serious and credible political reforms that respond to these obvious demands?
Despite some reforms and greater public liberties in countries like Jordan and
Morocco, core grievances remain strong and widespread (mostly about corruption,
abuse of power, inequitable opportunities for under-represented citizens, poor
socio-economic conditions, and security sector dominance of the executive and
legislative branches).
Jordan is grappling with these issues once again,
after the missed opportunity of the first attempt a decade ago to bring about
comprehensive reform from the top -- through the National Agenda process that
King Abdullah initiated but then apparently abandoned due to strong opposition
from some Jordanian quarters. Now, the demands for change are emanating more
from the grassroots, driven by three simultaneous forces: sustained economic
stress especially among marginalized provincial populations, the spillover
political momentum of the uprisings in other Arab countries, and citizens’
declining confidence in the king’s and the power elite’s seriousness to bring
about real change.
In response to calls for substantive constitutional
reforms, my impression is that King Abdullah understands the need to slowly
change the system into a constitutional monarchy in which parliament and the
cabinet run the government, and the monarch remains above day-to-day politics
and is mainly responsible for safeguarding the integrity of the state
(including the non-political status of the armed forces, judiciary and
religious institutions). Yet he has been unable to respond to the demands for
such political reforms because a more representative and empowered parliament
is the center of gravity of the apparently unbridgeable gap between the two
most powerful populist forces in the country whose demands are diametrically
opposed to one another (Transjordanian tribalists-nationalists, and
Islamists-Palestinians).
Some powerful Transjordanians reject a fully
representative parliament that might see Islamists and Jordanians of
Palestinian origin dominate the political-economic system, especially since the
Muslim Brotherhood’s base is disproportionately among Palestinian-Jordanians.
The Muslim Brotherhood and other leftist or Arab nationalist opposition groups,
on the other hand, seek a fully representative parliament that would satisfy
citizen demands for equality and credible accountability.
The new election law aimed to make incremental
progress on this issue, by expanding the number of seats to 150, including 27
seats elected by national lists, alongside primarily tribal local district
candidates. The 27 national list seats seem to be an attempt to achieve two
goals: to prod the development of political parties that are not based on local
tribal or religious affiliations, and indirectly to redress the chronic
structural imbalance that has always favored rural tribal districts and
pro-government MPs who are elected on the basis of tribal loyalty.
This election will probably not tell us anything
new about Jordan’s capacity to change in response to citizen demands. King
Abdullah will soon have to accept the limits of his ability to prod gradual
reforms from above, given the sharp differences between the two main political
groups in the country. Bold leadership will be required in the near future to
override the narrow provincial concerns of both tribalists and Islamists. And
instead, it must harness the untapped power of those millions of Jordanians who
have gone well beyond Transjordanian-tribal-Palestinian-Islamist identities,
and instead desperately seek the comforts and duties of equal citizenship under
the rule of law that is equitably applied to all, which has been the key
driving force of the Arab uprisings in the past two years.
Rami G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The
Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares Institute for Public Policy and
International Affairs at the American University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon.
You can follow him @ramikhouri.
Copyright © 2013 Rami G. Khouri -- distributed by
Agence Global