October 14, 2013
More than two and a half
years since the revolution, Tunisia still lacks a new constitution—and no one
seems to care. Although many agree on the document’s content, ongoing fights
are keeping Tunisia in transition, free of the old regime but not yet able to
focus on the reforms the country needs.
Progress on the
constitution, intermittent in the best of times, came to a screeching halt
following the assassination of opposition politician Mohamed Brahmi in July.
Sixty members of the National Constituent Assembly (NCA) withdrew and refused
to participate in further meetings. Capitalizing on the public’s anger, the
opposition seems less intent on improving the constitution’s text than
undermining the ruling Ennahda party ahead of post-constitution elections. As
the politicians fight, Tunisia goes without a constitution and continues a slow
decline.
The NCA, elected in October
2011 nine months after the fall of President Zine El-Abidine Ben Ali, is tasked
with drafting a constitution for Tunisia’s new political era. After elections,
Ennahda, an Islamic party who won close to 40 percent of seats, joined with the
next biggest winners the secular Congress for the Republic (CPR) and Ettakatol
parties to form a coalition. The agreement gave CPR the presidency, Ettakatol
the speakership of the NCA and Ennahda the prime ministry. The coalition had
announced that the assembly’s work would take one year.
During the constitutional
drafting process, which officially started in February 2012, the major divide
has been between Ennahda and the secularists. The opposition is now led by the
secular Nidaa Tounes party, which does not control many NCA seats but benefits
from resources and individuals associated with the former regime. The role of
religion in society and the balance of powers in government both featured prominently
in assembly debates and will likely continue to in the future.
Article 141 of the drafted
constitution, which highlights the role of religion and was fiercely contested
in the assembly, is a useful example of a drafting debate. The article makes
multiple clauses in the constitution permanent and unchangeable, including
Islam as the “religion of the state,” the “civil nature” of the state, and the
“number and duration of presidential terms.” Ennahda has pushed for the
article, which the opposition rejects. While, according to reports, Article 141
is likely to be removed in a compromise by Ennahda, the conflicting arguments
over it illustrate the divide between the Islamist party and the opposition.
Cementing Islam’s place in
Tunisian society, a clear objective of Article 141, can be seen as both a
political move by Ennahda and a response to history. Ennahda is a religious
party, its popularity a reflection of the prominence of Islam in Tunisia. As it
relies on the religious for its voting base, Ennahda stands to benefit from
enshrining a permanent role for Islam in the constitution. Ennahda also invokes
a historical argument to give Islam special protection. As one Ennahda
politician said, both Habib Bourguiba and Ben Ali, two dictators who governed
the country for 55 years from its independence in 1956, “worked against Islam,”
restricting the wearing of the hijab and harassing the very pious. Thus,
according to Ennahda, Tunisia’s context makes a case for protecting Islam even
if such a need is counterintuitive given Tunisia’s religious demographics.
The opposition sees things
differently. To them, Islam, the dominant religion in Tunisia, needs no special
protection. Instead, Article 141, they argue, reveals Ennahda’s goal of
Islamizing the state. One opposition member, Salim Ben Abdessalem, stated that
the “aim of Ennahda was to give Islam a special status, to put Islam above the
constitution.” The opposition criticizes Ennahda’s Islam as fundamentalist,
ignoring the various levels and forms of belief present among Tunisia’s
Muslims. “They want to impose their vision of Islam, a rigid vision,”
Abdessalem said.
Half of the debates in the
assembly focused on the role of religion in the state. The issue is important
and will be a constant point of discussion in Tunisia. But for now, according
to analysts and assembly members, a consensus on the constitution’s text has
been reached. Since this summer, the debate has instead focused on process, the
how as opposed to the what. The protests following Brahmi’s assassination
reflect that focus. Crowds have not demanded amendments to articles, but rather
changes in the institutions that will produce the document. “The people in the
streets don’t know what’s in the constitution,” said Amine Ghali, an analyst associated
with the opposition. “But they know the process has been bad.”
When the June 2013 draft was
released, some assembly members threatened court action. After months of
working in their separate topic-based committees arguing over and drafting the articles
related to the judiciary, civil rights, municipal governments, and others, they
had sent their work to the drafting and writing committee, tasked with
organizing the written articles into one document and polishing the language.
When the draft was released, however, members said that the content had been
altered. Rather than specifying what exactly had been changed, assembly debate
revolved around the draft’s lack of credibility because of the committee’s
actions.
If the assembly has been
stalled since June, it completely went off the rails after Brahmi’s
assassination in July. The drafting process, though, seems to be unrelated to
the public outcry toBrahmi’s death, who like Chokri Belaid was gunned down in
front of his home. Outraged, the opposition accuses Ennahda of coddling
fundamentalist groups like Ansar Al-Sharia. The political rallies in Bardo
square seldom brought up the constitution, instead they call Ennahda a “gang”
and it’s leader an “assassin.” In July, the opposition demanded the dissolving
of the NCA and government. Since, civil society groups have stepped in to
mediate between the respective governing and opposition coalitions.
The roadmap that has emerged
from Tunisia’s largest labor union, the UGTT, for political talks is promising
as it offers calendar deadlines for finishing the constitution—one month from
the first session. It remains to be seen how these deadlines will be enforced
or if the meetings themselves will be successful. Some elements of the
opposition’s demands, like a committee of
experts to supervise the NCA, are present in the roadmap, but others, like the
call to abolish the NCA altogether, have been dropped.
The demand for this
unelected committee, opposition politicians say, comes from the public’s
opinion that the assembly has taken too long, and is hence illegitimate. But
the assembly’s self-imposed, non-legally binding deadline was up almost a year
ago and passed without much of a stir. After another assassination, however,
the opposition acknowledges it is harnessing a fed-up public to cover their
withdrawal and demands. The fervor over
abolishing the NCA makes the process an end in itself, rather than the means to
a constitution. Now, once the elections are planned and the constitution
finalized the opposition can claim to its supporters it was due to their
rebellion.
Tunisia limps on. Old regime
laws, often meant to protect the authorities rather than citizens, endure;
journalists face prosecution. Tunisia’s economy and infrastructure also
continue to suffer as much-needed reforms are impossible without a
constitutional framework. Further, the chaos of transition may be putting off
exactly the kind of people who may be able to help Tunisia, highly skilled,
individuals unwilling to enter what they see as a free-for-all, avoiding
government and civil society service. Tunisia’s transition, often cited as a
model, has taken its toll on the country. With the constitution effectively
agreed upon, the transition needs to end.
Robert Joyce is a story editor at Tunisia Live.