Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, Tehran, Feb. 16, 2013. Office of the Supreme Leader/Associated Press
July 20, 2013
In June 1989, Iran’s
ruling clerics were in a bind. Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini had just died, at
the age of eighty-six. Given the fractious politics in post-revolutionary Iran,
it was vital that a successor be named as soon as possible to avoid a dangerous
power vacuum.
But who could replace
the very symbol of the Iranian revolution?
One candidate was
already out of the running; Ayatollah Hossein-Ali Montazeri, once the Imam’s
designated successor. Khomeini effectively sacked Montazeri just three months
earlier, for speaking out against the regime’s brutal excesses and questioning
Khomeini’s reading of velayat-y faqih, which made clerics absolute rulers in Iran. But when the Council
of Experts met in the Iranian parliament building within hours of Khomeini’s
death, its members—all clerics—could not agree on a single individual to become
Iran’s next supreme leader.
One of those clerics
was Ali Khamenei, then forty-seven and sporting a black bushy beard, who had
served as Iran’s president since 1981. Khamenei was a Khomeini protégé during
the long struggle against Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. His underground activism
landed him in the shah’s prisons six times. Later, after the victory of the
revolution in 1979, he dutifully took up all the positions Khomeini instructed
him to assume. In the meeting of the Council of Experts, Khamenei, himself just
a mid-ranking cleric, spoke in favor of a council to replace Khomeini. But the
idea garnered only a small number of votes.
Ali Akbar Hashemi
Rafsanjani, a Khomeini confidante who had become the powerful speaker of the
Iranian parliament, or Majles, stepped in. He lived next door to Khomeini and
had sat at his deathbed; he informed the Council of Experts that Khomeini’s
last wish had been for Khamenei to succeed him. According to Rafsanjani’s
memoir, Reconstruction and Development, Khamenei objected to this idea. He protested that he had run for
president only because Khomeini himself asked him to. He’d lost the use of his
right arm in a terrorist explosion in 1981 and complained that official
responsibilities tired him. He adored music and poetry, and preferred a task
that would allow him more private time.
The prospect of
appointing Khamenei was appealing for other reasons. Many members of the
Council of Experts hoped to distance the regime from Khomeini’s hardline
policies—his persistence in dragging out the war with Iraq for eight years, his
anti-Western rhetoric, and his uncompromising attitude toward dissidents—that
had isolated the country. Many clerics including Rafsanjani had come to believe
that Iran needed more of a ceremonial supreme leader, and that steering the
country in a new direction should be left to pragmatic politicians.
Khamenei was certainly
known for his non-confrontational style. As president, he had allowed Khomeini
to handpick his prime minister, Mir-Hossein Moussavi, who was responsible for
the day-to-day affairs of the country. Khomeini once embarrassed Khamenei with
a public lashing, accused him of being unaware of the principles of the regime
and interfering in matters that did not concern him. Khamenei bowed in silence
and never questioned Khomeini’s authority again.
And on that fateful day
in June, members of the Council of Experts cast their ballots to choose
Khomeini’s successor: Khamenei was elected overwhelmingly, with sixty votes out
of a possible seventy-four.
Faith in the Almighty
For a quarter century, nobody has wielded
more power in Iran than Khamenei, now seventy-five years old. Compared with
Khomeini, or with Iranian politicians such as Mohammad Khatami and Mahmoud
Ahmadinejad, Khamenei receives very little attention outside Iran. Even inside
the country, though his portrait is plastered in offices and on billboards
everywhere, he operates discreetly, usually far from public view. Yet Iranian
presidents and parliaments have come and gone while his reign continues—and it
has been an autocratic reign.
There is no case to be
made that Khamenei rose to the top out of ambition; clearly he was initially
chosen because he was considered a relatively weak figure, not a strong one.
But the office he assumed was already an extremely powerful one, and it remains
so. Before his death, Khomeini ordered a revision of the Iranian constitution
in order to cement the authority of the supreme leader of Iran. It mandated
Khomeini’s successor to safeguard the Islamic revolution, and gave him alone
the final word on matters of state. To ensure regime survival at any cost, Khamenei has repressed dissent at home and isolated Iran in the international community.
Fearing the loss of his power, he has even gone to extraordinary lengths to
sideline erstwhile allies. The burden Khamenei carried and the power he
inherited would transform the poetry-loving mullah into one of the age’s
enduring authoritarian rulers.
Khamenei began his rule
in 1989 with a typically humble statement: “I am an individual with many faults
and shortcomings. I am truly a minor seminarian. However, a responsibility has
been placed on my shoulders and I will use all my capabilities and all my faith
in the almighty in order to be able to bear this heavy responsibility.”
Khamenei declined to move into the modest home/office where Khomeini had lived
since returning to Iran to lead the revolution. Khomeini had simply addressed
supporters from his balcony, above the small backyard where they gathered.
Khamenei moved into an extensive compound in downtown Tehran, close to both
parliament and the president’s office. He hired a large staff and set up a
modern bureaucracy to monitor the works of government ministries.
In
recognition of his position as supreme leader, senior clerics in Qom had little
choice but to elevate him from a mid-rank cleric to a senior one, making him an
ayatollah. But Khamenei became wary that he might never command the respect of
his peers—traditionally, the criteria for becoming a marjah is wide acknowledgement and respect for a
cleric’s scholarly work and wisdom, not the assumption of political power.
Khamenei began to dismiss senior clerics who had been close to Khomeini,
including those in powerful positions in the regime—and replace them with
mid-ranking clerics loyal to himself.
Khamenei shared
Khomeini’s distrust of the army, which had rebelled against the previous
ruler—the shah—and sided with the people. Khomeini had founded the Iranian
Revolutionary Guard Corps, an ideological force that was loyal to him and whose
mission was to protect the revolution. Khamenei called the army and the
Revolutionary Guards the two wings of the regime, but he invested heavily in the
latter and expanded its militia, the Basij. He appointed their commanders and shuffled them regularly. Soon
he surrounded himself with a network of petty clerics and Revolutionary Guards
commanders—none with any notable revolutionary background.
Two
ideological positions guided Khamenei from the beginning. Though paying lip
service to freedom of thought, he has resisted demands for political and social
liberties. He believes that permitting dissent, even limited dissent, amounts
to the collapse of the revolution. He argued that the notion of freedom in
Islam was different than that of the West. Islam favors protecting individuals
not only from one another, but also from themselves and from society, he
argued. In November 1991 he said: “Freedom doesn’t mean that one person,
perhaps an influential orator, should be free to misguide an entire society.”
Secondly,
Khamenei has fiercely opposed improving relations with the United States.
Washington severed diplomatic ties in 1979, after Islamist students attacked
the American embassy in Tehran, and held diplomats hostage with the backing of
the Iranian regime. Khamenei has consistently repudiated rapprochement with the
United States, and used animosity toward Washington as a tool to bolster his
regime’s popularity. Dismissing talks with America as naïve, he has blocked any
effort that could possibly lead to reconciliation. “Negotiation in political
terms means a deal,” he said in May 1990. “It means compromise; it means that
you need to give something to get something else in return. What do you want to
give away from the Islamic revolution? The United States wants your loyalty to
the revolution. It wants your pride. Are you willing to give it away?”
Unholy Alliances
Domestic power politics, as much as
ideology, have shaped Khamenei’s autocratic rule. Rising public discontent
after the destructive war with Iraq, and new domestic political and economic
challenges, led Khamenei into a close alliance with Rafsanjani, who had
succeeded Khamenei as president of Iran. As Rafsanjani wrote in his memoir, “We
made important decisions together.”
Together they faced an
emerging campaign led by Islamist intellectuals who had become disillusioned
with the course of the revolution even before Khomeini’s death. With Khamenei
in power, they became increasingly vocal in criticizing the regime for the lack
of political and social liberties. They launched new publications, circulated
treatises about democracy and Islam, and condemned the regime’s suppression of
dissidents. They allied with Montazeri, under virtual house arrest in Qom,
whose liberal tendencies made him a symbolic threat to Khamenei’s rule. In a
speech in February 1996, Khamenei lashed back. “They have intentions to harm
the system,” he declared. “They are the enemy.” Other opponents criticized
Rafsanjani’s government for corruption, mismanagement, and soaring inflation.
At one point, the clash
with domestic opponents even entangled Khamenei in questions about the murky
death of Khomeini’s son, Ahmad. He died in mysterious circumstances in 1995 at
the age of forty-nine, a week after giving a public speech accusing Khamenei
and Rafsanjani of misrule. Iranian newspapers reported later in 1997 that the
Intelligence Ministry, which fell under Khamenei’s thumb, was behind the
killing of some eighty dissidents, including Ahmad. Khomeini’s grandson told
Iranian scholar Emadedin Baghi that authorities had revealed to him that his
father had been among the victims of those killings.
Khamenei endorsed
Rafsanjani’s pragmatism in the post-Khomeini era. Rafsanjani abolished the war
economy that had provided rationed food, and reinstated a more liberal economy,
importing goods from American-made household appliances to technology. He built
dams and roads, and revived a civilian nuclear program that had been
interrupted by the upheavals of 1979. In 1995, Russia agreed to complete two
nuclear power reactors in the southern city of Bushehr.
Rafsanjani
began mending ties with Western countries and drew Iran out of its isolation.
But Khamenei’s view of Rafsanjani soured over the latter’s olive branch to
Washington. Khamenei believed that any kind of compromise with Washington would
put Iran in a weak position and invite more pressure. Washington had repeatedly
criticized Iran’s human rights records and attacked its radicalism at home and
outside the country. In response, in nearly every public speech, Khamenei called
the United States the “enemy” and “world arrogance.” He claimed that Washington
intended to overthrow the Islamic regime. “The world imperialism is the enemy
of the Islam because it knows that Islam is against its looting,” he said in
February 1992. “Our enemies are afraid of the Islamic Republic because they
know that our government is the first Islamic regime founded upon Islamic
principles. It has massive support, and cut the hands of those who want to
control our nation.” A decade later, in 2003, Khamenei’s rhetoric was
unchanged. “What the United States, which has been spearheading the aggression
against our Islamic revolution, expects from our nation and government is
submission and surrender to its hegemony, and this is the real motive for U.S. claims
regarding weapons of mass destruction, human rights, and democracy,” he said.
Khamenei
faced the first serious challenge to his rule in 1997 with the election of
Mohammad Khatami as Rafsanjani’s successor as president. Khamenei backed a
conservative cleric who favored the status quo, while religious intellectuals
supported Khatami, a former culture minister who campaigned on a platform to
reform the Islamic system. Khatami talked about civil society and government
accountability, new terms in Iran’s political discourse. With young people,
women, and liberals quick to support the new face, Khatami won a landslide
victory with a historic 20 million votes.
Khamenei viewed
Khatami’s popularity as a major threat. The election unleashed a national
debate about the future of the Islamic regime, the freedoms it needed to grant,
and how much power the supreme leader should hold. Press freedom began to
flourish, facilitating open discussion of these issues. But Khamenei’s
judiciary proceeded to confront the emerging movement of Iranian democracy
activists; it jailed reporters, and shut down dozens of publications.
The
closure of a reformist newspaper in 1999 triggered the largest protests in the
country since the revolution. Khamenei’s Basij militia force attacked a dormitory, where the students
had held a vigil in support of the publication. It was brutal; they clubbed the
students, pushed some of them out windows, and wrecked the rooms. One student
was killed and dozens were seriously injured. The raid infuriated the nation
and precipitated a week of massive protests. Khamenei appeared on television
before a crowd of supporters, denouncing both the attack on the students and
the protests as inappropriate. Wiping away tears, he said: “I have a worthless
life and a maimed body. I have an honor which you have given me, but I will
sacrifice all that to guard the revolution and Islam.” Immediately afterwards,
Revolutionary Guards commanders published a letter to Khatami, warning that they
would end the protests by force if Khatami did not withdraw his supporters from
the streets. Fearing heavy bloodshed, Khatami complied.
Khamenei
emerged triumphant and unchallenged. The showdown had exposed the hurdles that
Iran’s 1989 constitution had created for democracy. Khamenei, alone, appoints
the heads of the judiciary, commanders of the Revolutionary Guards and Basij, members of the Guardian Council who vet election
candidates, head of the state television, and the ministers in charge of
national security departments such as foreign affairs, intelligence, defense,
and the interior. No one could challenge him.
Khamenei’s Man
In Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, Khamenei finally had
a president who promised to be a political and ideological ally. Khamenei
clearly backed Ahmadinejad’s bid in the 2005 election. The Revolutionary Guards
and Basij openly campaigned for him. A runoff vote pitted Ahmadinejad, a
little known engineering professor who had served a brief stint as Tehran
mayor, against Rafsanjani, a Khomeini confidante, former president, and a
founder of the Islamic Republic. Ahmadinejad won, with seventeen million votes
against Rafsanjani’s ten million. The message was clear: Khamenei was in
charge.
At his inauguration,
Ahmadinejad bent forward and raised Khamenei’s hand to his lips, reminding many
of Khamenei himself kissing Khomeini’s hand in 1981 when he became president.
Ahmadinejad publicly said that his relationship with Khamenei was that of a
father and son. Khamenei backed Ahmadinejad when his economic policies caused
skyrocketing inflation, when he cracked down on free speech, and when his
rhetoric deepened Iran’s international isolation. Ahmadinejad put Iran at the
center of controversy with provocative statements, such as calling the
Holocaust “a myth,” and reviving a statement by Khomeini that Israel should be
wiped off the map.
With high oil prices,
and the United States mired in military operations in neighboring Iraq and
Afghanistan, Khamenei sought to expand Iran’s regional influence. He repeatedly
said Iran could assist America in those countries if Washington treated Tehran
as an equal partner. Khamenei would go as far as to claim that Iran was the
inspiration for the “Islamic awakening” in Tunisia and Egypt. But during
Ahmadinejad’s presidency it was Iran’s pursuit of a nuclear program that best
reflected Iran’s determination—under Khamenei’s direction—to flex its strategic
muscle.
Khamenei has
consistently declared that Iran would not surrender to international pressure,
including punitive economic sanctions. “They know that we are not after nuclear
weapons,” Khamenei said in August 2006. “They are unhappy about scientific
progress in an Islamic state, a country that has not surrendered to the
policies of the United States, a country that has shown it is not afraid of America.
They don’t want us to have the most important technology in the world, which is
nuclear technology. But we have made our decision and are determined to
continue the path of struggle that we opted for twenty-seven years ago.”
Taste of Freedom
Many Iranians remained
disenchanted with the regime. Iranian society had gone under a metamorphosis
since 1979. The majority of people now lived in the cities; they were literate
and educated; more than half of university students were women. People had
access to the Internet and satellite media—sources of information that shaped
their views every day. Iranians had tasted freedom. Terms such as civil society
and government accountability had become part of everyday vocabulary. Many
believed the nation did not need “a father.”
When Ahmadinejad ran
for re-election in 2009, millions of Iranians threw their support behind
Mir-Hossein Moussavi—the politician who had served as Khamenei’s prime
minister. Pro-reform activists, students, even Rafsanjani’s son and daughter,
rallied behind him. Khamenei backed Ahmadinejad again. In the weeks leading to
the election, people campaigned in celebratory convoys, believing they could
use the election, the small window that the law granted them, to make a slight
difference.
Voters flocked to the
polls in huge numbers in the capital and in other cities. Historically, a large
turnout meant victory for the pro-reform candidate. But ominous omens began to
appear after the polls opened. Ahmadinejad’s government shut down Iran’s text messaging
services; the tool that Moussavi’s campaign was using to monitor the balloting.
Many polling stations lacked a sufficient number of ballot papers. In some
areas, Basij forces attacked voters outside polling stations. An early
official vote count put Ahmadinejad in the lead. Not long afterwards, Khamenei
congratulated Ahmadinejad, signaling that the regime had made its choice.
The next morning,
protests spread throughout Iran demanding new elections. With the streets still
filled with demonstrators a week later, Khamenei took the podium at Tehran
University to lead the nation’s Friday prayer service. With his disabled hand
resting on a rifle, he denounced the protesters. “Flexing muscles on the
streets after the election isn’t right,” he said. “It means challenging the
elections and our democracy.” Without naming other presidential candidates, he
called on them to pull their supporters off the streets. “If the political
elite ignore the law—whether they respect it or not—they will be responsible
for the ensuing bloodshed and chaos,” he warned.
Khamenei thus openly
put himself at the forefront of the battle. The next day, Khamenei’s forces
fired on the people. Dozens were killed, thousands arrested, and hundreds
tortured. Many former officials and leading politicians, including some of the
founding members of the revolution and two presidential candidates, Moussavi
and Mehdi Karroubi, found themselves in prison. Around the country, protesters
chanted “Death to Khamenei,” and “Death to the Dictator.”
Nazila Fathi was the Tehran correspondent for the New
York Times from
1999 to 2009. She is the translator of The
History and Documentation of Human Rights in Iran by Shirin Ebadi, the 2003 Nobel Peace
laureate. She received a 2010 Nieman Fellowship at Harvard University, and was
a Joan Shorenstein Center Fellow at Harvard’s John F. Kennedy School of
Government in 2012. She is currently a research fellow at the Belfer Center for
Science and International Affairs at the Kennedy School. On Twitter: @nazilafathi.