Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad at the Tehran Research Reactor, Tehran, Feb. 15, 2012. Iranian Presidency/ Xinhua Press/Corbis
Dealing with Iran
When Barack Obama entered the White
House in January 2009, the excitement inside the State Department was palpable.
It’s no secret that Washington, DC, is a left-leaning city, and the State
Department in particular is a government agency staffed with a cadre of people
who use the power of patience, forbearance, listening, and dialogue on a daily
basis. Thus, it was no surprise that many State Department officials preferred
the more urbane Barack Obama to George W. Bush and the trail of messes that
president left for them to clean up around the world. Perhaps no office was
more excited than mine. For four years, I served in the Office of Iranian Affairs.
We knew America’s status quo Iran policy was not working, and most of us agreed
with President Obama that it was time for a new approach.
For
the first three months of Obama’s presidency, the White House led an Iran
policy review that took stock of previous policies, and deliberated over the
best way to pursue the president’s promise for diplomacy. Middle East envoy
Dennis Ross and Puneet Talwar, senior director for Iran, Iraq, and the Persian
Gulf states at the National Security Council, led a top heavy, closely held
effort that incorporated feedback from numerous government agencies and
American allies around the world.
At
first glance, this approach appeared to be the most prudent way forward.
Attempting to learn from past mistakes and creating international buy-in
through close consultations are key facets of diplomacy. What many of us did
not anticipate, however, was the law of unintended consequences. Looking back,
the inclusive nature of the policy review closely resembled the process of marking
up bills in Congress. When a representative or senator introduces legislation,
their colleagues then have an opportunity to make changes and amendments prior
to recommending that the bill becomes law. Marked-up legislation often looks
very different from its original iteration. A similar process took hold of
Obama’s policy review: America’s partners abroad—including, but not limited to,
Israelis, British, French, Germans, Saudis, Russians, and Chinese—each had an
opportunity to mark up Obama’s vision on Iran. This political reality reduced
U.S. maneuverability and left us with a policy that was eerily similar to what
many of us had hoped to leave behind.
Fast
forward four years, and the U.S. and Iran stand at the precipice of a military
conflict that could engulf the entire Middle East, if not the world. President
Obama has repeated several times—including at the American Israeli Public
Affairs Committee’s (AIPAC) annual conference—that time still exists for a
diplomatic solution to the crisis. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu
vociferously disagrees and makes clear his preference for a military
confrontation aimed at destroying Iran’s nuclear program: “The world tells
Israel: ‘Wait. There’s still time.’ And I say, ‘Wait for what? Wait until when?’
Those in the international community who refuse to put red lines before Iran
don’t have a moral right to place a red light before Israel.”1 How
did an American president who spoke of engagement based on mutual interests and
mutual respect end up with no good options at his disposal? The devil is in the
details.
To
better understand how Obama’s Iran policy has played out, it is important to
deconstruct the realities and drivers of his strategy, and the political
psychology behind each round of negotiations involving the U.S. and Iran.
Understanding how we got to where we are will help us figure out how to move
beyond the status quo to a more productive and less dangerous relationship with
Iran.
Obama’s Strategy
It should now be clear that U.S. policy has never been a true engagement
policy. By definition, engagement entails a long-term approach that abandons
punitive measures—the “sticks”—and reassures both sides that their respective
fears are unfounded. Obama administration officials realized early on that they
were unlikely to adopt this approach. Instead, after the conclusion of Obama’s
policy review, a “carrot and stick” strategy similar to that of the Bush
administration has been pursued. This “dual track”—as it has been referred as
since January 2009—utilizes positive and negative inducements to convince Iran
that changing its behavior would be its most rewarding and least harmful
decision. The key difference between the Bush and Obama approach has been an effort
by the latter to avoid the tactical mistakes of the former. By publicly
disavowing regime change, striking diplomatic quid pro quos with key allies,
and dropping preconditions to diplomacy with Iran, Obama changed tactics, but
maintained an objective similar to his predecessor—making Iran yield on the
nuclear issue through pressure. By changing tactics, the U.S. has managed to
build a more robust consensus for international sanctions—something the Bush
administration was unable to achieve.
Yet,
as leaked diplomatic cables show, officials at the highest levels of the Obama
administration never believed that diplomacy could succeed.2 While
this does not cheapen the groundbreaking facets of President Obama’s initial
outreach, it has raised three questions that remain unanswered: how can U.S.
policymakers give maximum effort to make diplomacy succeed if they never
believed their efforts could work? Why has the U.S. expected Iran to accept
negotiation terms that relinquish its greatest strategic assets without
receiving strategic assets of equal value in return? And why did the Obama
administration expect Iran to make serious investments in diplomacy after
leaked cables showed it never had? Obama presented a solid vision upon entering
office—resolving the U.S.-Iran conflict through diplomacy—but his
administration’s pursuit of it has been half-hearted at best.
Newly
elected American presidents enter the White House with an unprecedented level
of political capital, which steadily shrinks as their reelection bid
approaches. Knowing this, why didn’t Obama fully abandon the Bush strategy and
create his own? Privately, high-ranking U.S. officials acknowledge they
underestimated both the domestic and international political obstacles to
normalizing relations with Iran, and the difficulty of understanding Iranian
government decision-making and strategic calculus. And yet, despite thirty
years of evidence to the contrary, these same officials seem to increasingly
believe that recycling previously unsuccessful pressure-based policies will
provide negotiating leverage, bring the Iranians to the negotiating table, and
perhaps hasten the end of the Iranian regime.
The Obama administration retained the same priorities,
policy vehicles, and much of the same senior personnel on Iran largely because
it believes that sanctions strengthen the credibility and leverage of those who
want to engage Iran, while also preventing more violent actions by Israel. The
administration insists that, in the long run, such an approach better addresses
the myriad mutual interests shared by the U.S. and Iran.
President
Obama himself reached the conclusion that too few negative incentives and
pressures existed to affect Iran’s internal calculus, particularly regarding
U.S.-Iranian mutual interests. Thus a policy followed that increased the
pressure on Iran based on assumptions that it would: bring the Iranians to the
negotiating table; affect Iran’s internal calculus; strengthen the credibility
and leverage of the pro-engagement camps; and prevent more violent actions from
Israel.
Obama
has dramatically increased the number and severity of U.S.-led sanctions on
Iran, while also reiterating numerous times that “all options are on the table”
to prevent Iran from developing a nuclear weapon. His comments have been
surprisingly direct: “We prefer to solve this issue diplomatically… Having said
that, Iran’s leaders should have no doubt about the resolve of the United
States… I have said that when it comes to preventing Iran from acquiring a
nuclear weapon, I will take no options off the table, and I mean what I say.”3
Obama’s preference to solve the crisis diplomatically, and his insistence that
the time remains to do so, are firmly grounded in a clear, shared assessment by
senior diplomatic, military, and intelligence officials in the U.S. and its
closest allies. Iran halted work toward nuclear weapons in 2003, and it has
since not made the political decision to pursue weaponization.4
Netanyahu
publicly contradicts Iranian assessments by the national security
establishments in both the U.S. and Israel.5 His push for bombing
Iran has been met with stiff resistance by President Obama. This—along with
Netanyahu’s refusal to implement a permanent cessation of settlement building
on Palestinian land—has cooled relations between the two leaders. The dynamic
seems to echo Netanyahu’s contentious relationship with President Bill Clinton
in the 1990s. Clinton’s memorable depiction leaves little to the imagination:
“Who the fuck does he think he is? Who’s the fucking superpower here?”6
With
the military option emphasized as a last resort, and diplomacy not having been
truly pursued, most of the Obama administration’s efforts to-date have centered
on developing, implementing, and enforcing “coordinated national measures”—or
“coalition of the willing” sanctions. Senior administration officials believe
that U.S. leverage vis-à-vis Iran is at its highest immediately before a new
round of sanctions—which in turn provides political space to carry out
“engagement-type activities” with Iran in a low-key manner. In practice,
however, movement on other “engagement-type” activities has been reactive
rather than proactive, so as to avoid impairing the short-term policy of
sanction implementation. Privately, Obama administration officials acknowledge
this contradiction but offer little in the way of resolving it.
These
realities and drivers of Obama’s Iran policy have colored each round of
negotiations to date between the Islamic Republic and the permanent members of
the United Nations Security Council plus Germany (P5+1). A closer examination
of what happened, and why diplomacy remains a work in progress, sheds light on
potential pathways out of the mounting crisis.
Round 1: October 2009
Negotiations
between the U.S. and Iran were always going to be fraught with complications.
An institutionalized enmity developed over many decades is hard to untangle.
The political space and the political will for diplomacy was further limited
from the outset by political obstacles, both domestic and international. At the
core of the distrust is a shared fear of overthrow: the U.S. believes that Iran
seeks to upend the regional security framework that it has built and operated
since filling the power vacuum left by Britain’s retreat from the Persian Gulf
in the years after World War II. The Islamic Republic believes that the U.S.
seeks to overthrow its regime. The U.S. and Iran have come to believe that
their interests are incompatible, and to view their relations as a zero-sum
game. Such outlooks have been fueled by minimal diplomatic contact,
interaction, or communication over the past three decades.
During the successive presidencies of Ronald Reagan,
George H. W. Bush, and Bill Clinton, both sides took turns shunning
negotiations when the other was ready to deal. George W. Bush rejected the most
promising opening in U.S.-Iran relations when he spurned an offer from Tehran
for comprehensive negotiations on all outstanding issues.7
After
years of U.S. refusal to enter into multilateral negotiations with Iran over
Iran’s nuclear program, the Obama administration did join its P5+1 colleagues
at the negotiating table. In October 2009, Obama’s diplomacy with Iran
commenced in Geneva, with all eyes focused on the diplomats from Washington and
Tehran. Expectations were low within the Obama administration, but by the end
it was a case of defeat actually being snatched from the jaws of victory.
Negotiations
that included a private bilateral meeting between the lead American and Iran
negotiators produced a surprise outcome: the Islamic Republic agreed in
principle to transfer approximately three quarters of its low-enriched uranium
(LEU) to Russia for further enrichment, and then to France for processing into
fuel rods for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR). Upon returning from Geneva,
Tehran’s top nuclear envoy, Saeed Jalili, asserted that the P5+1—and in
particular, the U.S.—had implicitly accepted Iran’s right to enrich uranium on
Iranian soil. Remarks from American officials struck a similarly positive tone,
calling the talks constructive.
U.S. officials took Iran’s constructive response
seriously: they believed that Iranian negotiators could not have proceeded
without the official consent of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. From Washington’s
view, this was a confidence-building measure that benefited both the U.S. and
Iran. The overarching principle for the Obama team was buying time. Already
eight months into a self-imposed, one-year time limit for diplomacy to succeed,
pressure from Congress and Israel to abandon diplomacy and focus solely on
punitive measures was increasing daily. Under the proposed swap, Russia and
France would spend a year reprocessing Iran’s LEU into 20 percent enriched
uranium and fuel. If the LEU was no longer on Iranian soil, it would undercut
those in Congress and in Israel who were calling for the end of diplomacy—their
demand being based on Iran’s growing LEU stockpile. President Obama would then
have greater political space to both extend the time frame of negotiations and
expand their scope.
Decision-makers in Washington also saw tangible benefits
for the Islamic Republic: the deal would head off a barrage of new sanctions,
and instead begin a longer-term process of negotiations with the goal of
resolving the many outstanding differences between Iran and the international
community. U.S. officials privately acknowledged that it was not lost upon the
Iranians that no discussion took place regarding the numerous UN Security
Council resolutions calling for Iran to suspend its uranium enrichment.
With
the contours of an agreement in place, the parties returned to their respective
capitals for consultations. But in Tehran, the deal was dead on arrival. Rather
than reject it outright, Iranian officials pushed for additional guarantees to
ensure that the West held up its end of the bargain. Most notably, they sought
a simultaneous exchange of LEU for fuel rods with Russia and France—not
entirely unreasonable given the lack of trust between the negotiating parties.
These fuel rods, Iran said, would power Tehran’s research reactor that produces
medical isotopes used to treat cancer patients. Obama administration officials,
however, quickly dismissed Iran’s request as foot dragging, and the talks fell
apart. Washington’s insistence that the Geneva deal was the only offer on the
table turned a confidence-building measure into an ultimatum—and Iranian
flexibility into resistance.
Washington
officials came away from the Geneva negotiations trying to figure out why
Iranian officials—particularly Ayatollah Khamenei—reneged on the deal. But, as
the Obama team would later experience first-hand, all politics is local.
President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad’s political rivals had in fact unleashed a
barrage of resentment that had been growing throughout his first four years in
office. A toxic combination of political and social upheaval in Iran ultimately
forced Khamenei to withdraw his support of the deal.
Stinging
criticism came at Ahmadinejad from across Iran’s political spectrum. Former
Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps Commander Mohsen Rezaei, two former chief
nuclear negotiators—Ali Larijani and Hassan Rowhani—and opposition leader and
former prime minister Mir-Hossein Mousavi all spoke out against the deal.8
They criticized Ahmadinejad for agreeing to modalities that required Iran to
relinquish strategic assets without receiving strategic assets of equal value
in return. Privately, these battle-tested revolutionaries were giving
Ahmadinejad a dose of his own medicine—after he’d spent the better part of his
first term in office sabotaging their attempts to mend fences with the
international community.
Privately,
some Obama administration officials concede that the U.S. saw an opportunity
and tried to seize it: with Iran still reeling from the “Green Movement”—the
unrest and domestic political fratricide that had erupted after Ahmadinejad’s
disputed reelection in June 2009—hardliners in Iran were thought to be looking
for a de-escalation of foreign tensions in order to focus more on problems at
home. Instead, America learned a valuable lesson: pressing Iran’s fractured
political system to give a quick “yes” usually results in Iranians saying “no.”
Round 2: May 2010
After talks
between Iran and the P5+1 broke down in late 2009, Obama’s political space for
diplomacy had closed and his administration used its remaining political
capital to win support for increased sanctions at the UN and among a U.S.-led
“coalition of the willing.” Iran’s relationship with every one of the P5+1
countries ranged from bad to worse, and a huge reservoir of mistrust,
suspicion, and hostility made resolving the nuclear issue a formidable task.
Recognizing this, Turkey and Brazil offered to use its cordial relations with
Iran and the P5+1 to help inject trust into the diplomatic process. Constrained
politically at home, President Obama took the Turks and Brazilians up on their
offer, sending them a detailed letter with specific steps that Iran had to
agree to—steps that were nearly identical to the 2009 deal that Iran walked
away from.9
Skepticism of the Turkish-Brazilian
initiative was high within the Obama administration. At one point, in private
telephone conversations prior to the Tehran summit, Secretary of State Hillary
Clinton delivered a tough message to Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and Brazilian President Luiz Inácio
Lula da Silva: go to Tehran, see for yourself that the Iranians are not
interested in a deal, then get on board with the UN sanctions. Rather than
capitalize on Iranian concessions and test the Islamic Republic’s ability to
follow through, some U.S. officials viewed the Turkish-Brazilian initiative as
part of a larger Iranian diplomatic strategy to divide the international
community and give sanctions naysayers something to hang their hat on.
But a funny thing happened in
Tehran. After a marathon negotiating session that lasted more than a full day,
Erdoğan
and Lula got Iran to sign on the dotted line. Iran’s primary objection during
the 2009 talks—the drawn-out process of shipping its stockpile of LEU in one
batch, the fuel swap taking place in a third-party country, and Iran receiving
fuel rods in approximately one year’s time—were all withdrawn. Turkey and
Brazil managed to win Iranian agreement to the key terms that Obama had
insisted upon less than a year earlier.
What Erdoğan and Lula didn’t know was that
President Obama, for his part, had already won Russian and Chinese support for
a new round of UN sanctions. While Turkey and Brazil were announcing their
successful diplomacy with Iran—securing everything that Obama asked for in his
letter—Clinton was telling Congress that the U.S. had secured a new UN Security
Council resolution against Iran. Despite having an agreement within reach,
Obama could not take “yes” for an answer.
Publicly, the Obama administration
claimed that it refused to accept the revised TRR deal because it focused on
removing 1,200 kilograms of enriched uranium from Iran. The U.S. now considered
this an insufficient amount relative to Iran’s stockpile at the time, which
exceeded 2,000 kilograms. The deal no longer addressed realities on the ground,
argued senior Obama administration officials, having been “overcome by events.”
Privately, senior officials conceded that Congress was coming at the
administration like a steamroller on the Iran issue. They explain that making
progress on the UN sanctions track was the only way at that point to push back
against more counterproductive sanctions that were being demanded in the House
and Senate.
Obama’s push
for new UN sanctions had begun long before Turkey and Brazil offered to broker
a revised version of the TRR deal. Negotiations between the U.S., Russia, and
China stretched out for months before the Russians and Chinese extracted
sufficient concessions in exchange for their support. Despite their best
efforts, Erdoğan and Lula had little chance of
securing concessions from Iran that the U.S. would have deemed acceptable.
As with Iran a year earlier in
2009, domestic political realities forced the U.S. to backtrack and prevented
its top decision-maker from following through on a deal that he originally
encouraged. The sense in the Obama administration was that any nuclear
deal with Tehran, short of full Iranian capitulation, could only be sold
domestically after a new round of sanctions. Yet, to date, this scenario has
not played out in practice. Instead, it has emboldened Iranian hardliners, who
have started responding in kind.
Round 3: January 2011
The pattern of
sporadic diplomacy continued into 2011, when Iran and the P5+1 agreed to meet
in Istanbul after an eight-month hiatus. As Iranian officials prepared to meet
their American, British, French, Russian, Chinese, and German counterparts,
expectations were understandably low. Yet there was cautious optimism that a
new venue in Istanbul—outside of the West, in Iran’s backyard—could produce
tangible first steps. Instead, the talks took an unexpected turn for the
worse as the Iranian delegation introduced two preconditions—the suspension of
sanctions and acceptance of Iran’s right to enrichment—that proved to be
non-starters for the P5+1.10
The
hardening of Iran’s stance puzzled many U.S. officials who did not fully
understand the political psychology behind Iran’s move. Contrary to the
expectation that Tehran would be in a position of weakness heading into the
talks, its conduct seemed to reveal that it perceived itself to be in a position
of strength.
Over
the weeks preceding the Istanbul talks, American and European officials made a
concerted effort to shape both the narrative and terms of debate. Information
divulged by diplomats to analysts and journalists sought to intimidate
decision-makers in Tehran by serving as the basis for numerous press stories
and analyses that painted a picture of an Islamic Republic besieged by
subversion, sanctions, and isolation.11 Government officials across
the Atlantic maintained that, while expectations for talks were low, they did
not expect anything irregular from their Iranian interlocutors.
Iran
responded in-kind by issuing the two preconditions that served as a de facto
ultimatum. Tehran was well aware of the unlikelihood of the P5+1 suspending
sanctions and acknowledging Iran’s right to enrichment. But the strategic (and
high-risk) move of laying down these prerequisites was meant to send a clear
message: Iran will not yield to pressure or make tactical compromises, but it
will enter strategic negotiations that address the concerns of both
sides and define in advance the desired result.
By
effectively declaring that it would not negotiate solely over its nuclear
program, the Islamic Republic raised the stakes in a delicate and dangerous
game of brinksmanship that has embroiled U.S.-Iran relations since 2002. With
President Obama’s dual-track strategy reaching a virtual deadlock, the Iranian
government calculated that it stood a better chance of getting what it needed
by escalating the conflict. Decision-makers in Tehran concluded that reaching a
viable, strategic long-term solution required an interim worsening of the
problem, so that policymakers in Washington could not ignore it or gloss over
it with short-term tactics. The Islamic Republic played a risky game, but not
one without strategy and logic.
Iran
was—and today, still is—betting that the U.S. national security establishment
will not favor another war in the Middle East, that it lacks viable options in
its regime change policy, and will therefore eventually change its hostile
posture towards Iran.
Sanctions—both UN Security Council measures and
American-led “coordinated national measures”—hurt Iran’s economic health writ
large, yet decision-makers in Tehran have maintained their refusal to yield
through pressure. After both sets of sanctions fell short in changing Iran’s
strategic calculus, the Islamic Republic viewed its position as strengthened,
and its hardened stance put the ball back in the court of the P5+1.
Iran correctly calculated that Russia (and by extension,
China) would not support additional UN Security Council sanctions in the short
to medium term. Consequently, the U.S. strategy has focused on expanding
“coordinated national measures.” Convincing an already hesitant set of allies
with long-standing economic ties to Iran—Japan, South Korea, India, South
Africa, and others—to sign onto another round of unilateral sanctions required
the Obama administration to strike diplomatic quid pro quos and provide
assurances to its allies that it would reinvigorate direct diplomacy with
Iran.
Rising
instability across the Middle East has increased Tehran’s confidence in its
regional strength. Decision-makers in Tehran pushed a public narrative
that framed the Arab Spring as Islam/Iran-inspired.12 Privately,
they acknowledged a regional dynamic that is far more fluid than their public
narrative suggested, but were confidant nonetheless that the Arab Spring worked
against a status-quo that had long favored U.S. interests. The Iranian
government continues to see increased instability throughout the region—save
for Syria, where it has long been allied with the Bashar Al-Assad regime—as a
way to deflect international pressure and exploit fissures within the
international community. Iran’s hardened stance in Istanbul pointed to a set of
decision-makers in Tehran who felt cautiously stronger on
the international scene
than the U.S.-led narrative of sanctions, cyber warfare, and secret
assassinations suggested.
Disconnect in Moscow
utual escalation continued unabated,
culminating in U.S.-led sanctions on Iranian oil and financial transactions.
Altogether this was estimated to cut Iran’s oil export revenues in half,
and processing payments became
costly and time-consuming.13 Iran responded in
kind by creating new facts on the ground with regard to its nuclear program and
doubling down on its support for the Al-Assad government in Syria. Together,
both the U.S. and Iran were playing an extremely dangerous game based on
misperception. Each side seemed to be misreading the strength and resolve of
the other. In this kind of game of chicken, small errors of judgment can result
in military confrontation. And in game theory, the opponent that seems “irrational”
or “crazy” can actually win. This misperception in Washington and Tehran
heightened the danger to the degree that both sides recognized the need to let
off some steam.
Against
this backdrop, Iran and the P5+1 agreed to meet again in Istanbul. According to
officials from both sides, mutual escalation sharpened the choices and focus of
all parties at the negotiating table. Despite the bar being set very low for
the talks, progress was made because all parties compromised: Iran dropped its
preconditions for addressing the nuclear issue, and the U.S. agreed to resolve
the nuclear issue within the framework of the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
(NPT). By agreeing to a framework for negotiations—the principle of a
step-by-step approach based on reciprocity—both sides were able to begin
discussions for concrete steps toward a negotiated solution. And a subsequent
meeting was scheduled in Baghdad.
Going into their second meeting of 2012, Iran and the
P5+1 understood the parameters of what a confidence-building measure based on
compromise would look like: Iran would accept limits on its enrichment of
uranium in return for a relaxation or postponement of sanctions. Yet knowing what
the contours of a deal look like, and having the political will to take the
necessary risks for peace, are two very different things.
Both
sides used their time in Baghdad to communicate directly and trade proposals.
Despite high anticipation leading up to the negotiations, the P5+1’s maximalist
position had been known for months: capping Iran’s uranium enrichment at the 5
percent level; shipping to a third-party country Iran’s stockpile of uranium
enriched to higher levels; and scrapping its deeply buried uranium-enrichment
facility.
Equally
important but less clear was the P5+1 package of incentives that would
reciprocate Iranian concessions. Its opening salvo surprised even the most
ardent skeptics of the Islamic Republic: stringent demands to curb uranium
enrichment but no sanctions relief. Instead, Iran was told the P5+1 would not
consider easing sanctions even if Tehran shipped out its stockpile of uranium
enriched to the 20 percent level. Unsurprisingly, the Iranian delegation deemed
this proposal “outdated, not comprehensive, and unbalanced.”14
As a
result, the focus shifted: negotiations became less about the U.S. knowing what
Iran was capable of offering and more about Washington driving a hard
bargain—or not having the necessary political space to reciprocate Iranian
concessions. Based on the step-by-step principles of reciprocity that were
agreed to during the prior round of talks in Istanbul, non-U.S. diplomats
privately noted that Washington had moved the goalposts in Baghdad and put a
diplomatic solution to the crisis at risk.
A
disconnect remained between the two sides on what comprehensive, transparent,
and practical steps should look like. From Tehran’s vantage point, if it agreed
to walk back uranium enrichment, it wanted the West to walk back sanctions.
European Union diplomats pointed out—correctly—that Iran was expected to
relinquish its greatest strategic asset (its stockpile of enriched uranium)
without receiving a strategic asset of equal value in return. Yet, both sides
still had an interest in bridging the gap. Failing to do so on any level would
force the talks to collapse and likely cause both sides to escalate toward the
worst possible outcome. Hence, they agreed to another round of talks in Moscow,
despite the gap in their positions.
Both
sides entered negotiations with their maximalist positions, and neither budged.
But, by returning to the negotiating table, they helped diplomacy become the
sustained process it was always supposed to be, rather than mere one-off
meetings. As both sides worked to find an agreement that could be sold to their
respective domestic political constituencies, they agreed to continue talks at
the working level before reconvening at the political level in Moscow.
There,
however, things took a turn for the worse. Both sides walked away from the
summit trying to figure out how to pick up the pieces after such a dangerous
turn of events. To the credit of Washington and Tehran, their public-relations
departments did a masterful job spinning just how badly the negotiations in
Moscow had gone. Privately, however, officials from both sides conceded that a
breakdown in the talks occurred largely because the United States moved the
goalposts—again. And an honest assessment indicates that political factors
drove Washington to back away from a deal. A senior U.S. official was candid in
his description to me: “We’re simply too close to the November election. The
president can’t take political risks that could open him up to charges of
weakness on national security issues.”
While
there is always concern about whether Tehran will live up to its end of a
bargain, numerous P5+1 officials have acknowledged that the Iranians focused
their bottom line on uranium enrichment at the 3.5 percent level and sanctions
relief. Iran’s enrichment of uranium to the 20 percent level; its corresponding
stockpile; and its underground Fordo nuclear facility all are fair game for
compromise—but for the right price. These will be key details in any round of
talks going forward.
If
there was a silver lining from the Moscow talks, it was the agreement to
continue diplomacy at the technical level (rather than at the political level)
through the end of 2012. Additional rounds of negotiations can help both sides
continue to reacquaint themselves with one another after three decades of
estrangement. But there is a downside: downgrading the level of talks further
reduced the likelihood of an agreement, which already faces myriad obstacles.
Nevertheless, continuing talks at a lower level is better than no talks at all.
The dustbin of history is littered with failed attempts
by both sides to reach some sort of accommodation. In 2009, the Iranians
balked. Today, it is the Obama administration that cannot take “yes” for an
answer. Simply put, political considerations related to Israel and President
Obama’s reelection campaign have severely inhibited Washington’s ability to
engage in a real, step-by-step process based on reciprocity.
As a
chronically reactive, authoritarian regime, the Islamic Republic will likely
remain in wait-and-see mode until America takes what it perceives as tangible
steps towards compromise. For its part, the Obama administration has likely
calculated that, in order to achieve a breakthrough with Iran, there must first
be a breakdown in the diplomatic process. Because multilateral talks have
reached a deadlock, the United States perceives that it stands a better chance
of getting what it really needs by escalating the conflict. This is a risky
game to play but there is logic behind it.
Washington
should be wary of overplaying its hand—something it often rightly accuses
Tehran of doing. The U.S. should be realistic about the effectiveness of
“crippling” sanctions—who is being crippled by these sanctions? Sanctioning
Iran’s oil and financial transactions undoubtedly has an effect but perhaps not
on those in Iran whom the United States is seeking to influence. History
repeatedly demonstrates that bending, and much less breaking, does not come
easily to an immensely prideful, nationalistic country like Iran.
Indeed,
Obama was caught on a live microphone explaining this dynamic to Russia’s
Dmitri Medvedev: “This is my last election… After my election I have more
flexibility.” Obama said he needs “space” until after the November ballot,
which will ostensibly increase his ability to compromise on contentious issues.15
In
theory, this makes sense. But in practice, what’s past is prologue. Yet,
regardless of who is president, Congress will be no less destructive; Israel
will be no less obstinate; and there is always the need to protect the
political party brand for the next round of elections.
Memo to the President
Finding ways to
communicate—let alone compromise—with the Iranian government over divisive
issues has been a key U.S. goal since the outset of the Obama administration.
The Iranian obstacles to successful diplomacy are well documented:
authoritarian governance; warring political elites; and a disputed presidential
election that shattered an already fragile semblance of regime unity.
President
Obama’s experience provides a glimpse of the equally important but less
understood American obstacles to successful diplomacy with Iran. Despite the
Obama administration’s genuine interest in doing things creatively, its
diplomatic strategy has been hostage to big picture policy and political
constraints. From the outset, when potential concessions to offer Iran were
discussed in 2009, the need to “inject a bit of realism” into policy
recommendations was emphasized. In government-speak, this means recommendations
must be politically tenable.
In
addition to domestic political considerations vis-à-vis Congress, the Obama
administration placed a premium on maintaining an international approach toward
Iran with the EU, Russia, China, and Israel. Working closely with other members
of the UN Security Council to engage Iran directly eased international concerns
about U.S. intentions, signaled America’s seriousness about reaching a
diplomatic resolution, and strengthened the coalition over time. And this in turn
was seen as preventing more violent actions by Israel.
For
four years, the Obama team balanced foreign policy with a hostile Congress and
its need to project strength on national security for reelection purposes. If
its Iran policy at times seemed schizophrenic, that’s because it was.
Effectively, the administration’s approach has been less to create political
space for robust diplomacy and more to ensure that policy options fit within
existing political realities. The paradox here is telling. Iran‘s domestic
politics are often described as fractious, thereby rendering Iranian
decision-makers unable to take “yes” for an answer. That may be the case—it was
in 2009. But the same can be said of Washington as well.
There
is only one way to break a thirty-four-year-old deadlock: break the rules.
America and Iran must talk to each other and trade compromises of equal value
in order to break down the hostility and misperceptions that paralyze
relations. Only by taking risks for peace will leaders in Washington and Tehran
have the necessary deliverables to beat back critics and spoilers. But how can
they do this? Here are some recommendations for dealing with Iran in the next
U.S. presidential term:
Start Right Away. The unfortunate reality is that there will never be a
“right time” for America to push forward with Iran diplomacy in earnest. When
Barack Obama entered the White House in 2009, a conscious decision was made to
wait until after Iran’s June presidential election before beginning serious
attempts at outreach. The predominant school of thought in the administration
believed that Ahmadinejad was politically toxic in Washington and Tel Aviv, and
starting serious outreach to the Iranian government could inadvertently boost
his reelection bid. But the decision to wait cost Washington six valuable
months of its self-imposed, one-year timetable for engagement with Iran. Then
the post-election protests and human rights abuses in Iran made engagement
impossible for an additional four to five months. Looking ahead, Washington
should reinvigorate its diplomatic outreach to Iran as soon as possible
following the November 2012 election. And yet risks remain by doing so—Iran’s
presidential election, scheduled for June 2013, clouds the political picture in
Tehran more than usual—but American (and Iranian) officials do not have the
luxury of waiting until the end of 2013 if they are truly intent on doing all
that is necessary to avoid a military confrontation.
Discretion is the Better Part of Valor. The majority of U.S.-Iran
negotiations during Obama’s presidency have taken place in front of cameras or
with journalists waiting outside the meeting room. Deconstructing an
institutionalized enmity that has built up over three decades while constantly
in the public eye is next to impossible. Decision-makers in Washington and
Tehran that invest in the diplomatic process must simultaneously protect
themselves politically from attacks at home. To maximize the chances for
success, increasing the number of direct, senior-level meetings that are
private if still a full-blown secret can help avoid many of the common pitfalls
that media attention and political infighting bring.
Talk to Everyone—Directly. As the only permanent member of
the UN Security Council that does not have a direct channel to Iran, the U.S.
is at a significant disadvantage. Going forward, efforts should be made to
quickly establish such a channel. And the belief that dialogue is only possible
if a singular authentic channel to Iran is found must be discarded. Such a
channel doesn’t exist. Rather, Washington should recognize that there are many
power centers in Iran, all of which need to be included in the process. Just as
no country expects to sign a significant deal with the United States without
addressing the concerns of the White House, State Department, Pentagon, and
Congress, no major decision is likely to be made in Iran unless a range of key
stakeholders is brought into the discussion. This partly explains Turkey and
Brazil’s success in getting Iran to agree to the U.S. modalities of the nuclear
swap. Their diplomacy with Iran was not focused on a single stakeholder in
Tehran. Rather, these countries built confidence with and won support for their
mediation from all relevant Iranian power centers. If direct engagement with
the Iranian parliament, the supreme leader’s office, and other political
centers and factions isn’t immediately possible, negotiators must be willing to
give them time, so that these stakeholders’ inclination to scuttle a deal that
they were not a part of, is neutralized.16
Stay the Course. By now, Obama has likely realized
what he should have known all along: diplomacy with Iran is hard, and it’s
going to get harder. Since Obama took office, the political space in Washington
to pursue diplomacy with Iran has progressively shrunk. The next American
administration must go into talks focused on the long-term benefits of engaging
Iran. It also must be willing to make the political investment necessary to
give the process a real chance to succeed. If the administration is going to
retreat at the first sign of Iranian intransigence or congressional
opposition—which are both probably inevitable—then it might be better not to
embark on a new round of diplomacy at all.17
In
2008, Barack Obama was the only presidential candidate with the foresight and
fortitude to openly acknowledge the need to engage America’s adversaries
diplomatically. Iran was at the top of his list. Four years later, the
imperative has only grown, but the logic behind Obama’s thinking has not
changed: the U.S. has much to gain and little to lose by abandoning its
policies of the past three decades—including the revised Bush policy that
became Obama’s policy—and instead beginning a real effort to establish working
relations with Iran.
The
enmity will not be undone over the course of a few meetings. Success will only
come if diplomats place a premium on patience and long-term progress rather
than quick fixes aimed at appeasing domestic political constituencies. Few
argue against the need to try, and no realistic alternative better serves U.S.
national security imperatives. Diplomacy with Iran is a marathon, not a sprint.
1 Deyoung, K. & Warrick, J. (2012, September
11). “Netanyahu: Without Ultimatum, U.S. Has No ‘Moral Right’ to Stop Israel
from Attacking Iran.” The Washington Post, Accessed: http://www.
washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/netanyahu-without-ultimatum-us-has-no-moral-right-
to-stop-israel-from-attacking-iran/2012/09/11/cb56ac8a-fc12-11e1-a31e-804fccb658f9_story.html
2 See:
Classified U.S. State Department Cables. “Iran: March 3 EU Debate on Sanctions
and U.S. Policy Review.” March 13, 2009; “Iran Sanctions: AA/S Glaser Consults
Key Ambassadors in Brussels.” April
8, 2009; “Iran Sanctions: AA/S Glaser Briefs EU on Priority Targets.” April 8,
2009.
3 Ravid, B. (2012, March 4). “Obama:
All Options Remain on the Table to Prevent a Nuclear
Iran,” Haaretz, Accessed:
http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/obama-all-
options-remain-on-the-table-to-prevent-a-nuclear-iran-1.416405
4 See: Risen, J. (2012, March 17).
“U.S. Faces a Tricky Task in Assessment of Data on Iran,” The New York Times,
Accessed: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/18/world/middleeast/iran-
intelligence-crisis-showed-difficulty-of-assessing-nuclear-data.html and Harel,
A. (2012, January 18). “Israel: Iran Still Mulling Whether to Build a Nuclear
Bomb,” Haaretz,
Accessed:
http://www.haaretz.com/print-edition/news/israel-iran-still-mulling-whether-to-build-
nuclear-bomb-1.407866
5 “U.S., Israeli Security Officials
Warn Against Attacking Iran.” Friends Committee on National Legislation
website. Accessed:
http://fcnl.org/issues/iran/us_israeli_security_officials_warn_
against_war_with_iran/
6. Miller, Aaron David. The Much Too Promised Land: America’s
Elusive Search for Arab-Israeli Peace. New York:
Bantam, 2008. Pg. 273.
7 Kessler, G. (2006, June 18). “In
2003, U.S. Spurned Iran’s Offer of Dialogue,” The Washington Post, Accessed:
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/06/17/
AR2006061700727.html
8 Derakhshi, R. , Dahl, F. &
Pomeroy, R. (2009, October 29). “Iran’s Mousavi Criticizes Nuclear Fuel Plan,” Reuters, Accessed:
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/10/29/us-iran-nuclear- opposition-idUSTRE59S0ZB20091029
9 For a PDF copy of President Obama’s
letter to Brazilian President Lula, see: http://www.
campaigniran.org/casmii/files/obama_letter_lula_iran.pdf
10 Peterson,
S. (2011, January 22). “Why Iran’s Nuclear Talks Ended in Stalemate,” The Christian Science Monitor,
Accessed: http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2011/0122/Why-
Iran-nuclear-talks-ended-in-stalemate
11 For
example, see: Broad, W., Markoff, J. & Sanger, D. (2011, January 15).
“Israeli Test on Worm Called Crucial in Iran Delay,” The New York Times,
Accessed: http://www.nytimes.
com/2011/01/16/world/middleeast/16stuxnet.html?pagewanted=all and Lander, M.
(2011, January 11). “Iran Nuclear Effort is Stalled by Sanctions, Clinton
Says,” The New York Times,
Accessed: http://www.nytimes.com/2011/01/11/world/middleeast/11diplo.html
12 Peterson,S. (2011, February 4). “Iran’s Khamenei
Praises Egyptian Protestors, Declares ‘Islamic Awakening,’” The Christian Science
Monitor, Accessed:
http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-
East/2011/0204/Iran-s-Khamenei-praises-Egyptian-protesters-declares-Islamic-awakening
13 (2012,
September 13). “Iran Oil Exports Cut in Half Due to Sanctions, Says U.S.,” Haaretz, Accessed:
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/iran-oil-exports-nearly-cut-in-half-due-
to-sanctions-says-u-s-1.464621
14 Sly,
L. & Warrick, J. (2012, May 23). “Nuclear Talks with Iran Show Little
Progress,” The Washington Post,
Accessed: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/middle_east/nuclear-
talks-begin-in-baghdad-a-day-after-un-watchdog-says-deal-with-iran-is-near/2012/05/23/
gJQABp73jU_story.html
15 Goodman,
J.D. (2012, March 26). “Microphone Catches a Candid Obama,” The NewYork Times, Accessed: http://www.nytimes.com/2012/03/27/us/politics/obama-caught-on-
microphone-telling-medvedev-of-flexibility.html
16 Parsi,
T. & Marashi, R. (2011, November 12). “Want to Defuse the Iran Crisis?,” Foreign Policy, Accessed:
http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2010/11/12/want_to_defuse_the_iran_
crisis?page=full
17 Ibid.
Reza Marashi
is research director at the National
Iranian American Council. He previously served in the Office of Iranian Affairs
at the U.S. Department of State. His articles have appeared in the New York Times, Foreign Policy, Atlantic, and National Interest. On Twitter: @rezamarashi.