February 12, 2014
As the Syrian uprising approaches its fourth year,
conflict rages in virtually every one of Syria’s thirteen provinces, wreaking
havoc on the country’s society and economy. Fighting has been especially
intense in and around major urban centers such as Damascus, Homs and Aleppo,
and in strategic corridors linking Syria’s coastal zone to Lebanon. In recent
months, the Bashar Al-Assad regime has retaken ground previously lost to the
opposition, with the active support of Hezbollah and Iran. Yet large swathes of
Syrian territory remain outside of regime control. Last
year, the violence also spilled over all of Syria’s borders, particularly into
Iraq and Lebanon, threatening regional stability. The statistics are grim: more
than 130,000 killed, over two million refugees, six million internally
displaced, and eight million in need of humanitarian relief.
After a round of talks between the regime and the
opposition, little has been resolved. The conflict rages on.
For the
opposition, few options remain. The United States and the international
community have consistently maintained that the Syrian conflict can only be
resolved through a politically negotiated transition based on the principles
established in the Geneva Framework of July 2012. As such, Washington was adamant
that the opposition participate in talks with the regime. But the Syrian regime
has little to gain in attending the Geneva conference and legitimizing an
opposition; the regime has long refused to sit across from the opposition’s delegation
and thereby recognize them. But the regime’s chief sponsor at the talks,
Russia, was equally adamant that representatives of Al-Assad attend. In the end
both the Syrian regime and the opposition attended the first round of talks and
are currently in the second round, which began on February 10.
The
regime’s strategy at Geneva thus far has been quite predictable, trying to
focus the conference on what it terms “combatting terror” and stabilizing the
country. On the opening day of the second round of talks at Geneva, Deputy
Foreign Minister Faisal Al-Moukdad demanded an end to violence, terrorism and
foreign intervention as a precondition to any discussions. He reiterated the
regime’s earlier efforts at stalling the negotiations while
trying to preempt and
ultimately circumvent key requirements and pre-determined outcomes of the
Geneva II process, including a the formation of a Transitional Governing Body.
The
regime still considers it possible to resolve the conflict by force, buoyed by
recent military gains, strong support from Russia, Iran and its proxies. The
intense barrel bombing campaigns that have preceded both rounds of the Geneva
II talks are a clear indication of the regime’s intent to soften up areas it
considers strategic priorities, such as Aleppo. It is part of a strategy of
pressuring the opposition to accept whatever conditions the regime seeks to
impose in return for local ceasefires, aid corridors and some limited prisoner exchanges. Al-Assad’s envoys have avoided the real purpose of the negotiations, which is a Transitional Governing Body. Instead, it has sought local ceasefires, a means by which the regime can regain nominal control of strategic areas. This has proved successful in the Damascus suburbs of Moadamia and Barze. In Barze, there are now even joint checkpoints manned by the regime and local opposition fighters. If the regime can get similar deals in Aleppo and stabilize its situation there, that would be a major success. (The Russians are publicly
endorsing this approach.) The regime’s strength contrasts the feeble and less
than convincing support that the international community has been willing to
offer the opposition.
The
Syrian opposition has thus far deftly navigated and countered the regime’s
tactics with strategies of its own. They rebuffed the regime’s repeated efforts
to divert all discussion to fighting terrorism. The opposition steadfastly
focused on the core issues outlined in the Geneva I framework—in particular, the
need to create a Transitional Governing Body with full executive powers. Despite
their best efforts, the opposition was unsuccessful in achieving progress regarding
the fate of Al-Assad or the establishment of such a Transitional Governing
Body.
Ultimately
the first round of Geneva ended up concentrating on humanitarian issues, such
as a temporary ceasefire and the lifting of sieges to allow aid access and the
movement of people. But the opposition refused to discuss this in Aleppo, as
the regime had initially demanded and tactically brought the besieged parts of
the old city of Homs into play instead. For the opposition, insisting on the
de-escalation of Homs makes sense: the city had all but militarily fallen to
regime forces and therefore the main concessions would ultimately come from the
regime. The opposition had everything to gain from such a deal (mainly in
alleviating the suffering of the besieged civilian population) and little if
anything to lose. Although there was no breakthrough at the first meeting, recent
events in the besieged parts of the old city of Homs, which are have led to the
evacuation of some six hundred civilians and the entry of aid to the blockaded
areas of the city, are the latest fruits of these efforts.
Currently
the delegations of both the regime and the opposition are in Geneva for the
second round, which is supposed to focus on forming a Transitional Governing
Body (TGB). However, the regime delegation is boxed in by its own propaganda, with
no authority to negotiate key issues regarding the TGB. Moreover, the Damascus
delegation has little room to maneuver beyond the core message of fighting
terrorists and the maintaining the Al-Assad presidency.
The opposition
remains fragile. More importantly, it has little influence over activists and
fighting formations inside Syria. In fact, many of those fighting on the ground
are Islamists and highly suspicious of the coalition—and the whole Geneva
process. Without the ability to show quick, tangible results—even modest ones—these
Islamist rebel forces may quickly turn against the Geneva process and the coalition
supposedly representing them there.
On the
other side of the table, there is little agreement among the key sponsors of
the Geneva II conference: the U.S., Russia and Saudi Arabia. More significantly,
Iran, which has been aiding and abetting the Assad regime, is not even present
at the conference. The lack of any real discussions or agreement among these
key actors is prolonging the deadlock.
Failure
is imminent. The Al-Assad regime has no incentive to enter these negotiations
with any seriousness; the opposition has no meaningful or effective leverage to
convince the key actors to bring significant pressure to bear on the regime or
to force its hand by military means. Unless there is a serious shift in the
balance of power combined with new creative strategies, there is no hope of any
agreement emerging from Geneva.
The major
impediment is that the Al-Assad regime continues to seek a military solution to
the conflict. It is therefore imperative that the Friends of Syria Core group,
led by the U.S., demonstrate to Al-Assad that such an option is not only
unacceptable but also a red line, with serious and immediate consequences,
including military ones, if crossed. Already there is talk in the U.S. of the
need for a new and more assertive Syria policy, following comments made by Secretary
of State John Kerry at the Munich Security Conference. In order to end the
conflict, Kerry must translate such talk into a new level of U.S. involvement.
The U.S. and the opposition must offer creative solutions to issues such as the
fate of Al-Assad, the length of the transitional period and the structure and
the implementation mechanisms of the transitional government. Otherwise, the
Geneva talks are simply a time-wasting exercise.
Amr Al-Azm is an associate
professor Middle East History and Anthropology at Shawnee State University. He
is a member of the Syrian opposition.