Hassan Nafaa: Egypt heading toward fourth transitional period

Author: As-Safir (Lebanon) Posted April 25, 2014

Amid sharp polarization in Egypt between the pro-legitimacy [pro-Mohammed Morsi] and the pro-road map [pro-Abdel Fattah al-Sisi] camps, few personalities are trying to reach a consensus formula to end the conflict existing in Egypt, or at least to keep it within the political boundaries and away from violence. Among these few personalities is Hassan Nafaa, a political science professor who served as the coordinator of the National Association for Change prior to the January 25 Revolution. As-Safir met with him in Cairo.

The text of the interview follows:

As-Safir:  How did the political situation in Egypt reach this point, after a revolution that carried great expectations?

Nafaa:  The current crisis was not born today, but dates back to the moment when the revolution managed to topple Hosni Mubarak. When Mubarak stepped down, the right choice was that the rebels form a council reflecting the demands of the revolution and seek to achieve its objectives. Mubarak assigned the political power to the military council, and the revolutionaries did not object, as a sign of appreciation of the national role played by the armed forces during the revolution. The military council did not have any intention to make the revolution succeed, but rather wanted to save the regime after sacrificing Mubarak. It tried to contain the revolution through formal reforms and sought to establish a regime that does not substantially differ from Mubarak’s regime, with the participation of the Muslim Brotherhood and other parties.

During this period, the military council committed several errors that led it to hand over the power to the Brotherhood. The latter became responsible for managing the transitional period. At the time, Mohammed Morsi thought that the time was right to hijack the revolution and extend the Brotherhood’s dominance, but this inclination angered the people. The Tamarod movement emerged and people took to the streets on June 30. On July 3, the army seized an opportunity, putting forward a road map that ushered the country into a third transitional period. This is the current stage in Egypt; it is unstable and on a razor’s edge. It may succeed or fail, especially since it has been unable to end the state of polarization.

As-Safir:  But there is a clear majority supporting the road map and a minority opposing it?

Nafaa:  The issue is not just about an opposing minority, but a minority trying to topple the road map. The transitional authority did not succeed in managing the crisis with this minority, and the policies it adopted led to the expansion of the opposition. Some of the young people who opposed the Brotherhood and participated in their overthrow are in prison today because of their opposition to the constitution, the law on demonstrations and gross violations of human rights. Moreover, the fact that the list of candidates includes only two names does not seem convincing and does not reflect the actual aspirations of the political and popular spectrum on the ground.

Candidates showed reluctance to enter the electoral race as they questioned the elections fought by a man accused of being the mastermind behind the coup. If it were true that June 30 was a popular revolution, this revolution would have presented its candidates for the presidential election. The loudest voice today is that of a network of interests associated with Mubarak’s regime. Some fear this network will succeed in hijacking the June 30 revolution just like the Brotherhood hijacked the January 25 Revolution. Moreover, the ambiguous position of Field Marshal Abdel Fattah al-Sisi adds to the fear. What is going on in his mind? How will he take over the rule? Which forces will he collaborate with, the old regime or the rebels? He has intervened in a decisive manner; he ousted the Brotherhood and saved Egypt, but is that enough? Will the next stage be the stage of establishing the rule of law or the stage of hatred and revenge? Unfortunately the loudest voice today is that of the powers wishing to take revenge and not that of the forces wishing to bring everyone together in a democratic state.

As-Safir:  But the Brotherhood itself refuses to negotiate and compromise?

Nafaa:  This is the logic of Israel itself. Israel wants to negotiate while slaughtering the Palestinians and then accuses them of refusing to negotiate. I have criticized and opposed the Muslim Brotherhood, I participated in the Tamarod movement and in drawing up the road map, but I did not feel comfortable with the formation of the government. I supported the nomination of the former head of the Dustour Party, Mohamed ElBaradei, as prime minister. However, the state was blackmailed by the Nour Party and the government of Hazem el-Biblawi was no different from the previous governments.

I hold the Muslim Brotherhood responsible for what happened. I do not believe that the group is wronged or oppressed. They had a real chance to build a democratic system in which everybody can participate. However, all this does not justify the violation of the law and constitution. Moreover, defending national security does not justify the violation of human rights. I believe that the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam must be part of the political landscape, but they should not dominate the system.

As-Safir:  What are the available options for reconciliation?

Nafaa:  Any future system ought to prepare for a stage that would allow greater participation of political forces, especially the Muslim Brotherhood and political Islam. The Brotherhood presented a program that was not accepted by all segments of people. Yet, they were chosen by the people on many occasions, given that they were seen as less corrupt than Mubarak’s regime, made sacrifices before the revolution, have experience and are competent. With the exception of corruption, the people discovered that their expectations were not correct. Eventually they found out that the Brotherhood policies were no different than those of Mubarak. However, the idea of reconciliation cannot be excluded, provided that terrorism is rejected and there is a serious will to fight it.

As-Safir:  You have already put forward a plan for reconciliation …

Nafaa:  The path I’ve suggested is not a solution, but rather a mechanism to reach a solution: forming a committee of wise men headed by Mohamed Heikal along with the following members: Tarek al-Bashri, Mohamed Salim al-Awa, Fehmi Huwaidi and other figures close to the decision-making circles, in addition to civil society intellectuals, such as Galal Amin, Ziad Bahaa al-Din and Mostafa Higazy. I figured that this group could discuss the governing rules to be applied in the following phase. When we find common ground, we can start negotiations involving the Muslim Brotherhood and their allies, with the representatives of the government in the presence of public figures. It is necessary to make mutual concessions to get out of this crisis.

As-Safir:  What is the fate of this proposal?

Nafaa:  I sent the proposal to Mahmoud al-Asar in October. I hoped that the state would deal with it seriously, but I have yet to receive a response in this regard. In February, writer Gamal Sultan proposed an initiative under the name of “the national coalition to support legitimacy,” which was something new as he proposed that the Islamist candidates do not run for presidency for two rounds and be prepared to accept the road map in return for the release of detainees.

I asked the Muslim Brotherhood leader Mohamed Ali Boshar about it, he said he had not heard of it. I asked Gamal Sultan and he said that the initiative is targeted at factions in the coalition, and there is a will to put pressure on the Brotherhood to accept it. Afterward, the April 6 Youth Movement, the Building and Development Party and Hizb al-Wasat issued statements stating that they accepted the initiative. I met with Boshar and told him that the Brotherhood ought to issue a statement to accept the initiative in order to pressure the government to follow suit. He said that the Brotherhood cannot do this because many of the leaders are in prison and the regime did not express a desire for a settlement. I had the feeling that the system is not prepared to engage in a dialogue prior to the elections. In the end, I think that both parties are responsible for the lack of dialogue. Yet, there is no other way than dialogue and reconciliation, and any future president will not be able to implement his platform, unless he has a perception for a way out of this crisis.

As-Safir:  Aside from the Brotherhood and the state, do you not see that a third party, whether political forces and revolutionary groups, can play a role in reaching a solution?

Nafaa:  This party is still divided and fragmented, and it does not have a regulatory framework. It is facing an organized media campaign accusing it of being a fifth column and a sleeper cell affiliated with the Brotherhood. Personally, my students accused me of all of that. The atmosphere is chaotic and the campaigns are systematic, which makes this sector ineffective. Even though it actually represents the spirit of the January 25 Revolution, it refuses the rule of the supreme guide or of any tyrant whatsoever, and it wants to lay the foundations for a system that accommodates everyone.

Read More: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/politics/2014/04/egypt-professor-heading-fourth-transitional-period.html