A Turkish soldier patrols the border where thousands of Syrian Kurds have fled from ISIS forces, Kobani, Syria, Sept. 27, 2014. Bryan Denton/Corbis
October 09, 2014
Vice
President Joseph Biden’s clumsy criticism of Turkey last week could not have
come at a worse time. By rebuking Ankara for allowing the flow of foreign
fighters through its border with Syria, Biden revealed the Obama administration’s
lack of strategy when it comes to confronting the ongoing crisis in the Levant.
This is further compounded by an incomplete grasp of the facts and the
inability to admit the mistakes of the past three years.
Turkey’s
waiting game on the Syrian border, just outside Kobani, is cruel from a
humanitarian point of view. From a cynical strategic point of view, on the
other hand, it is understandable. Any intervention in Kobani places Turkish
soldiers squarely in between the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and a
PKK-allied Kurdish force, with which Turkey has had a long history of conflict.
After three years of hesitation, Turkey has signaled its readiness to play a
more active role in Syria and to join the recently formed coalition against
ISIS. Specifically, the Turkish parliament has authorized the use of force by
the government, to establish a buffer zone inside Syria and to do so in
alliance with international forces that might have to use Turkish soil in
pursuit of ISIS.
Turkish
forces have been partially mobilized, and their tanks stand ready just outside Kobani.
But Turkey would like an intervention in Kobani to be part of an overall
strategy approved by the international alliance, something that is not yet
forthcoming. Primarily, Turkey wants a humanitarian solution to the continuing
flow of refugees across its borders, while keeping them inside Syria, rather than
inadvertently keeping them inside Turkey and establishing a long-term Syrian diaspora.
Turkey also wants any intervention in Kobani to be a first step toward a more
effective intervention inside Syria.
The
U.S. is pleased to have Turkey join the coalition, and is ready to at least
consider the buffer zone idea. But the congruence of views ends here. Three
areas of disagreement are obvious. First, Turkey wants a no-fly zone to protect
the buffer zone from Syrian aerial attacks. Second, it also wants the buffer
zone to serve as a base for training and equipping the Free Syrian Army (FSA). Third,
and perhaps most important, it wants any action against ISIS to be coupled with
action to bring down the regime of Syrian President Basha Al-Assad. All three
ideas require an active role by the U.S. and NATO.
The
Obama administration, rather than hurling unsubstantiated criticisms, should
listen to Turkey. The buffer zone is an old idea whose time has come. It would
serve not only as a safe haven for Syrian refugees, but also as an
on-the-ground base for moderate Syrian rebels, allowing them access to arms and
training from the coalition, and an ideal location from which to launch attacks
inside Syria. The Turkish-Syrian border, the National Security Council experts
should be reminded, is a lot closer to the battlefield than Saudi Arabia, the
currently suggested location to arm and train Syrian rebels. The no-fly-zone,
at least over the buffer zone itself, is no longer as difficult to install, now
that allied planes are already flying over Iraq and Syria in pursuit of ISIS
fighters. Whether or not the coalition decides to go after Assad, this would at
least serve the humanitarian purpose of preventing his air force from bombing areas
where refugees and other civilian populations are concentrated in the north. Finally,
attacking the source of the problem, the Assad regime, would complete what so
far has been an inadequate strategy.
Vice
President Biden, as the only administration senior official with foreign policy
expertise, ought to know that what started this whole mess is the Al-Assad
killing machine, which let jihadi fighters out of jail so they could wreak
havoc upon the secular opposition and the resisting population. The links
between the Al-Assad regime and the Al-Qaeda in Iraq fighters who fled Iraq to
Syria are all outlined in the administration’s intelligence files—all available
to the VP should he wish to refresh his information. To boot, Al-Assad warned
publicly, more than two years ago, that if the revolt against him continued the
trouble would spread to the entire region. His were not idle threats.
Two
other problems present both hurdles and opportunities for U.S. diplomacy:
Turkish-Kurdish relations and Turkish-European relations. Turkey has been
reluctant to jump into the fray at Kobani because it would involve Turkish
troops entering Syrian territory without adequate support from its Western allies
and their Arab partners. Such a move would also complicate relations with
Kurdish organizations that Ankara has hitherto considered as terrorist groups. It
is in the U.S. national interest to encourage closer relations between Turkey
and the European Union, to the point of promoting EU membership for a NATO ally
that has long desired closer cooperation with Europe. This is a propitious
time, given Turkey’s interest and the services it can render on the security
front. Arab allies, who may harbor jitters over a return of the Ottoman empire
to Arab lands, need to fish or cut bait: They will need boots on the ground to defeat
ISIS, and Turkey is the only one that can supply them inside Syria without
posing any threat to the region. Kobani is both an urgent humanitarian crisis
and a test for the airstrike-only strategy. If Kobani falls it would set back
the fight against ISIS and would dramatize the inadequacy of airstrikes.
Nudging
along Turkish reconciliation with the Kurds is also an opportunity that should
be seized. Turkey is already on better terms with Iraqi Kurds than ever. There
are also ongoing talks and partial agreement with Abdallah Oscalan, the jailed
PKK leader, which could, with a little help from mutual friends, be pushed into
a lasting resolution of the Kurdish question in Turkey. Turkey’s reluctance to
engage across its borders, absent an understanding with Kurdish leaders on the
future status of the Kurdish areas along its borders, is understandable. Turkey’s
stepping in to save Kobani, if done correctly, could help resolve several
broader problems. If done clumsily, it could only complicate them.
The Obama
administration was slow to recognize the gravity of the problems that would
ensue if Syria descended into total chaos, precipitated by the Syrian regime’s
war against its own people. Most independent observers, government insiders,
and former officials now recognize that fact. While admitting past mistakes
does not come easy, fixing them is still advisable and doable. The continuation
of this current regime in Syria means the continuation of the regional war that
has ensued indefinitely. Empowering the moderate opposition, even at this late
stage in the game, is still the only way to bring about a political solution,
one that reconstitutes the Syrian government in genuinely representative way. The
Turks have been saying this all along, and they are ready to help implement what
is at this point an admittedly very difficult proposition. Listen to Turkey,
it’s not too late.
Nabeel
Khoury is senior fellow for Middle East and National Security at the
Chicago Council on Global Affairs and a visiting scholar at the Middle East and
North Africa Studies Program at Northwestern University. On Twitter:
@khoury_nabeel.