June 02, 2013
Under the
norms prevalent in Saudi Arabia since the beginning of the Saud family’s rule,
princes of varying age and political responsibility have been expected to show
their allegiance to Islam, specifically the Salafi interpretation, in all
events public and private, even sporting events. This continuously announced
loyalty on the part of the ruling family is in turn rewarded by unwavering
religious support from the ulema (clerics),
who are constantly adapting religious interpretations to suit the interests of
the public and the ruling family. The Saudi version of religion has proven to
be an effective weapon for the monarchy to rely upon in facing political and
security crises, and the rulers have become highly adept at using religion and
state clerics to expand their own influence. However recently, Salafi clerics
have begun to fear a change to this long held agreement.
While a
group of prominent Salafi figures were preparing to meet King Abdullah on April
9 at his spring retreat in the oasis of Rawdhat Khuraim, northeast of Riyadh,
to voice their objections to what they saw as the corruption “of society and
women, news spread that Prince Mutaib bin Abdullah’s demand that “religion not
enter into politics” in an April 7 speech celebrating the annual Jenadriyah
Festival. Some Salafis saw this as a message from the royal family that it is
leaning towards separation of religion and the state—particularly coming from a
prince with so many roles (besides being the king’s son, Prince Mutaib is a
minister of state and the head of the National Guard.) However, there has been
precedent for such a statement: Prince Turki Al-Faisal, former head of the
intelligence services, first hinted that Saudi Arabia could go down a path of
separate political and religious sphere in an op-ed for the pan-Arab daily Asharq
Al-Awsat back in
2002. Prince Turki then defined the concept of “those in authority” (wali al-amr) in the Quranic verse “O you who have
believed, obey God and obey the Messenger and those in authority among you” (4:59)
as meaning the rulers alone. This contradicted the interpretation of prominent
figures in the religious establishment like Abdullah Al-Turki, who had argued
that wali al-amr referred
to both the rulers and the ulema.
Several
religious figures expressed their dissatisfaction with Prince Mutaib’s
statement, with Sheikh Abdul-Aziz Al-Tarifi being the most vocal in his
criticism, noting on Twitter that:
“Whoever says there is no relationship between religion and politics worships
two gods, one in the heavens and one on earth.” Even though the relationship
between religion and politics in Saudi Arabia actually differs little from the
thrust of Mutaib’s statement, the fact that he would openly say so is unusual;
Salafis see this as a violation of the unspoken rules of their oath of fealty.
Other
incidents at Jenadriyah Festival worsened the already contentious mood. A member of Committee for the
Promotion of Virtue and the Prevention of Vice (CPVPV) stormed a performance by an Emirati
musical ensemble and female singer and had to be forcibly removed by a group of
Saudi National Guard soldiers. Another confrontation between members
of the CPVPV and national guardsmen providing security took place during the
event. The CPVPV was acting on the orders of the official religious
establishment which forbids mixing between men and women as well as singing,
“especially if it is a woman’s voice,” as stated by the Senior Ulema Council. Meanwhile,
the annual Jenadriyah heritage and folklore festival in Riyadh is organized by
the National Guard, led (currently) by Prince Mutaib, and takes place in
Riyadh—at the seat of the monarchy.
King
Abdullah’s attitude might also be increasing the religious establishment’s
nervousness. The king has historically had close political, military, and
strategic ties with the United States and the West in general, and has been
open-minded towards other religions, as seen in the funding of an interfaith
dialogue center in Vienna whose November 2012 inauguration was attended by
Catholic priests, Jewish rabbis, and leaders from the Saudi religious
establishment. The king encourages investments in higher education and cultural
exchange, gives thousands of Saudi students, male and female, scholarships to
study in Europe and the US, and within Saudi Arabia. Not only did the king
spent over $30 billion on the groundbreaking King Abdullah University of
Science and Technology (KAUST), but also asked Sheikh al-Satri in October 2009
to resign from his position in the Senior Ulema Council for his objections to
KAUST being co-ed and allowing concerts on campus.
Prince
Mutaib’s statement shows that Saudi decision-makers have begun to lose their
patience with the pervasive influence of Salafi individuals and institutions
within Saudi public affairs, and see that historical relationship between
religion and politics as burdening Saudi rulers, who must find a new formula
for their relationship. The rulers seem to see it in their interest to limit
the powers of their religious partner and weaken its direct influence on
society through education, media, and the economy. Regardless of the
significance of the events at the Jenadriyah Festival, what is certain is that
the incidents reflect a larger dilemma: that of the Saudi state’s identity,
torn between the different visions espoused by the princes and the sheikhs. Is
it a religious state subject to Salafi interpretations of sacred texts still
maintaining the 1744 pact between Mohammed bin Abdul-Wahhab and Mohammed bin
Saud? Or is it a kingdom with a unique political system amalgamating a variety
of autocratic, traditional, and religious aspects and also balancing
secularism, realpolitik, and capitalism?
Ibrahim Hatlani is a Jeddah-based Saudi writer and
researcher.
This article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed
online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/05/21/of-identities-and-institutions/g46s