In Vienna, U.S. and Iran Working to Beat the Clock
Reza Marashi
October 18, 2014
“The
Iran nuclear negotiations are on life support. Iranian officials are trying to
leverage regional instability to win more favorable terms in a nuclear deal.
Iran's stubbornness has caused it to miss the last best chance at finalizing a
nuclear deal by the November 24th deadline.” These are the latest
arguments circulating in Washington, DC. The noise coming from Tehran about red
lines is equally unhelpful. But here in Vienna, one can’t help but notice a
stark difference between this rhetoric and reality.
Thousands
of miles away from the spin factories in Washington and Tehran, negotiators are
working diligently to seal the deal. To hear the Europeans tell it, a deal is
within reach. “[Russian foreign minister] Lavrov was telling the truth. The
deal is 95 percent done, but the remaining five percent is the most difficult
details,” a Western diplomat told me. “When you see the various drafts of the
agreement we're putting together, it's obvious we've come a long way—further
than many thought possible. Relatively speaking, very little disputed language
remains in brackets.”
As the
negotiations reconvene, all eyes are on three unresolved issues. That’s right—only
three. Numerous issues that have long been contentious—including Iran’s
underground enrichment facility, its heavy water reactor, and inspections and
monitoring, among others—have been largely hammered out. So what does that
leave for negotiators to hash out?
The
size and contours of Iran’s enrichment program under a comprehensive deal
remains the most challenging point of contention. To date, Washington has
insisted Tehran cut the number of its operational centrifuges to 1,500—down
from 10,000. Not surprisingly, Iran rejects this push and prefers to keep its
10,000 operational centrifuges in return for a freeze on centrifuge expansion
for the duration of a deal. The problem with these respective positions is that
neither is firmly grounded in science. Instead, domestic politics have thus far
dictated what the two sides insist upon at the negotiating table. This is not a
recipe for success.
Centrifuge
numbers are a dead end because they are largely arbitrary. It is more useful to
focus on Separative Work Unit (SWU) count, which can vary even if centrifuge
numbers remain constant. But even if SWU is used as the proper metric, bridging
the gap will require compromise and creativity from both sides. Washington is
insisting upon immediate-term limitations that prevent Tehran from enrichment
levels that it cannot yet achieve. For its part, Iran is pushing for
immediate-term enrichment levels that surpass its current needs.
Both
sides must make the political decision to compromise and meet somewhere in the
middle. It would be the biggest foreign policy blunder since the Iraq war to
abandon a technically feasible nuclear deal for domestic political reasons. A
good deal will cement Iran’s 2003 decision that nuclear weapons are not in its
interest—and make it impossible for Iran to pursue nuclear weapons without
being swiftly caught.
The
U.S. and Iran also disagree over the duration of any comprehensive nuclear
deal. It is worth noting both sides agree that Iran will adhere to limitations
on its enrichment program for a mutually agreed upon period of time as a
trust-building exercise. But after that period of time, Iran is free to act as
any other member of the non-proliferation treaty. And therein lies the problem—precisely
because the U.S. and Iran have trust issues, they disagree on how much time
should pass before Tehran takes off the shackles.
Washington
wants a deal to last for at least 20 years, while Tehran prefers three to five
years—preferably while President Hassan Rowhani is still in office and can reap
the domestic political benefits of ending the nuclear crisis. Accepting the
other side’s terms would be political suicide for Iranian and American
politicians. Again, both sides are using politics rather than science to
dictate their respective positions. Decades of mistrust cannot be undone in
three to five years—but 20 years of treating Iran differently that other NPT
signatories fuels rather than allays Iranian suspicions of American intentions.
The
duration of a comprehensive deal has become a political issue, so both sides
must split the difference. There is no truly objective way to do this, so they
should use the IAEA to provide scientific cover for a mutually agreed upon
political decision. For example, Washington and Tehran should hammer out a
timeline—10 years?—for permanently closing Iran's nuclear file, take it to the
IAEA, and have the agency announce the plan as an IAEA-led process. Doing so
will give their political timeline for the duration of a deal the scientific
veneer it needs to survive public scrutiny.
This
will also help resolve the third remaining point of contention: Cooperation
with the IAEA regarding Iran's past nuclear activities—particularly possible
military dimensions (PMD) prior to 2003. This is no doubt an important issue,
but it is equally important to avoid making mountains out of molehills.
To
hear Western diplomats tell it, one of the most interesting dynamics is the
interplay between issues: If the two sides can agree on the size and contours
of Iran's enrichment program and the duration of a deal, PMD (and sanctions
relief) issues should get resolved much easier. In other words, a political
decision must be made in Washington and Tehran to accept technical solutions to
these challenges—and it is easier to accept technical solutions when you know
the political road ahead.
Ostensibly,
Iran is negotiating with the P5+1 and the IAEA on separate tracks, but in
reality, Iran's cooperation with the IAEA is a direct function of the P5+1
track. Resolving PMD issues should be viewed through this lens. No amount of
scrubbing sites or shifting soil can remove criminalizing traces of radiation,
so the question is not if Iran answers PMD questions, but rather how. A
potential win-win solution could be Iran accounting for past activities in
return for ironclad P5+1 assurances that it will not pay for sins previously
committed.
Washington
and Tehran should accept this paradigm because focusing on a future that
verifiably ensures the peaceful nature of Iran's nuclear program is more
important than shaming Tehran for activities it ceased over a decade ago.
Consider the alternative: Without a comprehensive deal, Iran's cooperation with
the IAEA at best is reduced to pre-Rowhani levels. At worst, Iran-IAEA
cooperation is dead. Iran’s nuclear program is the most heavily monitored in
the world, and that is unlikely to remain the case without a comprehensive
deal. Assertions to the contrary are less than honest.
As
another Western diplomat told me: “If it was up to the negotiators, the deal
would be done. It’s now up to political leaders on both sides to take yes for
an answer.” Acknowledging the tremendous progress that has been achieved to
date does not lessen the importance of the unresolved issues. But those issues
need not torpedo a historic diplomatic victory. The common thread that runs
through each of these issues is simple: political leaders in Washington and
Tehran will need to show a greater willingness to absorb and sell compromise.
The
reality facing both sides will not change: There are spoilers in the U.S. and
Iran who will try to torpedo a deal, no matter the details. Precisely because
it is impossible to satisfy ideologues, they only way to defeat them is to have
a deal in hand that both sides believe is a win-win outcome. That will force
the ideologues to publicly flesh out the details of their alternative—and the
only alternative to a comprehensive deal is war. That is Obama and Rowhani’s
trump card, and as November 24 approaches, they must play to win the
game.
Reza Marashi is research director at the National
Iranian-American Council. This
article originally appeared in the Huffington Post.