Pakistani army chief General Raheel Sharif attends military exercise, Bahawalpur, Nov. 4, 2013. Qamar Pervez/Reuters/Corbis
October 19, 2014
Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif’s government took
office in June 2013—with a sizable parliamentary majority—and amidst raised
expectations that his party, the Pakistan Muslim League Nawaz party, or PML-N,
for short, would be able to create a
positive change on the political and economic scene. But the fractious polity
of Pakistan has threatened his tenuous hold on power and thrust his party into
a confrontation with the powerful military establishment, even as Sharif is
under attack from his civilian political opponents. Nawaz 3.0, his third time
in office, has started looking more like Nawaz 1.0. And rumors have begun
circulating of an “Egypt on the Indus”—the possibility of a soft coup perhaps
leading to the real thing.
First, the political crisis. As
Pakistan celebrated its sixty-seventh independence anniversary on August 14, at
least two political forces converged on the capital Islamabad to press for
change in the government. One challenge came from the relatively liberal
Tehreek-e-Insaf of cricketeer-turned-politician Imran Khan; the other from the
right-wing religious evangelist Muhammad Tahir-ul-Qadri, a resident of Canada
who brought his Minhaj-ul-Quran followers to bear on the
teetering and confused government. Khan had accused the Sharif government of
stealing last year’s elections, which left his party with just thirty-four
seats in parliament. The irony of a democrat demanding an extra-constitutional
change in the government was lost on Khan and his followers. But the
government’s ham-handed approach to his earlier demands for a recount in four
districts and then ten districts is partly to blame for Khan’s move to step up
his opposition to Sharif. Much more is behind the general and rising
unhappiness with Sharif, however. He presides over a sluggish economy and a
country that has been hit with severe energy shortages and flooding. Then there
is Sharif’s dynastic style of governance, which relies on a kitchen cabinet
rather than state institutions to deliver the goods.
Against the backdrop of a growing political crisis,
tensions have been rising between the civil and military institutions over an
apparent assassination attempt on one of the country’s most popular
journalists. Hamid Mir, a reporter for the Geo TV news channel, is a leading
critic of the country’s military-intelligence complex. When Mir accused the
Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) directorate of being behind the attack,
well-organized public demonstrations quickly erupted in favor of the head of
the ISI, Lieutenant General Zahir ul-Islam. Mir claimed that the ISI was
unhappy with his criticism of the intelligence agency.
Nawaz Sharif paid Mir a visit in the hospital where he
was recovering from six bullet wounds. At the same time, Chief of Army Staff
General Raheel Sharif visited ISI headquarters in a show of support for
ul-Islam. The following day, the Pakistan Ministry of Defence called for Geo TV
to be shut down for smearing the ISI. After veiled critiques of the military
continued from within Sharif’s government, General Sharif responded during a
conference of corps commanders: “While our country is faced with multiple
internal and external challenges, Pakistan Army upholds the sanctity of all
institutions and will resolutely preserve its own dignity and institutional
pride.” Defence Minister Khawaja Asif issued his own rejoinder noting that the
parliament was supreme and that no institution should violate the sanctity of
another, implying that the army had trespassed into civilian territory. Then,
inevitably, the corps commanders weighed in to express their “displeasure” over
Asif’s remarks.
To Coup or Not to Coup
Prime Minister Sharif has gone out of his way to
repeat the mantra of previous civilian governments that the government and army
are “on the same page.” Yet he has spawned a full-blown crisis by allowing
events to escalate into a public slanging match with a military whose public
opinion ratings were rising—even as the prime minister’s were shrinking. Rumors
have surfaced of an imminent coup, but this may not be as easy to achieve as in
earlier instances of a military takeover. Pakistani politics has reached a
stalemate. The army cannot mount a coup without support from the people or
without another political party waiting in the wings that is allied to the
military and has a strong enough base to justify and uphold the military’s
actions. Nor does it have the latent support of the judiciary or large parts of
the mass media that shape public opinion. For its part, the government has a
powerful base in the Punjab but not in Pakistan’s other three provinces—Sindh,
Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, and Balochistan—and so it too must contend with a newly
empowered judiciary and civil society, and media. Consequently, the posturing
persists but no serious breach of constitutional norms will occur unless some
major economic or political crisis erupts that demands immediate action.
Within his first year in office, Nawaz Sharif was in a
position to select a new army chief, historically the most powerful military
position in the land. Given his bad luck with previous choices and clashes with
past army chiefs when he was prime minister in the 1990s, there was speculation
that he would seek to alter the balance between the civil and military in a
substantial way. But, his performance indicates that though much has changed
inside Pakistan’s polity, much also remains unaltered. The military continues
to dominate discourse on key issues of national interest that properly lie in
the purview of the civilians, namely internal security, foreign relations with
neighbors and the United States, and nuclear policy. This is not likely to
change.
Time is limited for the civilian government to exert
its constitutional supremacy over the military; to do so, it must improve
governance and partner with the strengthened positions of other national
institutions: the media, civil society, parliament, and the judiciary. If it
does not achieve supremacy rapidly, the army chief is likely to acquire greater
power within his own institution as he selects his new crop of senior generals
to fill slots vacated by retiring officers.
This dynamic can be explained by
the principal-agent theory. The civilian government (as principal) could impose
itself on the military (as its agent) if it employs closer monitoring of the
military’s actions, and brings the military under public scrutiny via other
actors in Pakistani society that have established themselves as autonomous
actors in the past decade or so. The key would be a modulated oversight of the
military that is not too intrusive. The patterns of past civil-military
conflicts in Pakistan appear to bear out this theory. Benazir Bhutto’s attempt
to take over the ISI by appointing a retired general backfired, as did her
husband Asif Ali Zardari’s attempt to bring the ISI under the Pakistan Ministry
of Interior. Nawaz Sharif himself suffered in his earlier tenures the
ill-effects of trying to influence army chiefs to promote some of his favored
officers, thus treading upon a purview that army leaders were prepared to
defend.
No Blueprint for Change
Sharif’s third time as prime minister shows that he
has not progressed much on the scale of governance. His team remains largely
the same as in his previous terms in office, which ended in October 1999 with
the coup d’état of General Pervez Musharraf. Returning to power, his immediate
instinct was to consolidate key ministries under his direct control: defense,
foreign affairs, commerce, among others. Only reluctantly did he let go of the
defense and commerce ministries to meet the demands of the courts, and the need
to engage in trade talks with India at the ministerial level.
Sharif continues to rely on a Punjabi cabal of advisors
to make key decisions. A flurry of meetings took place with the military on the
need to move against militants in North Waziristan but the prime minister,
under advice from his ministers, chose to open talks with the militants
instead. The military was dumbfounded by this change of tactics. In the end,
the military launched the attack in North Waziristan and succeeded in
destroying the bases of the militants in that border region. But this tactical
gain may be hard to sustain nationwide without civilian planning and
participation in the counterterrorism campaign.
The absence of direct and disciplined civilian
oversight of the military contributes to an imbalance in how the military
perceives civilians. Moreover, on governance, no major bill has been passed in
parliament. Trade negotiations with India have ground to a halt. U.S. relations
are moving slowly and Afghanistan has been left largely to the military to
manage. The Sharif circle did not appear to bring a blueprint for change, for
example on broadening the tax net or integrating the Federally Administered
Tribal Areas (FATA), despite having been out of government for fifteen years
and having ruled the Punjab for the previous five years.
The only major sector in which the Sharif government
attempted to move rapidly has been energy. It paid off the accumulated circular
debt that was contributing to a downward spiral in energy output. Energy users,
including the government’s own agencies, refused to pay their bills in return
for which energy producers cut back on production. But the public criticism
centered on the fact that the creditors were largely the oligarchs, who
supported this government, and that there has been no visible increase in
energy production since that initial payout and instead, a steady increase in
the circular debt yet again. What could have strengthened the government’s
claim of good governance ended up being criticized by its opponents in the
civil and military as crony capitalism.
War on Terrorism
Most opinion polls in Pakistan place terrorism and
militancy high on the scale of public concerns, second only to economic
concerns. According to a Pew Research
Center poll in May 2013:
Roughly nine-in-ten Pakistanis
believe the country is on the wrong track, and about eight-in-ten say the
economy is in poor shape... Meanwhile, concerns about extremist
groups have increased markedly. More than nine-in-ten Pakistanis describe
terrorism as a very big problem, and about half now say the Taliban are a very
serious threat to their country. For the first time since the Pew Research
Center began polling on these issues, the Taliban are essentially considered as
big a threat to Pakistan as longtime rival India.
In the Punjab, the Sharif family bought off its
Islamist opponents with strategic electoral alliances in central and southern
Punjab. As the Economist subsequently noted in an interview with Punjab
chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, Nawaz Sharif’s younger brother, on February 3,
2014:
Mr. Sharif does not confront the
terrorists directly, while vociferously attacking “America’s war”; they return
the favor and leave Punjab alone. Were he to take on the Taliban now, that deal
would obviously break down, threatening to bring high levels of violence back
to Punjab.
The Sharif government’s talks with the
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, using a changing team of interlocutors, were marked
by a lack of public clarity of aim and remained largely focused on the FATA
bordering Afghanistan. No direct discussions took place on the Punjab,
Balochistan, or Karachi, the three other hubs of militant activity. The
military is concerned about operating against the Punjabi Taliban, most of whom
come from the same region in Central and Southern Punjab where the bulk of the
military’s own recruits originate. Military leaders therefore have to be
careful in continuing to use Islamic and nationalistic rhetoric to define their
aims in order to keep internal discipline intact, even while they adopt a more
pragmatic policy towards terrorism.
If the Sharif government can more sharply define the
war against terrorism and militancy and work with the military to bring it on
board, it may be in a good position to let the military take the initial lead
as a willing “agent” of the civilian “principal” in this effort. Over time this
should help establish civilian leadership in this field.
The drafting of the first
National Internal Security Policy under the Interior Ministry seemed to be a
chance for the civilians to show their ability to lead. But the draft, released
in February, appeared less comprehensive than expected and did not define the
respective roles of the civilian government and the military. By socializing
this policy among other civil society actors, the government may be able to
muster support that would help in its negotiations with the military. A
challenge will be to help the military in owning the strategy, at least in its
early stages, allowing the civilian principal to exert greater control over
time as its prepares to take over governance of cleared territory from the
military. A key weakness of the new strategy is the absence of a clear policy
toward the future of FATA and the restoration of civilian administration to the
territory under the same principles as apply to other autonomous territories in
Pakistan’s control. The army has maintained a studied public silence on this
policy and needs to be drawn much more into its discussions so that better
coordination on intelligence can be organized at the federal government level
while building up civilian capacity in this field.
Foreign Policy Files
The military continues to regard
relations with the United States, China, Saudi Arabia, and immediate neighbors
India, Iran, and Afghanistan as its major interest. This is a legacy of years
of military rule and the willingness of civilian rulers to allow the military
an unduly large role in foreign policy formulation. The Sharif government has
continued to cede a virtual veto to the military in foreign relations without
taking the lead itself. This old habit has made it hard for the Sharif
government, like its predecessors, to exercise full control over key foreign
relations. Hence military intrusion in this domain continues.
The relationship with the United States remains an
important one. Strong anti-Americanism and suspicion pervades the junior and
middle ranks of the Pakistan military even though their superiors need and
demand better U.S. weaponry and continued assistance. But as Aqil Shah noted in
Foreign Affairs, “By continuing to treat the Pakistani military as a state
above the state, the United States only reinforces the military’s exaggerated
sense of indispensability and further weakens civilian rule.”
Civilian-military differences remain on the issue of
India. The civilians under Sharif want improved ties. The military favors ties
and the absence of hostilities, but wants resolution of key disputes including
Kashmir to remain high on the agenda and it seeks to keep the public on its
side on these matters. Prime Minister Sharif wishes to engage with India on trade
but will have to convince the military of the benefits to its own commercial
enterprises and logistics operations of open borders with India. The government
has failed to educate the military or the general public of the issue behind
these negotiations and even on the issues pertaining to water cooperation and
climate change on which much groundwork has been done already. A new Indian
government under a strong prime minister, Narendra Modi, will be in a better
position to deliver on trade and other agreements, while keeping the threat of
force to punish Pakistan for any deviation from the path of cooperation or if
it foments terrorist activities across the Kashmir or Indian border. If Nawaz
Sharif succeeds in building trade and boosting the Pakistan economy by working
with India, he will be able to create a huge vested interest group among the
Pakistani business community and general population that will fortify him
against the military’s recalcitrance.
Afghanistan remains a major issue for the civilian and
military institutions in Pakistan. A powerful vestige of the past remains the
role of the ISI in Afghanistan and FATA and in treating some Taliban elements
as assets. Though the agency does not have the assured control that it seeks or
imagines, it continues to use that aspect of its relationship with the Afghan
and Pakistani Taliban as influence against any potential government in Kabul
that might turn against Pakistan. The absence of any overt Pakistani
involvement in the recent Afghan elections may be a good sign that reflects a
partial victory for the civilians who see Afghanistan as an opportunity rather
than a threat. Sharif sees trade and economics as key to changing the situation
with Afghanistan and through it with Central Asia. The army still sees threats
of Afghan nationalism, and an Afghanistan-India axis to support Baloch
separatists and sandwich Pakistan between two hostile armies to the east and
the west. The emergence of a powerful Indian nationalistic government in the
shape of Modi’s Bharatiya Janata Party will validate the army’s fears.
Sharif Against Sharif?
What might precipitate a conflict between the two
Sharifs? Poor governance and lack of tough decisions on the economy might send
the economy into a downward spiral, reducing the resources available to the
government and the army to continue the fight against domestic terrorism and
potential external threats. Street unrest resulting from energy shortages or
spiraling inflation may bring the army out in aid of civil power, as was the case
in August 2014 when the army was given legal cover to operate in the capital
region under Article 245 of the constitution. Afghanistan-based guerrilla
attacks on Pakistan may provoke a major incident on the Afghan border.
Similarly, jihadi attacks in Kashmir or inside India might provoke sharp Indian
punitive actions under a muscular Modi government responding to its right wing
base, leading to a potentially wider conflict. A successful jihadi attack on
the Pakistan army may lead to a sharp military response, broadening the war
against terrorism beyond the boundary of FATA. The military could provoke a
crisis under such conditions and orchestrate enough public support to justify a
coup along the Egyptian model.
The trial of former army chief
and president Musharraf is often cited as a potential flashpoint in the
civil-military relationship. Many among the senior ranks of the army feel
Musharraf refused their advice in returning from exile to Pakistan. There are
murmurings of unhappiness among the younger officers and soldiers that a former
army chief is being humiliated. But the army has no leg to stand on in opposing
this trial. Nawaz Sharif has handled the issue deftly. The court can let
Musharraf go and continue with the trial in absentia. Or it can convict him and
allow him to appeal the sentence. This all may take time. But Musharraf’s trial
is unlikely to produce widespread public unrest.
Civil-military relations will remain tenuous at best
for the next year or two. Both sides have to do well in their respective fields
to avoid conflicts between them. There remains a faint hope that civilian
supremacy will become a reality over time, provided it is accompanied by good
governance. Nawaz Sharif’s performance to date does not inspire confidence in
his ability to manage the civil-military relationship successfully. So long as
he dithers in taking strong decisions in the national rather than personal
interest, the betting will grow stronger against him.
Shuja Nawaz is the founding director of the
South Asia Center at the Atlantic Council in Washington, DC. He held numerous
posts during a thirty-year career at the International Monetary Fund, and
served as a division director at the International Atomic Energy Agency. He is
the author of Crossed
Swords: Pakistan, Its Army, and the Wars Within and numerous reports,
most recently, “India and Pakistan: The Opportunity Cost of Conflict,” with
Mohan Guruswamy.