February 08, 2013
Since the summer of 2012, the beleaguered Syrian
regime has all but abandoned areas predominantly inhabited by Kurdish
populations. So far, the main beneficiary of this situation of quasi-autonomy
for a “West Kurdistan” (as it is referred to in Kurdish political geography)
appears to be the Democratic Union Party (Partiya Yekitiya Demokratik, or
PYD)—a powerful Syrian Kurdish group established in 2003 by Kurdistan Workers
Party (PKK) militants of Syrian origin in the Qandil mountains of northern
Iraq. The largely bloodless withdrawal of the Syrian army and security forces
in the north and northeast of the country—as well as tensions between the PYD
and other revolutionary actors—has given rise to a host of accusations and
suspicions about the group’s motivations, as well as its national and regional
designs.
In a remarkably short time, the PYD has succeeded in setting
up a well-armed military of about 10,000 fighters, known as the Popular
Protection Units (or Yekineyen Parastina Gel, or YPG), as well as local,
self-organized civilian structures under the label of the “Movement for a
Democratic Society” (Tevgera Civaka Demokratik, or TEV-DEM). In theory, the PYD
shares power with some 15 other Kurdish parties (who form the Kurdish National
Council, or KNC) in the framework of the Kurdish Supreme Council, which was
established in July 2012 through the mediation efforts of Massoud Barazani,
president of Iraqi Kurdistan and leader of Iraq’s Kurdistan Democratic Party
(KDP). Yet on the ground, the PYD is dismissing its council partners as nothing
more than proxies for Barazani himself, whose close relationship with Turkey
the PYD deeply mistrusts.
Additionally, the PYD has prevented any armed
Kurdish presence besides its own loyalist Populist Protection Units; most
recently, armed altercations were reported with
the Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekiti) in the towns of al-Darbasiyah and
Qamishli.
The PYD and YPG have also repeatedly clashed with
fighters of the Free Syrian Army (FSA), who themselves are connected to the KNC
through the Syrian Opposition Coalition—particularly in the mixed town of Ras
al-Ayn (Serekani) on the Turkish border. Fighting continues to flare up despite
all attempts at mediation. The PYD have also repelled attempts by the FSA to
enter Kurdish areas in and around Aleppo and have accused Turkey of instigating
and supporting the forays of
Islamist elements (such as Jabhat al-Nusra and Ghuraba Al Sham) into Kurdish
areas.
The tension between PYD and FSA (as well as with
other revolutionary elements) have given rise to accusations that the PYD is,
in fact, acting as a sub-contractor for the Syrian regime. In late December,
Arab tribes attacked PYD
offices in the mixed city of al-Hasakah in retaliation for previous regime
violence against protesters, and accused the party of collaboration with the regime.
But while the position taken by the PYD certainly complicates the situation for
the FSA and its Turkish backers (and therefore provides an objective benefit
for the Syrian regime itself), there is little evidence for active cooperation
between the two sides. Areas controlled by the PYD are occasionally targeted by
the regime, if only on a much lesser scale than those where the FSA is present.
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the structures of Kurdish
self-government that have since developed could even survive should Bashar
al-Assad ever manage to reclaim control over the whole of Syria. Yet tensions
between the PYD and FSA imply the clear danger of worsening relations between
Sunni Arabs and Kurds in this part of the country—with sizable Christian
communities caught in the middle.
The second major accusation leveled against the
PYD—often by an increasingly nervous Turkey—is that the party is nothing more
than a front for the PKK. Officially, the PYD denies any such damaging
affiliation. Yet, even if one disregards the origins of some prominent PYD
leaders in the PKK, the group’s language, its symbols (most visibly, images of
imprisoned PKK-leader Abdullah Ocalan), and its organizational structures
(not least among them, a visible presence of female fighters in the lower
ranks) mirror those of the PKK. Moreover, it is unclear how the Syrian Kurds
could have set up (and by themselves, no less) the logistical and structural
framework to form an effective military force of more than 10,000 fighters.
At the same time, there is little evidence thus far
of Kurdish fighters attempting to infiltrate Turkish territory from Syria.
While the PYD and the PKK leadership are concerned enough to deny Turkey any
pretext for direct intervention—authorized by the Turkish parliament in early
October 2012, without specification where exactly it may occur—their priority
is to build autonomous structures and military forces. This priority fits into
PKK’s broader strategic shift since
2000, which abandons the call for a unified, independent Kurdish state and
instead strives for Kurdish autonomy within existing state borders.
Establishing a second autonomous Kurdish area (after Iraq’s) that puts one of
the post-PKK organizations in charge of the quasi-state structures (and
eventually, a role in negotiating Syria’s future) appears far too precious an
opportunity to be jeopardized. In addition, the rugged territory to the north
and northwest of the Qandil Mountains of northern Iraq, where the PKK
headquarters are located, offers far better inroads into Turkish territory than
the Turkish-Syrian border region—most of which is fairly accessible and
comparatively easy to monitor from the Turkish side.
Still, since the outset of the crisis in Syria, PKK
operations have been picking up across southeast Anatolia, with a notable
increase of fighters of Iranian-Kurdish origin among the reported casualties on
the Kurdish side. Interestingly, however, operations of the PJAK (the Iranian
version of the PKK) on Iranian territory have nearly ceased. Some reports even
advance theories whereby a strategic alliance has been forged between the PKK
and Iran in attempts to put the heat on Turkey and re-stabilize Assad. Yet even
without such an explicit realignment, the conflict over the Syrian crisis was
bound to undermine Turkish-Iranian security cooperation on the border region.
From an Iranian perspective, turning a blind eye to Kurdish infiltration of
Turkey offers the double benefit of both putting the squeeze on Turkish Prime
Minister Tayyeb Erdogan in retaliation for his support for the Syrian
revolution, while also directing the separatist efforts of its own restive
Kurds elsewhere.
These developments appear to have added new
dynamics to the long-standing struggle for leadership within the PKK, between
its acting leader Murat Karayilan and Bahoz Erdal/Fahman Hussein (often
referred to as “Dr. Bahoz”), the former commander of the People's Defence Force
(Hêzên Parastina Gel, HPG) from 2004 until he was sacked by Karayilan in 2009.
Erdal, a younger leader who supports military action, appears to have made a
comeback in 2011, as events in Syria improved the margin for such an approach.Time
and age are clearly on the side of Erdal (provided he continues to successfully
avoid being captured or killed), and so is his Syrian background—and control of
a quasi-state is bound to boost the weight of the Syrian element in the overall
PKK structure. Thus, it can be expected that the Syrian crisis will accelerate
the generational change within the PKK toward a younger, more radical
leadership. For the moment, the leadership is in the advantageous position of
being able to put military pressure on Turkey on one front while demonstrating
a capacity for maintaining stability in the midst of chaos on another.
Recent Turkish efforts to reopen negotiations with
imprisoned PKK-leader Abdullah Ocalan may in part reflect the extent of fears
of the PKK’s intentions and the corresponding urge to reign in the group’s more
militant elements. Turkey has few other options to address a situation it has
partly created for itself with its hard line on the Assad regime and its policy of Kurdish
suppression. None of its allies south of the border—neither the FSA nor Massoud
Barazani—has significant potential to put pressure on PKK or PYD. A
full-fledged invasion into Syrian (or Iraqi) territory would only galvanize the
local population behind the parties and expose Turkish troops to guerilla
warfare on foreign and intensely hostile terrain—a situation in which regular
armies rarely fare well. But that may just be the PKK’s preferred
scenario.
Heiko Wimmen is a researcher at the Berlin-based
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and coordinates
its project, “Elite Change and New Social
Mobilization in the Arab World.” Müzehher
Selcuk is a research assistant at the Berlin-based Forum for Public Security.
This
article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online
at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/02/05/rise-of-syria-s-kurds/fa80