September 25, 2013
The
Moscow-Washington tango that resulted in the Syrian chemical weapons agreement
was a first class diplomatic show that will be analyzed by political scientists
and pretzel makers for a generation. Every actor in the spectacle claims
victory and national strategic benefits, as always occurs in successful
diplomacy. The complexity of the cause-and-effect debate is what interests the
pretzel makers, whose own fine handiwork defies the attempts of rational people
to determine with precision where the pretzel starts and where it ends.
The
Russian-American agreement on Syria begs analysis and any possible credible
answers on three important questions. The first is for academics and historians
because it is unlikely to get a definitive answer: What role did the American
threat of the use of force against Syria play in pushing the parties to an
agreement? Arguments on both sides of this question reflect existing
ideological positions on issues like the degree of coherence in U.S. policy in
the Middle East and the efficacy and ethics of Washington’s proclivity to use
military force unilaterally and at will, anywhere in the world. This is a
fascinating and important debate because the United States will threaten or use
force again and again—as President Barack Obama and Secretary of State John
Kerry both repeated several times in recent days while explaining their
policies towards Syria and Iran.
The
second key issue to examine now is how the agreement will impact the internal
fighting in Syria, and the condition of Syria and Syrians. I expect fighting to
continue unabated on the ground across the country, and increase in places, as
both sides seek to show that they gained from the accord—while their respective
external supporters in the United States, Russia, Iran and Saudi Arabia will
continue to feed them money and guns. Any drop in American aid to rebels will
be compensated for by increased Arab Gulf aid.
The
third and most important political question in my view that the United
States-Russia agreement raises is about its likely implications for a set of
critical relationships revolving around the central actor in this wider
drama—Iran. In the short run two dynamics matter here: American and Russian
relations with Iran, and Iranian-Saudi Arabian relations. We should ignore all
the rumors, feints, suggestions, and small actual political actions and
statements out there today on these Iran-centric relationships, and pause a
week or two until things will be clarified at the convening of the annual
General Assembly sessions of the United Nations in New York, where everyone
speaks, many meet, and a few critical actors negotiate deals.
Both
Iranian President Hassan Rouhani and President Obama have made positive signals
about their respective desires to resolve issues of mutual concern, including
the opportunity of the UN General Assembly. Typically, Obama usually only
speaks of Iran in terms of its nuclear threat to Israel, the region, and the
world, and in the same sentence affirms that a serious military threat always
accompanies any diplomatic overtures. The agreement on Syria is so important
because it shows that when the major global powers work to achieve a result
that is win-win for them both, the local actors tend to have no option but to
go along with the deal. This suggests huge implications for striking a deal
with Iran on the issues that simultaneously concern Iran and the West.
The
most difficult relationship in this drama is the Iran-Saudi Arabia one, but it
also is the most important one for the fate of the region. For it determines
the status of little proxy wars across the region: in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq,
Yemen, Somalia, Palestine and other shattered and struggling Arab lands that
have failed their own test of leadership, and instead have handed their fate to
nearby patrons, financiers and armorers.
We
are approaching a historic and telling moment in the Middle East, as a global
diplomatic fire edges closer to the belly of the beast—Riyadh and Tehran.
Everything else is a warm-up act for this great spectacle to come soon, if the
United States and Russia agree post-Syrian accord that their interests and
those of the region require a Saudi-Iranian accord. But do not look for this on
a television screen or Twitter feed, because Riyadh and Tehran do not do public
diplomacy or meaningful press conferences. They negotiate and make war in the
same way—in the shadows, via proxies, using their ample money and guns for all
to see, and never very far from home.
The
big issue that demands clarification within the Washington-Moscow-Riyadh-Tehran
relationship is whether the two regional powers in Tehran and Riyadh have
effectively broken free from big power controls or threats, and can resist
pressures and inducements from Moscow and Washington in order to persist in
their regional proxy wars. We will know more by early October, which will
excite political scientists, affirm the joys of pretzel-making, and perhaps
allow the people of the Middle East to live a more normal life again.
Rami
G. Khouri is Editor-at-large of The Daily Star, and Director of the Issam Fares
Institute for Public Policy and International Affairs at the American
University of Beirut, in Beirut, Lebanon. You can follow him @ramikhouri.
Copyright © 2013 Rami G. Khouri—distributed by
Agence Global