October 27, 2013
Recent headlines
have heralded the demise of Tunisia’s governing Islamist party, Ennahda. In
fact, this interpretation is misleading. Ennahda and its coalition partners committed
to talks and an opposition-defined roadmap which enjoins the current government
to resign three weeks from the beginning of discussions. But while Ennahda has
accepted the principle of stepping down in favor of a new caretaker government,
party leaders say that this timeline is still subject to negotiation. So,
despite deep ideological rifts, continuing economic woes, and regional
pressures, Tunisia’s political game continues.
To
understand Tunisia’s current political state, it is helpful to distinguish the
public’s latent disenchantment, frustration and anger from the specific
triggers that, in the last several months, sparked a series of demonstrations,
moved large institutional players clearly into the opposition camp, and
motivated opposition politicians to push for an end to Ennahda’s rule and the
dissolution of Tunisia’s only elected body, the National Constituent Assembly.
Latent anger
stems from high unemployment levels, the rising costs of living, systemic and
petty corruption present at all levels of society, deficiencies in public
security, and the seeming inability or unwillingness of the government or the acting
legislature to craft and implement effective solutions to these problems. These
failings are glaring given that economic injustice sparked the revolution; now,
some figures show that unemployment
and perceived corruption
are higher than under the former regime (although the former regime manipulated
statistics for its own benefit).
Several
factors have contributed to the current government’s failure. First, members of
the ruling Ennahda party had no prior experience with the levers of state
control, a novelty after years in opposition and, often, in prison. Second, there
is deep distrust between Ennahda and state institutions, bureaucrats, and
powerful business interests that worked with or served the previous regime.
Third, Ennahda has, at times, put deeply divisive ideological issues that
challenge the traditional state conception of secularism on the national
political agenda. And fourth, Ennahda has been slow to robustly challenge and
clearly distinguish itself from violent Islamists.
Despite
these serious problems and the ineffectiveness of the Ennahda-led government in
adequately solving them, a new, immediate political crisis has appeared in
Tunisia, spurred on by opposition parties that are even less popular, according
to recent polling. Less than one month after the July 3 coup in Egypt and the
Egyptian military’s crackdown on the deposed Muslim Brotherhood, Tunisian
opposition politician Mohammed Brahmi was assassinated. According to the
Minister of the Interior, Lotfi Ben Jeddou, the CIA had informed
his ministry of the assassination plot. However, he said that the bureaucrats
below him did not pass this information up to him, and nothing was done to
prevent the plot.
The
opposition’s immediate calls for the government to step down and the withdrawal
of opposition candidates from the assembly failed. By mid-September, given no
further high-profile lapses in security, street support for bringing down the
government had begun to wane. Shifting to an alternative tactic, Tunisia’s
powerful labor union, the UGTT, and the employer’s union, UTICA put forward a new
“roadmap.”
This roadmap was sold as a way to break the political deadlock, but the most
important stipulation included bringing down the government. While Ennahda
accepted the plan, their statements regarding the specifics of the plan have
remained largely unspecific. If this roadmap fails to achieve the
anti-governmental aims of the opposition, they may revert to old tactics.
Wariness
on both sides is understandable. The UGTT and opposition are not certain that
Ennahda intends to give up power, since they have not publicly and definitively
accepted the parameters of the timeline. Instead, Ennahda emphasizes other
parts of the roadmap, particularly progress on the
adoption of the constitution, the electoral law and commission and agreement on
a new government.
This approach serves to protect Ennahda.
A poll
conducted by Zogby Research Services right after the assassination of Brahmi
shows that 60 percent think that the Egyptian coup will have some sort of a
political impact on Tunisia. In light of this, Ennahda may be concerned that
the democratic process itself and the party’s future potential to participate
in governance could be undermined if the party were to publicly embrace a
deadline for stepping down before securing election guarantees. Moreover, the
UGTT, which has billed itself as a mediator between the government and
opposition forces, is not a neutral broker. The union, which never called for a
general strike under the former regime, called for one after Ennahda had accepted
its calls for another national dialogue.
There has been consistent pressure
on Ennahda to engage in a national dialogue dictated by the UGTT and the
opposition rather than through the democratically-elected (and
Ennahda-dominated) Constituent Assembly. However, Ennahda may also see some
benefits to conceding to this new channel. They may see it as an opportunity to
break the deadlock and finally finish the constitution. The proposal’s
stipulation that a caretaker government will govern until elections could also
put Ennahda out of the national spotlight before Tunisians vote, potentially
serving to make sure that people do not blame them solely for the failings of
the past two years. Yet Ennahda has so far acted cautiously, and it is unlikely
they will agree to a caretaker government if it consists of people whom they
deem overly partisan or hostile.
Although the current political
stagnation carries its own risks, as long as dialogue continues, Tunisians may
be on the way to averting a more disastrous crisis. But stakes remain high. The
Zogby poll shows that 64 percent of Tunisians think the country is moving in
the wrong direction, while 55 percent say they are disappointed in how the
revolution is playing out. Given these disappointing numbers, it is important
that the national dialogue be transparent. Whether transparency of high-level
talks will be enough for a populace that feels deeply neglected by virtually
all of its national leaders remains unclear.
Fadil
Aliriza is a freelance journalist and writer currently based in Tunis,
Tunisia. He has written for Foreign Policy, The Independent, and Guernica. On Twitter: @fadilaliriza.