November 06, 2013
For
years, Israel and the United States have been urging Egypt to do more to halt
the illegal trade—in guns and rockets, but also in fuel, cement, and consumer
goods—under the 14 kilometer-long Sinai-Gaza border. Post-Mubarak Egyptian
governments have been more willing than the regime of close ally Hosni Mubarak
to go after the tunnels. It is not that Egypt decided to act against the
tunnels in an effort to maintain security along the Israeli border alone;
rather, changing circumstances made it abundantly clear to Egypt’s generals
that the tunnels have become a direct threat to Egypt’s national stability.
Starting
with the August 2012 massacre of 16 Egyptian soldiers in Sinai, Egypt’s
national security establishment realized that the flow of weapons and fighters
can travel in both directions. Since June 2013, in the lead up to President
Mohamed Morsi’s ouster in Cairo, the Egyptian military has maintained its most
effective operation yet against the tunnel network.
Looking
forward, though, it is unclear how long Egypt can sustain the current success
in tunnel closures. Furthermore, there is no indication that Cairo is
considering policy options to keep the tunnels closed for the long term once the
military withdraws from the border.
The
smuggling tunnels emerged as a problem in 2005, when Israeli forces withdrew
from Gaza; and smuggling expanded significantly following the 2007 takeover of
the strip by Hamas and the subsequent Israeli policy of limiting imports and
exports. However, the quantity, lethality, and capabilities of smuggled weapons
increased following the Arab uprisings: whether this was in the importation of Fajr-5 rockets from Iran or man-portable air-defense systems and
other anti-aircraft systems from Libya.
After the
August 2012 attack, the Egyptian armed forces initiated efforts
to block or destroy tunnels under the Gaza border as part of
Operation Eagle, a larger operation begun in 2011 to counter the Salafi-jihadi
threat in Sinai. However, the methods used had little effect on smuggling, and underground trade continued normally. Of the almost 250
tunnels Egypt covered or destroyed that year, more than half were back in
operation shortly after the military left the site.
In the
following months, Egyptian leaders concluded that the tunnels contributed to
threats to national security and the continued instability in Sinai. Egyptian
military, intelligence, and political leaders may have been willing to turn a
blind eye to Palestinian smuggling of food, fuel, and building
materials—accepting that occasionally weapons got through as well. Risking
Egypt’s own security, however, was another matter. As Essam al-Haddad, a top
Morsi advisor and Brotherhood leader, said at the time, “We don't want to see these tunnels
used for illegal ways of smuggling either people or weapons that can really
harm Egyptian security.”
With this
new realization, Egypt advanced its efforts. According to a January 2013 Israeli report, “U.S. technological measures made
available for Egyptian use … and intelligence cooperation” were enabling Egypt
to prevent “large-scale smuggling of weapons into Gaza.” In addition to
counter-smuggling interdictions, Egyptian operations to destroy the tunnels
themselves began in earnest in February 2013. Unlike previous efforts, which
could be easily reversed, from February forward the Egyptians actually flooded
tunnels, which degraded their structure and stability.
In
addition to taking action on its side of the border, Egypt also has used its
leverage over Hamas to encourage action inside Gaza. For instance, after the
August 2012 attack on Egyptian soldiers—despite Hamas claiming this had nothing
to do with Gaza—Egyptian influence saw that Hamas promptly closed the openings on
its side of the tunnels. Hamas did so again in the wake of the May 2013
kidnapping of Egyptian security forces: declaring the entire border area a “closed military zone.”
In the
month prior to Morsi’s removal, Egyptian forces again stepped up their campaign
against the Gaza tunnels. By one measure, the amount of fuel entering Gaza
through the tunnels in the last week of June 2013 was around 10 percent of that
entering at the beginning of the month. According to the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA),
“These amounts were the lowest recorded since August 2012.” This suggested that
Egyptian forces indeed had the capability to effectively shut the tunnels, and
it was the will to act that stopped them from doing so previously—when such
action was not yet perceived as protecting Egyptian sovereignty and stability.
In the
first week of July, when the military removed Morsi from power, OCHA estimated
thatfewer than ten tunnels were
operational. By the end of August, Raed Fattouh, president of the Palestinian
Authority’s coordination committee for the entry of goods to Gaza, said that Gaza’s tunnels were only functioning
at 30 percent of their capacity. Even with this slight easing, the tunnels have
yet to return to their post-Mubarak traffic.
The
post-Morsi counter-tunnel operations have also been the most sustained effort
to date. Estimates of the number of operational tunnels in June 2013, before
the latest crackdown, range from below
100 to as many as 220 or even around 300. By late September only around ten were open. According to another report,
fuel was still being smuggled through the open tunnels—at less than half the rate as
during early 2013—but exclusively for the use of Gaza's power station. In late
September, the spokesman of the Egyptian armed forces said Egypt had destroyed the effectiveness of
the tunnel network. The Egyptian military also announced that it would
establish a “buffer zone” along the Sinai border.
Destroying
tunnels, though, requires constant vigilance. Earlier this month, the Egyptian
military claimed to have destroyed almost
800 tunnels in 2013. In January 2013, however, Egyptian
journalist and Sinai expert Mohannad Sabry estimated there were around 250
operating tunnels, which suggests that Egyptian forces are continuously closing
the same tunnels. While highly effective in the short term, consumer and
humanitarian demand inside Gaza ensures that tunnel trade will resume the
moment Egyptian forces back away. Regular Egyptian activity on the Gaza border
is also a worry for Israel, which has long enjoyed Sinai as a buffer between
its forces and the Egyptian’s. Egypt and Israel—which approves any Egyptian
deployments that would exceed peace treaty limitations—must decide if such
operations are a long-term solution or else consider other options for
decreasing the extent of the Gaza tunnel network.
Finally,
Egypt and Israel seem to agree on the need to clamp down on the Gaza tunnels.
Moving forward, the two will need to determine—together—the best way to address
this challenge.
This article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2013/10/22/tunnel-vision/gqxp
Zack Gold is a Washington-based Middle East analyst and author of
the Brookings Institution’s Saban Center analysis paper “Sinai Security: Opportunities for Unlikely Cooperation Among
Egypt, Israel, and Hamas.”