July 30, 2014
Unlike former Egyptian
presidents Hosni Mubarak and Mohammed Morsi, President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi
does not have a political organization to call his own. Sisi has drawn on a
broad but disorganized array of networks for political support, including partisans of Mubarak’s former National Democratic
Party, tribal and clan leaders, a host of liberal and leftist political parties, big business, and opportunistic pro-Sisi movements. But so far, he has shown no
interest in organizing these groups further, and has repeatedly expressed disdain for partisan politics. Sisi’s
primary support base consists of the state institutions that brought him to
power—particularly the military, which he led from August 2012 until March 2014
and whose senior officers endorsed his presidential bid. Yet an overreliance on
these institutions could undermine Sisi’s capacity to address Egypt’s pressing
economic problems and leave him vulnerable to a reemergence of popular
discontent.
Restoring the stability
and prestige of the Egyptian state have been recurring themes in Sisi’s rhetoric since the coup that ousted Morsi last
July. Reflecting intense frustration with the revolutionary upheaval of the
past three years and the resulting challenges to state institutions, Sisi’s
regime has attempted to reestablish the top-down, controlled politics of
pre-revolution Egypt. As part of this effort, Islamist political forces have
been ruthlessly suppressed, with thousands killed by security forces and tens of
thousands more detained. Other opposition groups have also been targeted; for
instance, the April 6 Youth Movement was banned and prominent revolutionary activists sentenced to lengthy prison terms. A draconian
protest law implemented last November has been used to crack down on
demonstrations. Journalists and human rights activists have likewise been harassed,
and adraft NGO law could soon place even more onerous
restrictions on Egyptian civil society.
This attempt to repress
political activity has also influenced the design of Egypt’s elected
institutions, which have been structured to limit the reach of popular
politics. For example, thenew law for parliamentary elections seeks to
benefit prominent individuals with ties to big business and the former Mubarak
regime, rather than political parties. The balance of power in the 2014
constitution also works against representative institutions in favor of
stronger state institutions like the military, judiciary, and security forces.
Though in line with
Sisi’s broader objectives, this arrangement creates a dilemma for the
president. He has so far refrained from trying to organize his political supporters,
perhaps because the idea of a dominant presidential political party is
unpopular with the public, the state, and likely Sisi himself. Yet relying too much on the armed forces
instead could still pose problems, because Sisi needs the senior officers more
than they need him. The 2014 constitution provides the armed forces with enough
autonomy to comfortably protect their interests regardless of who fills the
executive branch, and the military has also proven itself more than willing to
oust unpopular presidents.
As a result, Sisi will
be careful to keep the armed forces happy, even if it undermines the chances
for reforms that would help to address Egypt’s
economic grievances. The military’s extensive business interests—ranging from
major infrastructure and development projects to the operation of hotels and gas stations—fuel corruption and crowd out private companies. Sisi’s government already has and will likely continue to expand
these interests rather than reforming them. This limiting relationship also
applies to the broader state bureaucracy, which will be protective of the
status quo and reluctant to implement potentially disruptive changes. Though a
more organized political base would not eliminate this problem for Sisi, it
would offer him some leverage over state institutions to enact broader reforms.
Yet even though Sisi
will do what he can to protect the armed forces, he cannot always count on them
to return the favor. Because the military has its own reputation to protect, it
is more likely to adopt populist stances when the president takes unpopular
decisions. For example, when the border with Gaza remained closed during the
Israeli bombardment, a military spokesperson called the closure a “political decision” and suggested the president should
open the crossing. In such circumstances, Sisi will likely take the brunt of
any public anger, while the military plays to popular opinion.
Egypt’s serious
economic problems require major reforms, but Sisi’s lack of an organized support
base outside the state may complicate that effort. As long as he remains
heavily dependent on the military and other state institutions, he can neither
push too hard against their interests nor count on them to always back his
policies. This places the president in a tricky situation. If the economy fails
to improve because of a lack of action—or alternatively, if Sisi moves too fast with the necessary but unpopular
reforms needed to revitalize the economy—he may find himself increasingly
isolated in the presidential palace and vulnerable to a reemergence of popular
discontent.
This
article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online
at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/07/24/sisi-s-dilemma/hhzd
Scott Williamson is a junior
fellow at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace’s Middle East program.