November 18, 2014
Police
strikes have erupted in Algeria over tough working conditions, and
demonstrators are demanding the removal of corrupt security officials. But
while many of their demands are echoed by other workers within the security
sector, they are unlikely to bring about genuine change. Internal divisions and
vested interests stand in the way of any serious security sector reforms that
would alienate sector elites. However, short of significant reforms, the
government remains vulnerable to further unrest if it continues to ignore
police demands.
On
October 13 and 14, police officers in Algeria’s southern oasis city of Ghardaia
went on strike to protest low salaries and nepostism—not just within their
respective deparments but throughout the Ministry of Interior. This came in the
wake of increased civilian hostility against
the police after two people were killed and a policeman injured in the latest
of a series of clashes between
the local Arab and Ibadi Berber communities. Although the police in Ghardaia
resumed their work on October 14, their colleagues in Algiers have been
demonstrating in solidarity. The same day, around 300 policemen marched and
tried to reach the presidential palace where Bouteflika dwells. They called for
the establishment of a police union and the removal from office of
Director-General of National Security General Abdelghani Hamel, an ally of
President Abdel Aziz Bouteflika, on allegations of corruption and the abuse of
power.
Although
these protests were small and have diminished to some extent, the anger has
spread to other security sector workers, especially the firefighters, who like
the police are overseen by the pro-Bouteflika Ministry of Interior. Customs
officials, some military units, and even the staffers for the Constitutional
Council have also joined the police protests. Their calls range from improving
work conditions to political demands such as the ouster of General Hamel.
Although
the Bouteflika government responded to the immediate economic and professional
demands of the police force, it ignored the fundamental and more political
requests. The government agreed to grant security forces (including police,
gendarmerie, military personnel, and firefighters) large retroactive salaries
increases and access to new and affordable housing. Other demands, including
the removal of General Hamel, however, have gone unnaddressed. The government
has thus sought to deter further uprisings by dismissing several local police
chiefs accused of orchestrating the rebellion.
The
ongoing issue with the police is symptomatic of Algeria’s interminable power
struggle between the presidency, the army, and the Department of Intelligence
and Security (DRS). Bouteflika’s faction in government has made a series of
reforms including decree 14-183 and
other shake-ups before
it—aimed at restricting the DRS and the army’s influence in politics. This
power struggle prevents any fundamental reforms that could address the security
forces’ underlying demands. In the event that Bouteflika—or Prime Minister
Abdelmalek Sellal, who has taken over most duties from the ailing
president—does want to negotiate with protesters and reach an agreement on the
establishment of a police union and the removal of corrupt officials, the DRS
would likely fight back against such measures.
Given
recent tension between the DRS and Bouteflika, the latter and his associates
have little room to upset the DRS, as they have already expended great
political capital on instituting DRS reforms. The DRS pressured Bouteflika’s
camp, threatening to leak files proving bribery and corruption among his
allies, and the Bouteflika wing responded with their own threats about exposing
files incriminating DRS. This divide limits the government’s ability and
interest in pursing meaningful security sector reforms without worsening
preexisting rifts. The Algerian regime has built its power and influence on the
strength and loyalty of security institutions including the police, which is
why it has expended an incredible amount of money and privilege addressing
their requests.
With
an ailing president, an unclear succession plan, and a range of demographic and
social pressures, police riots and protests appear to be a secondary concern to
the Bouteflika government. By throwing money at the issue, it hopes to buy time
to work through internal divisions and restructure before police protests
resurface. But this short-sighted solution is highlighing the government’s
vulnerability and its lack of legitimacy among Algerian people. Without real
reform, then, the next riot will be much harder for the government to
contain.
This
article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online
at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/11/12/algeria-s-police-riots/huf7
Abdallah
Brahimi is an alumni fellow of the Maxwell School of Syracuse University and a
freelance consultant for Algerian NGOs.