ISIS fighters ride in commandeered Iraqi army vehicle, Mosul, June 23, 2014. Associated Press
October 19, 2014
Nearly a dozen years after the American invasion and
occupation of Iraq in 2003, an extremist group called the Islamic State in Iraq
and Syria (ISIS) has swept through the Sunni populated areas of Iraq. The
dramatic turn of events demands answers to a number of questions: To what
extent did the U.S. invasion change the broader region? And how will ISIS’s campaign
affect future developments in the Middle East?
To start with, the removal of Saddam Hussein from
power in Baghdad certainly unleashed sectarian and extremist forces that the
Iraqi dictator had hitherto suppressed and/or prevented. The attempt to build a
democratic system in Iraq led ultimately to a new constitution and to the
institutionalization of political forces that had not had the opportunity to
participate in the country’s political life before 2003. The rivalry, as well
as the occasional collaboration between those political forces, for good or
bad, became part of the new and complicated political dynamic that followed the
fall of Saddam. Regional powers, primarily Iran and Saudi Arabia, but also
Syria and Turkey, were sucked into the vacuum left by the ouster of Saddam—and
this created a new regional dynamic that has become part of life inside Iraq.
What happens in Iraq, the past decade has shown, does not stay in Iraq.
Conversely, what happens in the region now flows directly into Iraq and becomes
a part of its political reality.
The American Project
When we put aside the question of
whether Bush administration officials genuinely believed that Saddam possessed
Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), building democracy in Iraq becomes the predominant
remaining motivation for the American invasion. Indeed, if we parse the
conflicting official pronouncements along with the accusations and analyses
from administration critics, the building of a democratic system emerges as a
co-equal rationale for the war—along with the destruction of the presumed WMD
and the defeat of terrorism. President Bush stated it very clearly, in a speech
before the Philadelphia World Affairs Council in 2005: besides the defeat of
terrorists and the training of Iraqi security forces to keep fighting them, “a
vital element of our strategy [in Iraq] is our effort to help the Iraqi people
build a lasting democracy in the heart of the Middle East.”
One would have to judge the overall mission as
unfulfilled, if not an outright failure. Al-Qaeda recruitment rose to an
all-time high during the first two years of the American presence in Iraq. This
led to the establishment of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) which, under Abu Musab
Al-Zarqawi, wreaked havoc all over the country; AQI killed American soldiers,
blew up Iraqi ministries, and murdered Iraqi Shia on camera and placed the
videos of these deeds on the Internet for the world to see. True, the American
occupation of Iraq cannot be blamed directly for regional developments that
could have taken place with or without the presence of U.S. troops, but
elements of the occupation undeniably contributed to such developments.
The first two major policy decisions taken by the Bush
administration were the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the purging of
Saddam’s Baath Party loyalists from the Iraqi public sector—so-called
de-Baathification. Both decisions were rooted, theoretically and practically,
in the overall goal of building democracy—on the grounds that you could not
build a new political system without fully destroying the old one. Bush
administration strategists believed that the die-hard supporters of Saddam
(“dead-enders,” in the view of Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld) were
ideological enemies of democracy, and therefore rooting them out was critical
to securing the future of the new Iraq. Sadly, both decisions led to a power
vacuum—particularly on Iraq’s borders, which could not be protected adequately
by the relatively small number of foreign coalition forces in the country—and
to an internal bleeding and the sowing of deep divisions between the country’s
eclipsed Sunni minority and its newly empowered Shia majority. Had
de-Baathification remained focused on the uprooting of Baathis from the upper
echelons of the party and high level state officials under Saddam, it would not
have had such a far-reaching impact on social cohesion. In the hands of the
Iraqi Governing Council (IGC), it turned instead into a McCarthyist campaign
against Sunnis at all levels of government and in a wide variety of
professions. The sense of victimization among ordinary Sunni citizens had much
to do with their apathy towards the spread of AQI in their main cities. The
gate was open for AQI’s seductive appeal for jihad against the “new-age
crusaders,” and Muslim fighters from all over the Middle East flowed into Iraq.
The rapid growth of AQI had domestic and regional
consequences. In a sectarian environment, inside and outside Iraq, the rapid
growth of Sunni extremism logically and inevitably led to the counter growth of
Shia militias. Given the strong desire to protect their holy shrines and their
worshippers from AQI, and given the willingness and readiness of Iran and
Lebanon’s Hezbollah group to assist in the matter, the rise of armed Shia
militias did not take very long. Along with the already trained and
Iran-supported Badr Brigade of the Supreme Council for the Islamic Revolution
in Iraq (SCIRI), soon came Muqtada Al-Sadr’s Mahdi Army as well as Kataib
Hezbollah and Asaib Ahl Al-Haq, the
latter two funded by Iran and trained jointly by the Iranian Revolutionary
Guard Corps (IRGC) and Lebanese Hezbollah. The bitter and bloody civil war that
ensued in 2006 was a natural consequence of the sectarian polarization.
The election of Prime Minister Nouri Al-Maliki brought
a brief lull. In his first term of office, it seemed that his use of the carrot
and stick approach was succeeding in getting these militias to put aside their
weapons and join the political process. But it turned out to be the calm before
the Arab Spring storm of 2011 and the bloody struggle that erupted in
neighboring Syria. Shia militias made a comeback in 2011, encouraged by Al-Maliki,
to support the Bashar Al-Assad regime in Syria. More recently, these militias
have again been called on to help fight off the onslaught of ISIS in the face
of a woefully inadequate Iraqi army.
Let a Thousand Flowers Bloom
The goal of replacing Saddam’s dictatorship with a
democratic republic was certainly taken seriously by Coalition Provisional
Authority (CPA) Administrator L. Paul Bremer and the young men and women who
filled the CPA’s ranks from the U.S. bureaucracy—mainly Department of Defense
contractors—and from the allied governments who agreed to share the burdens of
governing Iraq with the United States.
The cost of governing Iraq, along
with the growing risk to civilians, led the CPA to speed up the transition to
an independent Iraqi government. Between the summer of 2003 and March 2004, the
date that the Transitional Administrative Law was signed into law by the IGC,
political parties, civil society organizations, and women’s organizations were
encouraged, facilitated, and sometimes financed by the CPA. Sensitive to the
criticism that the CPA was fostering the transition from foreign occupation to
the rule of a few Shia Iraqi leaders, handpicked from opposition to Saddam that
had largely lived abroad for at least the last ten years of Saddam’s rule, the
CPA tried hard to broaden political participation and find, in particular,
Sunni leaders that might be acceptable to the Shia community and yet credible
enough with the Sunni population of Iraq—a near impossible task. At the same
time, given the eagerness of Iraqi Kurds for autonomy, and the partiality of
American and British diplomats to Kurdish leaders, the principle of federalism
was pushed early on into any discussion of transitional constitutional
documents. Amid all the discussions of elections, constitution writing, and
good governance, one had to keep an eye on religious sensitivities and clerical
interventions. To that end, the Delphic pronouncements of Ayatollah Ali
Al-Sistani from Najaf had to be taken seriously when made, and solicited when
not forthcoming. In addition, the politician-clerics within the IGC also
pronounced on the appropriate phrasing of the role of sharia law in the framing
of constitutions, temporary or otherwise.
With the ability of Iraqis to organize and voice their
opinions in the absence of an overpowering authority, nearly a hundred
political parties and hundreds of civil society groups were formed in addition
to new religious groups, media organizations, and, of course, the militias.
This sudden blooming of pluralism, while of critical importance for the
launching of a democracy, was also problematic for securing the very same goal.
The ethnic, religious, and political diversity came with inherent
contradictions, tensions, and unhelpful and undemocratic attitudes and
intentions. The more fundamentalist among the various religious groups had no
desire to share power with those of different religious faiths or with
extremely secular views; the Shia groups in general, weary of years of
oppression under Saddam, had no interest in sharing power with Sunnis, and the
latter in turn did not trust the Shia majority to treat them fairly.
To this day, Middle Eastern critics of the occupation
blame the United States (and the West) for deliberately sowing the seeds of
conflict in Iraq. This is an unfair accusation. The CPA certainly did not
create the current and various divisions, interests, and shades of opinion.
Diverse identities were part of the social fabric of Iraq. The mutual suspicion
and conflicting political goals were the result of years of suppression, a lack
of experience in shared government, and a deep uncertainty about the future. The
American invasion, and the ensuing democracy project, naturally unleashed these
forces, and the CPA, in trying to build an inclusive, yet secure transition,
unwittingly facilitated the eventual political and violent clashes that
followed. To be sure, there were critical voices, particularly in the State
Department, that warned of the sharpness of the divisions and the dangers that
might result. The architects of the invasion, however, believed that the
divisions and clashes could be managed.
The current turmoil in Iraq, keeping aside the
regional aspect of it for the moment, continues to be a manifestation of the
multiplicity of organizations with conflicting goals and interests. Hence, the
parliamentary nature of the Iraqi system, decided on largely during the CPA
days, reflects the difficulty of forging coherent coalitions between the close
to fifty political parties still competing for power. Since no one political
party is large enough to secure a majority of seats in parliament, elections do
not offer a clear way ahead as to who governs the country. Hence, the 2010
parliamentary election results—though giving the Iraqi National Movement (led
by Ayad Allawi’s Iraqiya party) a two-seat edge—enabled Al-Maliki’s State of
Law coalition to outmaneuver its rival and form a broader coalition (albeit
with some regional prodding and facilitation) and earn the right to form a
cabinet and rule the country. Instead of negotiating in good faith with his
Sunni opposition, Al-Maliki proceeded to hurl accusations against their leaders
and treat sit-in organizers as terrorists, totally alienating the Sunni
community in the process. Correcting the destructive course embarked upon by Al-Maliki in 2006, and before that by the IGC, is a difficult, long-term
challenge.
The federal question, unleashed by the removal of
Saddam and the attempt to placate the Kurdish sense of identity and their need
for autonomy, is, after a few years of abeyance, returning to the fore in
potentially explosive arguments and opposing policies and stands. Disagreements
arose from the start, as discussions and negotiations took place over the new
Iraqi constitution. The Kurds pushed hard for a loose federal structure which
would grant their region wide economic, political, and security autonomy, while
the predominantly Shia parties pressed for a more centralized government—so
much so that the very word, federalism, took on the meaning of dismemberment of
Iraq in the Shia street. The discussion has not been merely academic. In the
security sector, the Kurdish peshmerga had a favored status among most American
officials. The Kurds had, after all, actually fought alongside the United
States and helped defeat Saddam’s army.
Further, the peshmerga had the reputation of being
more disciplined and more interested in securing the Kurdistan region than in
attacking any other region in the country. There were two problems with making
an exception for the Kurdish militia in the attempt to disband all militias in
favor of a new central Iraqi security system. First was the image problem of
favoring the Kurds over other Iraqis, and second was not looking into the
future and how inter-sectarian and inter-ethnic relations might evolve. The
disbanding of militias was discussed in the context of agreements between the
various leaders, that is, that the disbandment would be voluntary. Within the
CPA, the understanding was that exempting the peshmerga would be conditional on
their staying within their federal borders, well north of the capital. This
failed to address the logical fear that the gray areas, such as the city of
Kirkuk, would at some point have to be fought over if no consensus was reached
as to their status. In recent years, Al-Maliki, angered by the Kurds exporting oil
from their territory to Turkey, cut off funding public programs in the Kurdish
areas from the federal budget. As a consequence of the ISIS sweep of
northwestern Iraq, the Iraqi army largely abandoned Kirkuk; the peshmerga,
citing the fear of leaving the city to ISIS, moved in and replaced the
retreating Iraqi army—some Kurdish officials asserted publicly that they would
never leave.
Hence, the failure of the American project was double
edged. Politically, the CPA failed to negotiate an agreement on militias that
would be acceptable to all sides. Militarily, it failed to build a
professional, reliable, and sect-neutral Iraqi military. One result: the Iraqi
army, regarded as a hostile force by the Kurds and as an occupation force by
the Sunnis west and north of Baghdad, proved unable to meet the jihadist threat
coming across the border from Syria.
The Regional Factor
The fall of Saddam Hussein in 2003 created a vacuum
right at the center of the Gulf and the Arab world, but more importantly at the
center of the struggle for power between Iran and Saudi Arabia. Regardless of
what one may say about Saddam himself or about his authoritarian regime, Iraq
was a bulwark against foreign incursions and an impregnable rock between Saudi
Arabia and Iran. For Iran and Saudi Arabia, Iraq has been, and still is, a
must-win zone over which there can be no compromise. With the Syrian conflict
splitting Sunni and Shia communities in Iraq as supporters of opposing camps,
Iraq has turned into a theater for the Syrian war and Iraq’s internal divisions
have been exacerbated by Syria and the regional conflict swirling around it.
The Iran-Saudi rivalry dates to the 1960s as the two
Gulf giants naturally competed for influence in the region, politically,
economically, and sometimes militarily. During the time of Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi, the two monarchies were sometimes on opposite sides of conflicts, such
as in the Dhofar rebellion in Oman. Occasionally, the two disagreed on oil
policies and prices. Yet, as pro-Western regimes, they found themselves on the
same side more often than not, particularly when Iraqis overthrew their own
monarchy in 1958 in favor of the Arab nationalist Baath party.
After the 1979 Islamic Revolution in Iran, the contest
between the two countries took on classic characteristics of a cold war, with
ideological, religious, political, and economic aspects. Iran became a
revolutionary Islamic republic while Saudi Arabia remained a monarchy; Iran
sought to speak for the downtrodden and, at least rhetorically at first,
encouraged revolts against monarchies in the region and lent support to Shia
minorities in the Gulf. Saudi Arabia, by contrast, thought of itself as the
center of the Muslim world, a defender of Sunni communities and preferred a
stable regional status quo. On foreign policy, Iran sought independence from
the United States and the West, and accused Saudi Arabia of being the gateway
for American neo-imperialism in the region.
In classical cold war fashion, the two powers sought
to avoid a direct clash, while competing for influence via assistance to favored
groups and regimes, and weighing in on the side of their respective protégés in
times of conflict. In recognizing certain limits in their conflict, Iran and
Saudi Arabia tried to maintain a civil tone in talking about one another in
public and tried in particular to mitigate sectarian rhetoric, though it was
not easy at times given the difficulty in controlling mutually antagonistic
clerics on both sides. Saudi Arabia, being the host country for the annual hajj
pilgrimage, remained open to Iranian pilgrims, though the latter were at times
politicized and tried to use their visit to Mecca to publicize political
issues—necessitating discussions and ultimate coordination between the two
countries to prevent the issue from leading to violence.
The balance of power was maintained between the two
during the first two decades of the Islamic Republic, with the regional status
quo remaining largely stable. The one event that could have changed the balance
was the Iran-Iraq War from 1980 to 1988, which each side saw as an attempt by
the other to upend the balance in its favor. The war ended in a stalemate.
Changes occurred during the events of 2003 and later 2011, which raised the
ante and heated up the conflict considerably. The U.S. invasion of Iraq knocked
out a regime that, for better or worse, had held Iraq together for thirty years
and had a very strong army that could defend its borders from regional threats.
The dismantling of this center of power left the conflict arena for these two
giants empty—a situation with mixed results for both. For Iran, the removal of
Saddam was a welcome development as was the American intention to establish a
democracy, which in sectarian terms meant the replacement of a Sunni/Baathist
regime with a Shia-dominated one with obvious historical ties and sympathies to
Iran. The downside was the presence of American troops so close to Iran’s
borders and under the command of an administration that could in principle
attempt to duplicate the experience with a march on Tehran or Damascus.
For Saudi Arabia, the removal of Saddam, after his
1990 invasion of Kuwait and at least implicit threat to roll into Saudi Arabia,
constituted sweet revenge. The replacement of Saddam with a Shia-led
government, however, was an entirely different matter. Saudi hopes for a strong
role in shaping the future of Iraq were frustrated by the Americans’ seeming
indifference to Riyadh’s concerns and interests. Concern turned to alarm when
the intent to pull troops out became certain, particularly when the Obama administration
put a serious deadline on it. Miffed, the Saudis did not send an ambassador to
the new Republic of Iraq until 2012, and only after pleadings from Washington
and in particular from the U.S. military, which needed a good regional
intermediary with Iraq’s Sunni community. The Saudis may have never had a real
chance to influence events in Iraq, but missing out on the four formative years
of Iraq’s history under occupation did not help matters. Iran used the ties it
had built with Iraq’s Shia leaders while they were in opposition outside the
country to good advantage, brokering deals and lending support to favored
groups and individuals. Hence the main power blocs, Dawa, SCIRI, and the Sadr
Movement came to depend on Iran and to seek Iran’s advice. By contrast, Ayad
Allawi, the interim prime minister from 2004–05, a Shia with good ties to the
Sunni communities, was favored by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf Cooperation
countries, but did not succeed in leading the country, either during the last
days of the American mandate or after the 2010 elections in which his party
failed to form a majority coalition in parliament—one of several tests of will
between Iran and Saudi Arabia in the Iraqi theater, won by Iran.
It is not entirely clear what
Saudi Arabia’s strategy was in trying to gain influence over Iran in the region
or indeed inside Iraq. It was abundantly clear during the 2006 Iraqi civil war,
the 2006 Israel-Hezbollah war, and the 2009 Israel-Gaza war, that Iran had
established tight connections with non-governmental militias in Iraq, Lebanon,
and Palestine—militias that could make a difference on the ground. In 2005,
after the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, Saudi
Arabia supported and encouraged the March 14 Coalition in Lebanon to lay the
blame on the Syrian regime, and to seek justice as well as the dismantlement of
Hezbollah’s war machine via an international tribunal and a United Nations
resolution—two goals that proved totally impractical, and therefore gained
Saudi Arabia no victories over Iran in the Lebanese theater. Iran, in the
meantime, augmented its alliance with Bashar Al-Assad and Lebanese Hezbollah
with money, arms, and a joint defensive strategy that strengthened both allies
and formed a formidable tripartite axis in the region. When the Arab Spring
began in late 2010, and turned particularly bloody in Syria a few months later,
Iran and Hezbollah quickly committed to assisting the Syrian regime with money,
arms, training, and intelligence—a combination that has proved successful in
keeping Al-Assad afloat to this moment. Saudi Arabia tried to be a player by
sending funds and weapons to Syrian rebel forces but, once again, had no troops
on the ground, no strategic skills or advice to offer, and failed to recruit Western
help for the rebel forces it championed against Al-Assad.
In addition to
the Free Syria Army (FSA), Saudi Arabia and Qatar relied on Sunni tribes in
northwestern Iraq to help the opposition to Al-Assad in Syria. The Saudi
allies, however, have been notoriously unsuccessful in fighting in Syria. Iran,
in contrast, working with the Al-Maliki regime and Shia militia organizations
in both Iraq and Syria, has been able to use Iraq to its advantage in the
struggle for Syria.
The ISIS Factor
The ISIS sweep of northwestern
Iraq during the summer of 2014, in the context of the regional cold war, is a
critical, if complicated factor. The group, born in a merger of AQI with other
jihadi and salafist groups during the 2006–07 civil war (an umbrella organization
called Mujahideen Shura Council was created for that purpose), established ties
to some of the Sunni tribes and youth who were frustrated with the new Shia-led
government in Iraq. Bested in fighting and squeezed out of Iraq’s main cities
by U.S. and coalition forces, the group’s leaders mostly fled to Syria and
seemed to have disbanded during the last two years of the American occupation
of Iraq.
The group re-emerged as American
troops pulled out of Iraq and the Syrian uprising faced a bloody crackdown by
the Al-Assad regime. The group’s return-with-a-vengeance to Iraq certainly
complicates the domestic political scene and makes it difficult to even
advocate a democratic outreach in the heat of battle, even though it makes
perfect sense for the central government to smooth over its difficulties with
Sunni and Kurdish oppositionists. The several thousand ISIS fighters should not
on their own be able to fight the entire Iraqi security structure, not to
mention the now revived Shia militias, the Kurds, and those Sunnis still
interested in helping sustain the state of Iraq. The fact is, not only was a
seriously disgruntled Sunni population in Anbar province sympathetic, and
therefore hospitable, to ISIS, but a tribal fighting force whose numbers are
currently difficult to estimate actually joined ISIS in its sweep. The Kurds,
whose military help is essential in the Sunni areas adjacent to Kurdistan, took
advantage of the retreat of the Iraqi army from Kirkuk to take over the city,
certainly with the aim of denying it to ISIS, but also without even the
pretense of denying that this also settles the question of who controls/should
control Kirkuk once and for all. For the central government of Iraq, even under
the leadership of newly elected Prime Minister Haider Al-Abadi, disarming
Sunni, Shia, and Kurdish militias and putting Humpty Dumpty together again will
be very challenging to say the least.
Regionally, with absent American
forces and antagonized Sunni and Kurdish communities, Iraq’s Shia leaders have
become even more dependent on their Iranian patrons, for whom Iraq has become
the perfect theater for regional competition—an even better one than Lebanon,
given its proximity to Saudi Arabia. On a purely mathematical basis, Iran has
more cards to play in this game than does Saudi Arabia. Iran’s assets, aside
from its influence within the Iraqi government and army, include the Shia
militias. Iran also possesses the IRGC, a force that is already familiar with
the Iraqi turf and is willing, ready, and able to assist directly as needed.
Syria, with encouragement from Iran, has also leant material and military
support to Iraqi forces against ISIS. By contrast, Saudi Arabia doesn’t have
any real champions on the ground, unless one considers the tribes of Anbar—who
previously received more American than Saudi support, but are currently not
funded and are largely sympathetic to ISIS, or at least willing (until a better
deal is offered by the post-Al-Maliki government in Baghdad) to look the other way
as the group takes over Iraqi cities. The Shammar tribe of northwestern Syria,
though used by the Saudis in the early days of the Syrian uprising to funnel
money and arms to Syrian rebels, doesn’t have a known unified fighting force
and, on its own, is not likely to become a factor in the current struggle.
The International Factor
Despite the alarm of the Obama
administration over the ISIS sweep and the rush to deliver previously purchased
military hardware and dispatch an initial tranche of advisors, U.S. assistance,
as has been described by the Obama administration, is not likely to make much
difference on the ground. Since the beginning, President Obama has repeatedly
said there would be no boots on the ground in any assistance to the Iraqi
government, and the airstrike campaign, though enlarged to include several Arab
countries and NATO allies, is not sufficient in and of itself to dislodge ISIS
from territory it has gained in Syria and Iraq. Iran, by contrast, has sent not
only advisors to assess Iraqi needs, but also a small fighting force, with the
promise to send more as needed. The IRGC, which could easily put several
hundred fighters on the ground very quickly, is more likely to be a key player
in the fight. Qassim Suleimani, the IRGC military commander, was dispatched to Baghdad
where he is reportedly directing the battle against ISIS—having already gained
experience from doing the same thing in Damascus. Iran, unlike the United
States, has no qualms about sending in its own military into Iraq should they
be needed. Additionally, Lebanese Hezbollah, which has made the difference
between success and failure for the Syrian armed forces against the multitude
of Syrian rebel groups, has promised to send in five times the forces as were
sent to Syria, should the Shia shrines come under attack. This commitment of
advisors, troops, and money—when combined with the familiarity of Iran and
Hezbollah with the Iraqi terrain and its Shia fighters—makes any promise of
American assistance seem a marginal undertaking at best.
The U.S. strategy to defeat ISIS, involving pushing
for political reconciliation in Iraq and getting Kurds and Sunnis to help the
central government of Iraq fight the extremists, is something that was urgently
needed at least five years ago—years wasted in mollycoddling Al-Maliki when he
could have been pressured to do the right thing by his own people or resign
much earlier than he did. Better late than never. Nevertheless, the strategy is neither global
nor comprehensive. The Arab states joining the fight have been playing a
largely symbolic role via contributing redundant air power and no boots on the
ground. Turkey and Jordan, the states most concerned because of their common
borders with Syria and Iraq, have an as yet undefined role, and the FSA
training is to take place in Saudi Arabia, far from the battle zone and with
Saudi trainers who themselves lack the critical battle experience needed to do
the job well. In addition, the U.S.-Iran understanding over the fight against
ISIS is far from clear and has obvious limitations, should boots on the ground,
whether American or Turkish, become necessary and find that they have to go up
against the Al-Assad regime.
Russia, no friend of Sunni
extremism and already a strong ally of the Al-Assad/Iran alliance, has stood
ready to supply weapons to the Iraqi government (albeit it at a price). News of
the first air strikes by the Iraqi government against ISIS was publicized as
having been executed using newly arrived Russian Sukhoi jets. Given the
withdrawal of U.S. troops from Iraq, and the impending pull-out from
Afghanistan, the perception in the region is that of declining U.S. influence
and a relative gain for the Russians in the region.
When the Dust Settles
One can safely say that the American project in Iraq
has failed. Putting aside the issue of WMD, the goals of building a stable
democracy in the country and reconstructing its security system are now both in
deep trouble, with the security system in almost total collapse and the
political one stalemated. In a best-case scenario, Iraq is back to square one,
back to the situation after the fall of Saddam in 2003. In a worst-case
scenario, Iraq could be driven back to the bloody days of 2006–07, only this
time without the presence of U.S./coalition troops to back up Iraqi forces and
to act as a buffer between Iran and Saudi Arabia.
Is the American project responsible for the chaos, or
would it have happened anyway? What does this state of affairs mean beyond
Iraq’s borders, considering how Iraq has become the main front in the battle
for the heart, soul, and body of the region?
It is impossible to answer the first question in any
scientific or factual way. If we had to offer an educated guess, most observers
would probably agree that had the United States not invaded Iraq in 2003,
Saddam, or his children, would still be ruling the country today. Saddam’s
control of Iraq, though brutal, would have most likely acted as a strong buffer
against incursions into Iraq by AQI, and by extension, ISIS. For one thing, the
Sunni community, feeling somewhat privileged under him, would not have created
as hospitable an environment for Al-Qaeda and ISIS as has been the case under
the Al-Maliki/Shia majority rule. The American project created a power vacuum
that Iran, Al-Qaeda, AQI, and ISIS, among others, naturally filled. We cannot,
however, blame the negative changes in the region on the U.S. invasion of
Iraq—nor credit the positive ones to the invasion for that matter. Political
Islam has been growing in strength for the past two decades, largely due to the
failure of secular Arab nationalism to meet the needs of an increasingly
frustrated Arab youth. The Arab uprisings, a major development in the region,
would still have happened regardless of Iraq. Growing frustration with Arab
dictatorship, lack of responsiveness of the rulers, and failure to solve basic
social, economic, and political problems are responsible. It is interesting,
for example, that in most cases, the youth who started spilling onto streets
and public squares in January 2011, carried and chanted slogans that rarely
touched on the United States, Israel, or any foreign policy concern.
As for the impact on the region, the ISIS sweep and
reactions to it will likely further tip the regional balance in favor of the
Iran/Hezbollah/Al-Assad axis. From an Iranian point of view, the situation in
Iraq is too tempting not to jump into. After defeating ISIS forces and driving
them out of the areas they now control, Iran would be left more deeply embedded
inside Iraq than ever before. Having better control of Iraq gives Iran direct
access to the Saudi border, with the potential of lending direct, or at least
more effective, assistance to the Shia community in eastern Saudi Arabia. Add
to that the increasing power and influence of the Houthi tribes in Yemen, just
to the south of the Kingdom, and Iran’s growing influence with them, and the
regional balance tips heavily in favor of Iran.
The challenge for Iraq, even
presuming an eventual victory over ISIS, will remain one of governance. Anbar, once
cleared of ISIS forces, would still be a disgruntled region of the country and
the Kurds are likely to cling more than ever to their drive for more autonomy,
if not total secession and independence. If fighting off ISIS causes much death
and destruction to Sunni civilians and towns, as it well might, and drives the
wedge further between Baghdad and Kurdistan, the job of forming an equitable,
all-inclusive government in Baghdad will be harder than ever, once the dust of
battle settles.
Nabeel Khoury is senior fellow for
Middle East and National Security at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs and
a visiting scholar at the Middle East and North Africa Studies Program at
Northwestern University. He spent twenty-five years as a diplomat in the U.S.
foreign service, serving in various posts including: deputy chief of mission in
Yemen; consul general in Casablanca; deputy director of the State Department
Media Outreach Center in London; and director of the Near East South Asia
Office of the State Department’s Bureau of Intelligence and Research. In 2003,
during the Iraq war he served as State Department spokesperson at U.S. Central
Command in Doha and in Baghdad. He has contributed to the Middle East Journal, Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies, International Journal of Middle East Studies, and Middle East Policy. On Twitter: @khoury_nabeel.