General Khalifa Haftar (second left) talks about military operations with Libyan army commanders, Benghazi, Dec. 3, 2014. Stringer/Reuters/Corbis
January 20, 2015
What is happening in
Libya? And how will Egypt react? Libya today has devolved into a violent
political struggle between two major blocs: the internationally recognized,
Tobruk-based parliament versus Tripoli’s parliament and administration. Over
the last few months, hardliners on each side have become increasingly
entrenched in a quest for power and control of the country’s key resources, at
the expense of security and rule of law. The humanitarian consequences have
been dire, with more than 400 killed and hundreds of thousands displaced. Food
and medicine are in severely short supply. Egypt, historically Libya’s most
influential neighbor, is rightly concerned.
First, some
background on the atomization of Libya. Throughout 2013, Islamist factions
within Libya’s elected parliament became dominant, damaging the opposing
secularist bloc. In the eastern provinces, radical groups and common criminals
continued a campaign of aggression, intimidation, and assassination of
opponents, former officers, and the security forces. Against the backdrop of
deteriorating security, General Khalifa Haftar attempted to unseat then-Prime
Minister Ali Zeidan’s government, in February 2014. A former officer under Muammar
Qaddafi, Haftar had defected in the 1980’s and returned to Libya after the 2011
revolution. Following his failed coup
d’état, Haftar appointed himself the leader of the Libyan National Army and
attacked Islamist formations in Benghazi. His purpose was to purge the city,
without distinguishing between moderates and militants. In response, Islamists,
collaborated with Misrata’s forces to stage a counterattack in Tripoli.
Islamists occupied the capital and its environs. This forced the elected
assembly into exile, to the eastern city of Tobruk, where they are under
Haftar’s protection.
The space for
negotiations between the two governments is shrinking. The United Nations, in
intensive shuttle diplomacy led by Special Representative Bernardino Leon, is mediating
between the warring factions in order to forge consensus around the need for a
national unity government to bring Libya out of the current crisis. The
challenge has been to reconcile two divergent narratives that frame the situation.
On the one hand, the Tobruk parliament and Operation Dignity characterize the
fight as one between secular, nationalist, pro-democracy forces against radical
jihadists. On the other, the Tripoli-based Dawn supporters dub it a struggle
between supporters of the February 17 revolution and counterrevolutionaries who
wish to bring back elements of the former regime.
A fundamental factor
in favor of UN mediation in the face of these obstacles is the international
community’s generally cohesive stance behind Leon’s efforts—most importantly, arguing
for the principle of non-intervention by foreign powers. The advantages
of non-intervention are
two-fold: it would prevent each faction in Libya’s domestic struggle from
gaining military and economic support from external actors; and thus empower
moderate elements and create an environment more conducive for negotiations.
Yet the opposite is
happening in Libya. First, Qatar and Turkey have and are providing arms and
equipment to the Tripoli-based faction. Second, it has become evident—as well
as openly announced by members of the Dignity operation—that Egypt is heavily
involved in assisting efforts against Islamists in both the east and, as
continuous airstrikes indicate, in the west. Libya is thus becoming a proxy for
a larger regional struggle that pits anti-Islamist coalitions (led by the
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia) against the presumed
supporters of Islamists (Turkey and Qatar). Such international support for
the factions undermines UN mediation efforts. In particular, the backing that
Egypt provides to General Haftar and Operation Dignity empowers those forces
that want to continue the armed struggle until the whole country is “liberated”
from those who understand that there is no military solution to the crisis,
rather only a negotiated one.
Since the collapse
of order in Libya, Egypt has been the most affected by the instability. The
power vacuum allows extremist elements to infiltrate Egyptian territory and
carry out attacks against security forces. The temptation then is very high for
the Egyptian state to intervene directly in Libya and secure at least a buffer
zone, but also possibly exert full control over as much of Libya’s eastern
territory as feasible. An open intervention by Egypt’s military, however, would
not only hinder a peaceful settlement in Libya, but also negatively affect Egypt’s
interests. It would entrench the polarization of Libyan forces on the ground, further
diminishing prospects for a political solution, and entangle Egypt in a war
against forces that will gain wider support as the local population shifts from
anti-Islamist sentiments to animosity toward a foreign invader.
Egyptian
Interests in Libya
Egypt is correct to
worry about its western border and the potential spillover effects of the
conflict in Libya. Since the ouster of democratically elected president
Mohammed Morsi by the military, Egypt has suffered from the threat of violent
extremism along its borders and particularly in the Sinai Peninsula. Analysts,
UN officials, and Egyptian security officers often point to the porous border
as the source of heavy weapons and ammunition falling into the hands of
extremists and other Islamists, including supporters of the Muslim Brotherhood.
In July 2014, armed
men attacked the Farafra checkpoint in Egypt near the Libyan border, killing
twenty-two Egyptian border guards. The incident sparked outrage within the
military-backed government and roused accusations
that terrorists, trained in Libya, were infiltrating the Egyptian border and
conducting assaults against security forces. Consequently, rumors that
militants trained in Libya and Sinai-based jihadists groups were forging ties grew
louder. The best-organized militant group, Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM), represents the most overt threat to
the government. The group has repeatedly attacked government assets and
military personnel, resulting in the deaths of hundreds of officers and the
theft of weapons, vehicles, and equipment. On November 10, ABM changed its name
to Wilayat Sinai, or the Sinai
State, since it pledged allegiance to the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria. Given
that, only a few months earlier in June, the relatively new Libyan jihadist
group Majlis Shura Shabab Al-Islam
(the Islamic Youth Shura Council) in Derna also announced its allegiance to the
Islamic State, it only cemented the suspicion
of a link between the groups.
Concern of militant
extremism only represents one part of the equation in Egypt’s interests in
Libya. Another more subtle aspect involves migrant labor. The lack of economic
opportunity directly contributed to the unrest that led to the January 2011
uprising against former President Hosni Mubarak, and Egypt’s authorities
recognize the importance of a stable Libya in providing an outlet for their
surplus labor. While exact numbers are difficult to obtain, the International
Organization for Migration estimated that, by the end of 2013, the number of
Egyptian workers in Libya amounted to about 700,000 and potentially reached 1.5
million, counting illegal migrants. Remittances to Egypt rank third among the
highest contributors to GDP and foreign currency, amounting to $20 billion in
2013, with Libya accounting for up to $33 million per year.
Although the amount
seems meager compared to that received from Gulf countries, the proximity and
relative ease of entry to Libya (particularly for poor or unskilled Egyptian
workers) and the widespread unemployment and underemployment in Egypt puts Libya
at the top of the list of destinations for migrant labor. The conflict over
Tripoli and elsewhere, however, led to a mass exodus of approximately 200,000
or more Egyptian workers in February and March of 2014. Many of these workers returned
to dismal economic conditions and placed additional pressures on Egypt’s job
market and local economies.
In addition to
security and labor problems, Egypt also suffers from an acute energy crisis
after the past three years of political and economic turbulence. Egypt became a
net energy importer at the end of 2013 and owes about $4.9 billion to foreign
energy companies. The country now relies heavily on Gulf state support (in both
finances and fuel) to satisfy its needs. President Abdel Fattah El-Sisi
announced difficult subsidy reforms in July to relieve pressures on government
expenditures, but the knock on effect has increased prices across the board.
Libya could potentially offer a solution. With most of its oil fields in the
eastern part of Libya, favorable relations with the Tobruk government could
yield significant dividends in acquiring fuel at below-market value. Such a
situation, however, requires a stable environment to restore production levels
and ensure a reliable supply chain.
The
Egyptian Response
Given such vital Egyptian
interests in Libya, intervention in the conflict between the Tobruk-based and
Islamist Tripoli-based rival factions seems logical. By settling the dispute,
Egypt could crush—or at least better control—the cross-border militant and
criminal activity, facilitate the return of Egyptian workers, and mitigate its
energy crisis.
With the beginning
of the Libyan crisis in May 2014, Egypt initially pledged not to interfere in
Libyan affairs while calling on all militias to disarm. As the political crisis
in Libya intensified, however, Egypt and its ideologically aligned sponsor, the
UAE, took operational matters into their own hands. Despite repeated denials by
their officials, the two countries appear to have taken direct part in
airstrikes launched on Islamist positions in Libya in August and September. The
strikes can only be read in terms of the regional struggle over influence in
North Africa between Egypt’s backers, the UAE and Saudi Arabia on one side, and
Islamist supporters Qatar and Turkey that have been accused of arming the
Islamist backed GNC on the other. But they also served to squarely place Egypt in
the Tobruk camp, negating its (at least rhetorical) role as an objective
arbiter, emboldening Operation Dignity fighters, and cementing the
confrontational stance with Operation Dawn. Egypt also announced a plan to
train Libyan army fighters in October and increase security cooperation with the
internationally recognized government in as effort to counter militants and insurgents. There have
also been unconfirmed
reports that Egypt has agreed to set up a Libyan internal security service.
On the diplomatic
front, Egypt has been equally insistent on its intention to combat Libya’s
Islamist militants. At a conference in Madrid in September, Egypt intensified its
calls to keep foreign actors—referring implicitly to Qatar—out of Libya’s
conflict (notwithstanding the irony of its own intervention). In President El-Sisi’s
first meeting with President Barack Obama on the sidelines of the UN General
Assembly, he also stressed the need to support the elected government and took
another overt step in choosing sides when Tobruk’s Prime Minister Abdullah Al-Thinni
and his counterpart Ibrahim Mahlab met in October in Cairo to discuss bilateral
relations and security cooperation.
El-Sisi also visited
France in November to discuss Libya’s situation with President François
Hollande who had already expressed an interventionist bent with regard to
supporting the Tobruk government. During his visit, El-Sisi urged the United
States and Europe assist the Libyan army in its fight against Islamist
militants to prevent instability there from reaching the scale of Iraq and
Syria. Despite the Libyan Supreme Court decision throwing the legitimacy of the
Tobruk parliament into doubt, over the past months Libya, Egypt, and Gulf
states have advanced a full court press. This led to a reiteration of explicit
support for Tobruk in December from the United States, the United Kingdom,
France, and Italy, insisting they do not recognize any other entity as the
legitimate government in the country. The timing of this announcement coincides
with Prime Minister Al-Thinni’s public rejection of UN-mediated talks and
General Haftar’s imposition of extremely strict conditions for participating in
the negotiations.
Consequences of Intervention
Is Egypt setting the
stage for a forceful intervention in support of the government in Libya’s east?
An Egyptian military intervention might deliver immediate, apparently positive
consequences, such as wiping out jihadi groups that have established training
ground in the eastern part of Libya. If the forces involved are strong enough,
they might even conquer the city of Derna and eliminate the growing Islamic
State stronghold. As part of this effort, Egypt could help the government, now
limited to the cities of Bayda and Tobruk, to take their seat in Libya’s second
largest city of Benghazi and earn back its credibility and prestige. From
Benghazi, this newly empowered Libyan government could exert control all the
way to Sirte and from there project power in an attempt to reconquer the
western part of the country.
The challenges to
accomplishing this are manifold, and such interference could spell negative
ramifications that undermine both Egypt and Libya’s prospects for stability.
First, the strength of the Islamists in the east should not be underestimated.
They are very capable of holding their territory and could begin heavy
guerrilla warfare against what at that point could easily and justifiably be
portrayed as foreign “invaders.” This would cause further polarization in the
country and fuel radical elements’ justification for taking up arms and maybe galvanize
support from what, up until today, has been an inimical but largely passive
population.
Moreover, should Egypt
succeed in restoring the Tobruk government’s authority, the latter would face
residual questions of credibility and lawfulness, since its power would have
been established thanks to a foreign army. In the best-case scenario, even if it
earned the larger public’s tacit approval, the opposition would not withdraw
silently. There would undoubtedly be a continued resistance movement from those
who have been forcibly marginalized from the political sphere, prolonging the
Libyan government’s reliance on Egyptian support and thus reigniting questions
of legitimacy. The continued struggle against insecurity would also compel
authorities to divert resources away from infrastructure and reconstruction
that would serve the long-term interests of the state and its people.
For Egypt,
intervention would help cut the smuggling corridors that supply militant
extremists in the restive Sinai Peninsula and other parts of the country. Egypt
would also enjoy strengthened relations with the Libyan government, allowing it
to reap the rewards of eased travel restrictions for Egyptian labor and
profitable energy contracts. After the massive unrest and destruction of Libya’s
infrastructure, Egypt could even acquire lucrative reconstruction projects for
its companies. From a security and economic perspective, Egypt has every reason
to contemplate military intervention.
Nonetheless, El-Sisi
must ask himself if his confrontational stance toward all things Islamist may
in fact exacerbate those security and economic issues he aims to solve. If
Egypt establishes a buffer zone along the border or even limits itself to tactical
assaults in support of the Libyan army, its resulting label as a foreign
invader would provide fodder that may draw more, not fewer, jihadists to
Egypt’s borders. Even if security cooperation with the Libyan government
prevents infiltration into Egypt, its interests and citizens in Libya could
still come under the crosshairs of angry regional and international extremists.
Furthermore, the deployment of Egyptian troops to Libya’s borders would open a
second front in Egypt’s war on terror, overstretching the military and drawing
resources away from Sinai.
For the sake of its national
interests, Egypt should limit its involvement in Libyan affairs. To play a
positive role, Cairo should exercise all of its diplomatic clout over the
Tobruk government to push it toward a mediated and negotiated political
solution with its opponents. This, in the medium term, would guarantee Egypt’s
influence over the whole of Libya in terms of economic rewards without
committing its army to a potentially prolonged engagement like that of Egypt’s
involvement in Yemen during Gamal Abdel Nasser’s presidency. If Egypt plays a
constructive role in helping to resolve the Libyan crisis, a negotiated
solution would be more conducive to creating stability and security within
Libya that would finally allow it to continue its transition toward a
pluralistic and participatory political system. Such a Libya would better serve
Egypt’s interests, becoming an ally through the power of diplomatic support
rather than armed engagement that would threaten to undermine Libya’s
socio-political fabric and its potential as a strategic partner.
Karim Mezran is a senior fellow with the
Atlantic Council's Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East with a focus on the
politics and economics of North Africa.
Tarek Radwan is the associate director for research
at the Atlantic Council’s Rafik Hariri Center for the Middle East. On Twitter: @tradwan.