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Homepage > Regions / Countries > Middle East & North Africa > Iraq, Iran & the Gulf > Yemen > The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa
The Huthis: From Saada to Sanaa
Middle East Report N°154
10 Jun 2014
The power balance in Yemen’s north is shifting. In early 2014, Zaydi Shiite fighters, known as the Huthis or Ansar Allah (Partisans of God), won a series of battles, in effect consolidating their control over Saada governorate, on the border of Saudi Arabia, and expanding southward to the gates of the capital, Sanaa. Now a patchwork of shaky ceasefires is in place, albeit battered by bouts of violence. Tensions are high between Huthis and their various opponents – the Ahmar family, Major General Ali Mohsen al-Ahmar (no relation to the Ahmar family) and his military allies, Salafi fighters, and the Sunni Islamist party, Islah, and their affiliated tribes. Fear is growing that an escalation could draw the state into a prolonged conflict. To head off a conflagration, the parties must turn the inchoate understandings reached during the country’s National Dialogue Conference (NDC) into an implementable peace plan.
Renewed violence comes at a sensitive time in the country’s transition. In January 2014, Yemenis completed the NDC, which produced a blueprint for far-reaching political reforms. But the plan is aspirational at best. The country has until January 2015 to complete drafting a constitution and a referendum approving it, before holding parliamentary and presidential elections later in the year. Obstacles are many, including a weak, divided government; a desperate economic situation; and deteriorated security. Widespread violence would imperil the transition by undermining the state’s already weak authority and its embryonic political consensus. The status quo is already doing so, albeit more slowly.
Fighting in the far north is nothing new. Between 2004 and 2010, when the Huthis fought six rounds with the government, they were political and military underdogs, confined primarily to Saada governorate, with ill-defined demands and no clear political agenda. But the 2011 uprising against former President Ali Abdullah Saleh changed the country’s political dynamics, propelling the Huthis onto the national stage. Today, they have taken advantage of state weakness and political infighting to expand their popular support and territorial control in the north, including all of Saada governorate, where they run checkpoints, secure roads, collect taxes, oversee local government administration and administer justice. As the government has scant authority, they have become a virtual state within a state in these areas.
By joining the NDC, they gained a seat at the national bargaining table, where they advocated popular positions, including a federal state based on democratic principles, political pluralism, religious freedom and balance of powers. Their reputation as outsiders – opposed to Saleh-era power brokers and the widely disliked transition government – won them additional support, even outside their traditional base in the predominately Zaydi north. The result is a shifting coalition of competing streams – religious, tribal and even leftist – cooperating under an anti-establishment umbrella, the overall character of which has yet to be hashed out. Whether the group will emerge as a party, a social movement, an armed militia or some combination thereof will depend on how the transition is managed.
Huthis claim that their expansion is locally driven. Yemenis, they say, welcome them because they are frustrated with old regime forces, including the Salehs, Ali Mohsen, Islah and the Ahmars. With their foes, they claim, determined to violently halt the peaceful spread of their ideas, they insist on retaining their weapons, at least for now, to prevent a state controlled by their enemies from crushing them.
Opponents contrast the Huthis’ inclusive rhetoric with their often repressive tactics. Critics routinely accuse the group of wanting to reinstate, by force, a theocracy similar to the Zaydi imamate of Yemen’s past. Some go further, claiming that the Huthis have turned away from their Zaydi roots toward Twelver Shiism – to which Iran’s Shiites adhere – and are serving Tehran’s agenda. As the Huthis have gained ground, an increasingly wide array of Yemeni stakeholders have grown wary, demanding that they immediately relinquish heavy weapons and form a political party as proof they are serious about peaceful competition.
The situation is combustible. Emboldened by recent victories, the Huthis may overplay their hand and miss a chance to consolidate gains through compromise. Their opponents, who show no sign of giving in, are pushing state intervention to roll back Huthi advances. President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi’s government is at risk of being pulled into a conflict that it cannot win militarily, especially while it fights an emboldened al-Qaeda branch. Southern separatists also are watching developments in the north closely; should the military become embroiled there, they could seize the opportunity to advance an independence bid.
The NDC agreements, while a helpful starting point, cannot halt the creeping violence. They did not fashion a clear consensus around the issues driving the fighting, such as power sharing and the division of the country into six federal regions. Some elements, like disarmament of non-state actors, are dangerously vague, lacking timetables and enforcement mechanisms.
In April 2014, President Hadi initiated talks with Huthi leader Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi about ending the recent fighting and implementing the NDC. But Hadi and UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar must go further and transform the NDC conclusions into an implementable peace deal. The talks must include, at least informally, additional stakeholders: high-level representatives of the General People’s Congress (GPC, former President Saleh’s party), Islah, the Ahmars, Ali Mohsen and Salafis. Any realistic peace plan will need to satisfy the core concerns of belligerents and guarantee them with enforcement mechanisms. Three elements are critical:
  • National and local power sharing until elections can be held. This should include a consensus government that would ideally comprise Huthi representatives, with ministers chosen on the basis of professional skill and political affiliation.
  • Disarmament. The Huthis should agree to a detailed, sequenced program for transferring weapons to the state in exchange for government steps to improve its neutrality, especially of the security services. Disarmament, first of heavy and then medium weaponry, must apply to all non-state actors. To promote transparency and implementation, all sides could agree to a monitoring framework.
  • Guarantees of freedom of religious belief and peaceful political activities. As a first step, the Ahmars, Islah, Salafis and Ali Mohsen should explicitly accept the Huthis’ right to propagate their religious views and pursue peaceful political activities. The Huthis should do the same for others and form a political party.
Negotiating the details and sequencing of implementation are far from easy. The parties were unable to do so during the NDC, which succeeded in no small part because difficult decisions were delayed. Yemen no longer has this luxury. At stake is not only a relapse into violence, but the country’s fragile transition.  
To achieve a general ceasefire agreement and lower tensions
To President Abdo Robo Mansour Hadi:
1.  Initiate talks between key stakeholders – including senior representatives of the Huthis, the GPC, Islah, the Ahmars, Ali Mohsen and Salafis – to secure a general ceasefire for the north.
To all belligerents (Huthis and associated tribes, including affiliates of the General People’s Congress; the Ahmars; and combatants affiliated with General Ali Mohsen and Islah):
2.  Honor existing ceasefire arrangements and refrain from opening new fronts.
3.  Participate in negotiations to achieve a general ceasefire in the north.
4.  Declare publicly Sanaa city off-limits for combat and take immediate actions to demobilise fighters in the capital.
5.  End media campaigns and mosque sermons that portray adversaries in sectarian terms or as pawns of foreign actors.
6.  Recognise publicly the right of all groups to propagate religious ideas freely and to engage in peaceful political activities throughout the country.
To build an implementable peace deal
To President Hadi and UN Special Envoy Jamal Benomar:
7.  Continue talks with Abd-al-Malik al-Huthi to develop a detailed and implementable peace plan, based on NDC guidelines.
8.  Incorporate in talks, either formally or informally, representatives of additional stakeholders: GPC, Islah, Ali Mohsen, the Ahmars, and Salafi groups.
9.  Ensure that negotiations address national and local power sharing as well as a specific disarmament plan that applies to all non-state actors.
To international supporters of the transition (including the U.S., UK, Gulf Cooperation Council and European Union):
10.  Support, in a coordinated fashion, President Hadi and Jamal Benomar’s efforts to secure an implementable peace deal based on NDC guidelines.
To the Huthis:
11.  Continue to participate in talks, sponsored by the president, in order to:
a) formulate a disarmament plan that applies to all non-state actors, begins with heavy weapons and includes oversight mechanisms in return for the state taking steps to improve the neutrality and inclusiveness of its institutions, especially the security services at the local and national levels;
b) form a political party that will participate in scheduled 2015 elections; and
c) conclude a local and national power-sharing agreement that facilitates Huthi participation in the consensus government and ensures the group’s support for the national government and transition writ large.
To the Ahmar family, Ali Mohsen, Islah and the General People’s Congress:
12.  Participate in talks, either informally or formally, as requested by the president, in order to agree with the Huthis on the objectives listed above.
Sanaa/Brussels, 10 June 2014
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