Key Points
- The rival jihadist Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra groups are well positioned to put pressure on the Syrian government's key supply line connecting Damascus to the Alawite heartland through Homs.
- Assad is likely to face a stark choice between losing this highway or concentrating his forces to keep it open, putting at risk his hold on other areas such as the city of Aleppo.
- The growing threat to road communications through Homs and the potential loss of Aleppo risk destabilising Assad's rule and increases the likelihood of his removal by the army leadership, supported by Iran, but this would not end the conflict in Syria.
EVENT
The road connecting Homs and Damascus is critical for Syrian President Bashar al-Assad's survival, but is likely to come under concurrent attack from the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra.
The Islamic State conducted a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) attack against Syrian government positions in Falqees, 40 kilometres east of the city of Homs, killing 17 Syrian government soldiers on 9 April. The Islamic State has been present in eastern Homs province for several months. It has been conducting attacks against government forces in energy fields in the area, such as Sha'er and others. The Islamic State is likely to push harder into the province of Homs, especially if it continues to lose ground in Iraq. Ideologically, this would help maintain its narrative of regular victories wheras militarily it would threaten al-Assad's control of the M5 main supply route. Moreover, it would take advantage of the US-led coalition's concern not to be seen to be providing air cover to Syrian president Bashar al-Assad's forces, reducing the pressure on the Islamic State from air strikes. Additionally, it would probably help the group rally potential supporters from among existing militants in Homs province to its side, given that they have been under constant pressure from the Syrian government for the last two years, and that other insurgent groups have failed to challenge the Syrian government effectively.
On the western side of Homs province, Jabhat al-Nusra, Al-Qaeda's official affiliate in Syria, is positioned in the Qalamoun Mountains between Lebanon and Syria. Jabhat al-Nusra has stated that it intends to launch an offensive into Syria in the coming weeks, as soon as the weather permits. Throughout the country, the Islamic State and Jabhat al-Nusra have fought each other bitterly over the past year; however, in the Qalamoun region, the two groups have co-operated with one another. This might well in part be because of long-standing personal relations, or because the groups are trapped between the Syrian and Lebanese armies, forcing greater co-operation. The extent to which Islamic State fighters in eastern Homs province manage to co-ordinate their operations with Jabhat al-Nusra in Qalamoun will be a major factor in how well these groups do against the Syrian army in Homs province. Simultaneous attacks by the two groups would place maximum pressure on Assad's forces.
Crucially, Homs province connects Damascus province to the coastal mountains, which constitute the Alawite heartland. Maintaining that supply line open is critical for the ability of Assad's Alawite-dominated government to govern from Damascus. Moreover, the presence of a significant Alawite community in Homs is a further factor that would cause the Syrian government to give priority to relieving jihadist pressure around the city. Additionally, the prolonged closure of the Damascus-Homs road would likely destabilise Assad's hold on power for several reasons, even if, as is likely, the jihadists were unable to keep the road closed and Assad had to concentrate forces to keep it open at the expense of other sectors. First, this would lead the Iranians to question the viability of Assad and his security forces as the best representatives of their interests in the Sunni-Shia war. Second, it would lead the Alawites to question whether Assad is still the best option to protect their interests. That might well make the Assad's removal in a military coup more likely.
FORECAST
An offensive by Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State, probably working independently and aimed at severing communications between Homs and Damascus, is likely in the coming weeks. The Syrian government is likely to dedicate significant resources to defeating any such offensive. However, given how overstretched the Syrian forces are, this may well force it to pull back critical resources from other areas such as Aleppo. The Syrian government in Aleppo has already been significantly weakened, and a withdrawal of some forces from there to Homs may well pave the way for an insurgent takeover by the city, most likely by Jabhat al-Nusra and Ahrar al-Sham.
This kind of major defeat in either Aleppo or Homs would be likely to destabilise Assad's hold on power, as his domestic Alawite supporters and his Iranian sponsors might well decide that his removal is necessary to bring different elements of the Sunni population hostile to Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State to the negotiating table. Even Assad's removal would, however, be unlikely to end the war in Syria, as many militant groups would not accept a government which included any of Assad's current ruling elite. Moreover, even in the event of a peace agreement, the large numbers of militias in the country would take years to disarm, and infighting between them would also continue.
