Iran Won Upfront Sanctions Relief, but With Potential Snags
The framework agreement reached on Thursday night clearly gives the P5+1 a combination of constraints on Iran’s nuclear program that should reassure all but the most bellicose opponents of diplomacy. It also provides the basis for at least a minimum of sanctions relief in the early phase of its implementation that Iran required, but some of the conditions on that relief are likely create new issue between Iran and the Western powers over the process. The agreement’s dependence on decisions by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the penchant of Israeli intelligence for discovering new evidence of illicit Iranian activities will encourage moves to delay or obstruct relief of sanctions.
US and European officials had been telling reporters that they would phase out their sanctions on oil and banking in return for Iranian actions to modify its program only gradually over several years, and made it clear that the purpose of this strategy was to maintain “leverage” on Iran.
Iran, however, was demanding that those sanctions be lifted immediately upon delivering on their commitments under agreement. And a source close to Iranian negotiators told Middle East Eye that Iran was confident it could deliver on all of the actions related to its enrichment program and Arak within a matter of months.
The same diplomatic conflict was being fought over UN Security Council sanctions: Iran wanted them to end as soon as they have fulfilled its commitments; the US and its allies were insisting that those sanctions could only be suspended gradually on a schedule that would extend through most or all of the initial ten-year period. And the P5+1 was also demanding that, in order to get those sanctions lifted, Iran would have to fully satisfy the IAEA that it had cooperated completely in regard to the “possible military dimensions” (PMD) of its program, and wait for the IAEA to give Iran a clean bill of health that its nuclear program is for peaceful purposes only.
Figuring out how those pivotal issues were finally resolved requires sifting through evidence that is not entirely clear-cut. The two sides apparently agreed that they would not release any official text of the agreement. The joint statement by EU foreign policy chief Frederica Mogherini and Iranian foreign minister Zarif, which is the closest thing to an official statement, was very brief and general and failed to clarify the provisions on sanctions removal. And the only available text of their statement, a transcript of the English language translation of Zarif’s Farsi language version of the statement, which was published in the Washington Post, unfortunately fails to complete the one sentence on how the issue of sanctions removal was removed, because it was partially inaudible.
The fact that no official text was released has meant that press coverage of the content of the agreement has relied primarily on the much more detailed summary of the agreement by the US State Department and on remarks by Secretary of State John Kerry. The US interpretation of the agreement, however, is ambiguous on some aspects of the sanctions removal issue, raising serious questions about what was precisely agreed on.
On US and European unilateral sanctions on oil and banking, which are of greatest short-term importance to the Iranian economy, the documents says those sanctions “will be suspended after the IAEA has verified that Iran has taken all of its key nuclear-related steps.” That wording appears to suggest that the sanctions would be suspended immediately upon the verification of the last step taken by Iran.
The US text thus seems to indicate that the Iranians won their demand that the Western powers give up their scheme for a “gradual” or “phased” withdrawal of sanctions. But the Iranians had wanted some of the sanctions removed each time they completed the implementation of a commitment, and instead the payoff comes only after the final step taken.
The US document also makes it clear that the “architecture of sanctions” regarding US unilateral sanctions – meaning the legal and bureaucratic systems underlying the sanctions – “will be retained for much of the duration of the deal and allow for snap back of sanctions in the event of significant nonperformance.” The Iranians have complained that suspending sanctions while leaving the threat of future sanctions in place has an intimidating effect on banks and businesses regarding resumption of relations with Iranian entities. But they didn’t have much leverage over that question.
The UN sanctions issue was resolved in a distinctly different way. According to the US text, all the UN Security Council resolutions on Iran, which impose various sanctions on Iran, “will be lifted with the completion by Iran of nuclear-related actions addressing all key issues (enrichment, Fordow, Arak, PMD and transparency).”
The implication of the US summary is that Iran would get some sanctions relief from the UN Security Council each time it has completed the implementation of one of its key “irreversible” commitments, as Iran had been demanding – not only at the end of all of its performance on all of the commitments. The inclusion of the PMD (“possible military dimensions”) of the Iranian nuclear program as an issue on which Iran would have to satisfy the IAEA introduces a potential obstacle to early sanctions relief, because IAEA Director General Yukiya Amano has said it could take several years to complete its assessment of the issue. But at least a delay by the IAEA would not prevent Iran from obtaining relief upon completing the other actions it would take.
Further confusing the interpretation of the agreement, Secretary of State John Kerry referred to the United States and its “international partners” providing sanctions relief “in phases” – a statement that appears inconsistent with the State Department text. In a tweet on Thursday, Zarif cited the Iran/P5+1 joint statement as saying the US would “cease all application of ALL nuclear-related secondary economic and financial sanctions”, and asked rhetorically, “Is this gradual?”
Judging from the US interpretative statements, Iran could get the bulk of the sanctions relief in the initial period of implementation – much of it within the first year or so. But that prospect would depend on the good will of the Obama administration and the IAEA. The Obama administration may well be inclined to facilitate the provision of early sanctions relief. But the political dynamics swirling around US and IAEA policies toward Iran suggest that the processes of IAEA assessment and delivery of sanctions may not go as smoothly as Iran would hope.
Looking even further ahead, Iran is certainly concerned about how a future US administration could and would implement the agreement. Iran was insisting that the UN Security Council resolution repealing previous resolutions with a new one reflecting the comprehensive agreement be passed before the change in administration in Washington in 2017, according to the source in contact with the negotiators. It remains unclear whether the P5+1 agreed to that demand.
One thing the US text makes clear is that the issue of Iranian research and development on advanced centrifuges research & development (R&D) remains unresolved. The US statement says that for the first ten years of the agreement, enrichment R&D will have to be consistent with maintaining breakout timeline of at least one year – obviously based on further understandings that have not been revealed or are yet to be negotiated. And beyond that period, the Iranian R&D plan will be “pursuant to the JCPOA”, meaning the final Joint Comprehensive Program of Action” is still to be negotiated.
Gareth Porter, an investigative historian and journalist specializing in U.S. national security policy, received the UK-based Gellhorn Prize for journalism for 2011 for articles on the U.S. war in Afghanistan. His new book is Manufactured Crisis: the Untold Story of the Iran Nuclear Scare. He can be contacted at porter.gareth50@gmail.com.
Read more by Gareth Porter
- Iran Demands Lifting of Sanctions for ‘Irreversible’ Moves, Says Insider – March 31st, 2015
- Sanctions and the Fate of the Nuclear Talks – March 27th, 2015
- The Real Story Behind the Republicans’ Iran Letter – March 12th, 2015
- The Long History of Israel Gaming the ‘Iranian Threat’ – March 5th, 2015
- How US Diplomatic Strategy Gave Netanyahu Leverage – February 22nd, 2015
رفع تحریمها علیه ایران به حسن نیت آمریکا و آژانس بستگی دارد - شهر خبر
April 4th, 2015 at 1:51 am
[…] گرت پورتر تحلیلگر آمریکا ( America ) یی در یادداشتی برای «آنتیوار[۲]» به موضوع ( subject ) مذاکرات هستهای و بیانیه مشترک […]
گرت پورتر: رفع تحریمها علیه ایران به حسن نیت آمریکا و آژانس بستگی دارد
April 4th, 2015 at 6:35 am
[…] فارس، گرت پورتر تحلیلگر آمریکایی در یادداشتی برای « آنتیوار » به موضوع مذاکرات هستهای و بیانیه مشترک ایران و گروه […]
carnaptious
April 4th, 2015 at 8:10 am
The US War Party – ably assisted by "special friends" in the Middle East – fabricated "evidence" of Iraqi WMDs. There's no reason to think the War Party and friends won't be just as creative with "evidence" of Iranian violations of the nuclear agreements.
The epic season of spinning Iran deal begins!
April 4th, 2015 at 9:28 am
[…] Gareth Porter seems hopeful but also points out how many details of the agreement are unresolved. At antiwar. com: […]
گرت پورتر: رفع تحریمها علیه ایران به حسن نیت آمریکا و آژانس بستگی دارد | جهان خبر
April 4th, 2015 at 10:01 am
[…] فارس، گرت پورتر تحلیلگر آمریکایی در یادداشتی برای «آنتیوار» به موضوع مذاکرات هستهای و بیانیه مشترک ایران و گروه […]
NewWorldOrder
April 4th, 2015 at 1:40 pm
What Israel fear the most an Iran rapprochement with the West and equally worse, sanctions to be removed. Now Iran will be able to deal arms as they please upgrading their self defense capability. In other words, Israel worse fears is the fact that it will get much harder for them to use fear propaganda. As time will go by and Iran remains quiet without giving beer talks (but still an enemy of Israel), no one will believe the zionists anymore.
Economic liberalization of Iran would go a long way towards reduction of Islamic radicalism then any military interventionist policy could ever achieve. Given the History of Iran, they were perhaps the first country in the region to try and establish a democratic order of governance. The Iranian Constitutional Revolution of the 1905-1906 led to the establishment of a parliament during Qajar dynasty rule. This was even in the backdrop of Russian and British occupation of parts of Iran. Russians occupied Northern Iran in 1911 and the British occupied other parts during World War 1 and withdrew only in 1921.
With the withdrawal the Soviet and British forces, the Qajar Dynasty was ousted and Pahlavis came to become the Shah in 1921. Iran under the Pahlavi dynasty was neutral during the World War 2. During the holocaust years, in 1940, Abdol Hossein-Sardari, the Iranian consul in Nazi-occupied France, saved about 2,000 Jews from Holocaust in France by keeping their identities hidden.
The British and the allied forces had strategic interests in Iran and the Anglo-Iranian oil company owned and operated the Abadan oil Refinery. They gave the Iranians only 10% of the profit. The British and Soviets fearing that the Germans will get hold of the Iranian resources attacked and occupied Iran in 1941 in the Anglo-Soviet Invasion of Iran. The Iranian shah at the time, Reza Shah Pahlavi had even appealed to the Teddy Roosevelt on the basis of the Atlantic Charter, to provide help against the invasion. President Roosevelt refused. In 1943, American troops joined the British and the Soviets in the Iran to keep the Persian Corridor open.
The withdrawal of allied forces from Iran finally came in 1946. However the Soviets did not withdraw even then and with support from Soviets Azerbaijan was wrested from the Iranians to form a new country on shores of the Caspian Sea. A bit of trivia is that the Iranian government complained to United Nations about the fact that the Soviets did not withdraw in 1946 which is the first complaint by any country to the newly formed UN.
In 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh became the democratically elected prime minister of Iran. The British Anglo-Iranian Oil company (AIOC) had developed most oil fields in Iran and only 10 – 16% of the revenue was going to Iranians. This was widely unpopular in Iran and Mosaddegh made the critical folly of trying to nationalize Iran’s oil industry. He was deposed by a CIA led British supported coupe in 1953 to reinstall Shah in power.
The Shah’s rule was fairly autocratic and brutal with SAVAK, a Gestapo styled intelligence apparatus that suppressed political dissent through unfair means. This went on for 26 years till 1979 when the Ayatollah led Iranian revolution happened.
This Iranian Islamic revolution changed the Muslim world for ever. It’s strong currents were felt throughout North Africa and Asia and perhaps was the strongest force behind the currents in today’s world that call forth for Islamic Revivalism as a political force.
رفع تحریمها علیه ایران به حسن نیت آمریکا و آژانس بستگی دارد - اخبار روز
April 4th, 2015 at 2:40 pm
[…] گرت پورتر تحلیلگر آمریکا ( America ) یی در یادداشتی برای «آنتیوار[۲]» به موضوع ( subject ) مذاکرات هستهای و بیانیه مشترک […]
گرت پورتر: رفع تحریمها علیه ایران به حسن نیت آمریکا و آژانس بستگی دارد
April 5th, 2015 at 7:57 am
[…] فارس، گرت پورتر تحلیلگر آمریکایی در یادداشتی برای «آنتیوار» به موضوع مذاکرات هستهای و بیانیه مشترک ایران و گروه […]
Mark_Thomason
April 5th, 2015 at 9:53 am
If Iran does not get it side of the deal, then the deal will be off.
It won't be possible to put it back together again after such a betrayal of trust.
That is what happened in Korea, where Bush cheated on the agreement Clinton made, and for a few shiploads of residual heavy oil he got a dozen N Korean bombs and a problem that is, so far, beyond solving.
Now they're trying to do that again. Why? Because they are not really afraid of a bomb in Iran, they are afraid of Iran and want it hemmed in or destroyed like Syria and Iraq.
While the Saudis cooperate it in this, they ought to beware, because they're next for reduction to a Syria or Iraq or Libya. It is to be a villa in a jungle, and the area is being cleared to revert to jungle.
abi
April 7th, 2015 at 11:07 am
http://www.rajanews.com/news/207185
ظریف در جلسه کمیسیون امنیت ملی به هیچ یک از سوالات پاسخ نداد/ این توافقنامه از خط قرمزها عبور کرده است/ عقب نشینی ها بسیار شدیدتر شده / دوستان ظریف هم منتقد بیانیه بودند / دولت علیه منتقدین هسته ای خفقان رسانه ای ایجاد کرده است