Dr. Po Dharma |
Le Van Duyet, the famous Vietnamese governor of Gia Dinh who dared to sponsor and encourage Panduranga-Champa to stand up against the Hue court, died in 1832. After this event, King Minh Menh ordered his military to reoccupy Panduranga-Champa in order to punish the Cham king who had broken away from Hue. Every Cham and high-ranking official in the city was killed or imprisoned.
This event was one of Minh Meng’s bloodiest campaigns, for he launched it with the intention of erasing the remnants of Champa from the map once and for all.
After this brutal suppression, the Hue court further oppressed the Cham people by imposing heavy taxes and hard labor upon them in their own lands. In addition, they continued to suffer from those unscrupulous Vietnamese aristocrats and officers who constantly harassed them or sought to acquire their land and property by any means. As this oppression was carried out in broad daylight day after day and year after year, the people were pushed to the limit. Finally, they concluded that the only way to change their situation was to rise up against their occupiers and oppressors. The first uprising was led by Katip Sumat.
The Uprising of Katip Sumat (1833-1834)
The spark that set off this uprising was the political and military upheaval in the Gia Dinh citadel (later known as Saigon) after the death of its governor (Le Van Duyet) in 1832. On 8 May 1833, the Chronicle of Vietnam[1] recorded that Le Van Khoi, his adopted son, gathered those who were loyal to him in order to attack the central Hue government, which controlled his adopted father’s domain in Gia Dinh. Within six months, he controlled six southern cities.
This uprising initiated a period of crisis throughout all of Vietnam. In June of the same year, Le Duy Luong revolted in the north at Ninh Binh and Hung Hoa.[2] A month later, Nung Van Van, a brother-in-law of Le Van Khoi,[3] started another uprising throughout the Central Highlands in the northernmost part of Vietnam.[4] And in Panduranga-Champa, Katip Sumat led his own army to liberate that country from Hue’s control.
Katip is a Muslim title used to denote the man who gives the Friday sermon in the mosque. His real name was Sumat (some reports say “Tamat”[5]), and he was born in Cambodia. According to one of the Cham records written in Cambodia, Katip Sumat went to Malaysia to study the Qur’an at “Makkah” (in reality, this was the present-day Malaysian state of Kelentan[6]). However, since the date is not mentioned, we do not know for certain whether his uprising took place before or after that of Le Van Khoi. However, regardless of what happened, the Chronicle of Vietnam[7] does not link the two uprisings together; Minh Menh believed that Katip Sumat received help from the splinter groups of Le Van Khoi’s revolt in the south.[8]
Katip Sumat Arrives in Panduranga-Champa
Cham historical records indicate that Katip Sumat returned to Cambodia after finishing his studies in Kelentan. At that time, Minh Menh was besieging Cambodia.. Therefore, he went to Panduranga-Champa with large number of Muslim Cham in order to start a resistance campaign against the Vietnamese occupation. The Cham Muslims received him as a hero and a savior because of his superior knowledge of the Qur’an. In addition, they believed that he had magical powers, such as moving about without leaving any traces behind. The Cham officials treated him with the utmost respect and promised to join him in the noble cause of national liberation.[9] Po Phaok The, the former king of Panduranga-Champa, and such high-ranking officers as Po Nyi Liang, Po Ling, Po Ceng, and Katip Ja Thak Wa, joined the movement and accepted his leadership.[10]
Internal Struggle
In order to maintain a low profile, the leaders decided to keep Katip Sumat’s presence a secret until they had built up a sufficient infrastructure.[11] Unfortunately, Po Kabait Thuac, a former Cham Hindu officer who had been a member of the resistance groups fighting the Hue court, was afraid that he might be captured and so secretly informed the Vietnamese officers of the planned uprising. Minh Menh immediately ordered the capture of all people suspected of collaborating with or sheltering Katip Sumat. All of those who were committed to the movement refused to reveal his whereabouts. In the absence of any evidence, the Vietnamese had no choice but to release them. On the other hand, they executed Po Kabait Thuac on the grounds that he accused people without clear evidence. This incident indicated that the Hue court did not have control over Panduranga-Champa’s sociopolitical situation during that time.[12]
The Holy War
Given the atmosphere of suspicion that this event engendered within the Cham community, Katip Sumat began to consider whether he should return to Cambodia, restore peace in the Cham community, or continue the struggle.[13] When this became known, his loyal followers begged him to continue the struggle. He accepted their request on the condition that the movement must be based on Islamic principles, having decided that such a foundation would make its members more disciplined and loyal. He believed that once these people believed in the one God, they would be willing to sacrifice everything for the noble cause.
Katip Sumat then brought his movement to Mount Con Cong (Cham: Cek Aih Amrak) in Dong Nai,[14] located on the southern border between Cambodia and Panduranga-Champa, in order to study Islam and learn how to fight. He also sent his men to the Raglai and Churu tribes living in the Central Highlands to recruit more members, and urged them to believe in the one God of Islam. In pursuit of his dream, he secretly purged all Cham Bani members who opposed him.[15]
Looking back, no one denies that his intention was to liberate Panduranga-Champa. However, his method reveals that he was more concerned with spreading Islam and making Panduranga-Champa an Islamic country, a dream that he had failed to realize while staying in Cambodia.[16] To realize this goal, he invented an ideology of a holy war against the Vietnamese occupiers.[17]
After refusing to submit to the Hue court,[18] Katip Sumat placed Tuan Lik[19] in control of Phan Ri province, a Cham officer named Kuac Riwa in control of Long Huong province, and Katip Ja Thak Wa[20] in control of Phan Rang. When the preparations were complete, he raised the flag of revolt, on which was written “Po Rosat,”[21] and ordered his forces to attack the Vietnamese troops in Panduranga-Champa.
This uprising represented a grave situation for Minh Menh, who not only reinforced the thousands of his excellent troops already stationed in Panduranga-Champa, but also ordered local Vietnamese settlers, most notably those Binh Thuan county, to burn, loot, and steal as much of the rebels’[22] property as they could and without any fear of punishment.[23] Responding to this officially sanctioned scorched-earth policy, they went on a rampage throughout the land, trying to settle unfinished businesses with the local Cham by driving them toward the mountains or the uninhabited areas in order to steal their lands. In response to this onslaught, the Cham resistance movement, which included members of the Raglai and Churu tribes, put their faith in Po Auloah’s (Allah) protection.[24] Full of faith but without any actual warfare experience or a sound strategy, their resistance soon became no more than a suicidal mission. Facing a powerful army equipped with advanced weaponry, Katip Sumat’s forces collapsed within a few weeks.
After this failed revolt, Katip Sumat retreated to Mount Con Cong in upper Dong Nai, leaving behind a few poorly equipped troops to hold off the advancing Vietnamese army. In no mood to be merciful, the Vietnamese ruthlessly annihilated the remaining pockets of resistance, along with the local inhabitants of Phan Rang and Phan Ri as collective punishment, even if they had not been involved with the revolt.
Conclusion
This uprising stemmed from years of oppressive Vietnamese rule after Minh Menh’s forces had erased Panduranga-Champa from the map in 1832. It was an act of desperation after years of cumulative suffering directed at the oppressor, and one result of the people’s belief that Katip Sumat could channel their anger by using Islamic principles to organize a powerful force capable of defeating the Vietnamese enemy.
The Expanding Islamic Movement
The suppression of Katip Sumat’s revolt was one Minh Menh’s bloodiest campaigns against the people of Panduranga-Champa. As a result, they suffered greatly. However, this uprising had one – albeit small – positive outcome: Minh Menh abandoned the traditional policy of Vietnamizing non-Vietnamese races and directed his efforts toward a new threat: Islam. The Hue court described this new religion as “They only recited prayers in a strange language, believed in the saints, and housed evil spirits in their residences.”[25] In other words, the people of Panduranga-Champa had been “mislead” to embrace Katip Sumat’s beliefs. It was well known that Minh Menh adored Vietnam’s long-standing Confucian-based culture and tradition that it had received from China many centuries ago.[26] He was worried that Katip Sumat, a fighter from a foreign land, had successfully brought a new religion into Panduranga-Champa, one that he considered counterproductive to Vietnam’s dominant culture.
He also feared that Katip Sumat’s imported religion would destroy his own dream of using Vietnamese culture to assimilate the people of Champa-Panduranga. If he did not stop this new belief from spreading, in time it would gradually creep into the traditional beliefs of Vietnamese. Faced with such an imminent threat, Minh Menh issued an immediate order and sent reinforcements to Panduranga-Champa to destroy Katip Sumat’s movement as quickly as possible. Furthermore, during this time, the inhabitants of six provinces located in Gia Dinh province secretly embraced Christianity, another foreign religion, and joined in Le Van Khoi’s uprising. In King Minh Menh’s mind, this development was concrete proof that Le Van Khoi was receiving help from foreign powers that were conspiring to remove Gia Dinh from Vietnamese control in order to establish a Christian country.
The Carrot Policy
In order to suppress Katip Sumat’s movement as quickly as possible, Minh Menh devised a plan to isolate him from Po Phaok, Panduranga-Champa’s former king who had close ties with Le Van Duyet and his adopted son Le Van Khoi. Based on his assumption that Po Phaok had played a decisive role in the uprising, Minh Menh thought that he must bribe Po Phaok The at any cost.[27]
In June 1833, therefore, he proposed to knight Po Phaok The. The latter man, now known as Dien An Ba, thus acquired a very respectable title and position. Furthermore, Minh Menh offered to build a temple or a monument to commemorate the previous Cham kings who had commanded great respect among the Cham and to provide the necessary state funds needed to restore those Cham temples that were not being properly care for or had fallen into ruin. He even allowed Po Phaok The to collect taxes in Panduranga-Champa.[28] The underlying goal of all of these offers was to thwart what he believed to be a direct relationship between the uprisings of Katip Sumat and Le Van Khoi. If he could bring Po Phaok The over to his side, this presumed relationship would cease to exist. If not, their combined uprisings would pose a grave threat to the Vietnam’s national unity.
Even though the royal records of the Hue court discussed this potential alliance between Katip Sumat and Le Van Khoi, as well as the plan to bribe Po Phaok The at any cost, the Champa chronicle does not mention Po Phaok The or his involvement in the uprising. No matter what happened to Po Phaok The, his absence was not very significant, for the uprising went on without him.
Why the Uprising Failed
To defeat the uprising quickly, Minh Menh told his military forces in Panduranga-Champa to use any means necessary to suppress the rebels. He did not care if the method was brutal, only that it was effective. The other reason was that Katip Sumat had mislead his forces into placing their entire belief in Islam instead of studying the arts of warfare and fighting. He and his followers recruited the Cham Ahier and the Cham Bani, as well as such Central Highland tribal peoples as the Churu and the Raglai, by persuading them that their absolute belief in the one God of Islam would cause Him to protect them on the battlefield. In addition, he convinced them of the superiority of Katip Sumat’s leadership and magic powers over military strategy. During their training, therefore, they were taught that their pure belief would render them invisible and transform their bodies into steel so that neither gun nor sword could harm them. However, these beliefs proved futile, for the Vietnamese troops were well equipped with modern weapons and their generals were experienced in warfare.[29]
Ja Thak Wa’s Resistance Movement
The failure of Katip Sumat’s uprising led several senior members of the organization to voice their protest of his policy[30] of placing thousands of untrained men on the battlefield “protected” only by their belief in God and magic spells in place of any military training. They also opposed his policy of disguising the national struggle under the cloak of holy war.
One of these leaders was Katip Ja Thak Wa, a Cham Bani from Van Lam, a small village in Phan Rang province, who had held important posts in Panduranga-Champa before its annexation.[31] Not agreeing with Katip Sumat’s conduct of the uprising, he organized his own resistance movement in 1834. It is interesting to note that Katip Ja Thak Wa was a Cham Bani[32] unlike Katip Sumat, who professed orthodox Islam. His movement has all the characteristics of a modern-day resistance front.
After the birth of this new resistance front, those loyal to Katip Sumat secretly informed the Hue court about the new potential uprising and suggested that he issue an arrest warrant immediately. But Minh Menh ignored this advice, for he wanted the in-fighting between the resistance leaders to escalate, as the resulting confusion and ill-will could only benefit him. This divide-and-conquer policy served him well.[33]
After this, the Champa chronicle does not have much to say about Katip Sumat. Cham records,[34] however, suggest that Katip Ja Thak Wa refused to fight under the banner of Islam, for he thought not following this policy would enable his troops to learn and then use the military tactics needed to defeat an enemy two or three times their size and equipped with advanced weaponry,[35] instead relying solely on the supernatural. There is another plausible cause for this policy: Ja Thak Wa thought that if Katip Sumat brought Islam into Panduranga-Champa and his influence over the people grew too large, it would further complicate his plan to establish a united resistance front comprised of different ethnicities in those communities of which he was the leader.[36]
The birth of Ja Thak Wa’s movement occurred at the right time in terms of politics, for the people of Panduranga-Champa had been suffering under Vietnamese occupation for quite some time and were just waiting for an opportunity to explode. Ja Thak Wa worked his way in and used the existing situation to advance his political agenda. He called upon the people to unite under a common banner, regardless of color, belief, or affiliation; step out of their province-only identity; and adopt one goal in their fight against the common enemy: the restoration of the historical Kingdom of Champa to its rightful position as an independent kingdom, as well as the restoration of everything that Minh Menh had destroyed. Toward that end, he established countless bases in remote areas beyond the reach of Vietnamese influence. In 1834, he started his network in the Central Highlands in Panduranga (upper Dong Nai) and in Kauthura (Nha Trang, Phu Yen province), areas that neither Vietnamese spies nor officers could penetrate.[37]
Restoring King Po Rome’s Dynasty
After securing all of his bases, Ja Thak Wa called upon the national representatives of different regions to anoint a national figurehead for the new movement. They voted for Po War Palei,[38] who belonged to the Raglai tribe in Ca Dang village, to be Panduranga-Champa’s king (Po Patrai). This man was a brother-in-law of Po Dhar Kaok (known in Vietnamese as Nguyen Van Nguyen), a former prince of Panduranga-Champa under Po Phaok The[39] (1828-1832). Ja Thak Wa also proposed a member of the Churu tribe as crown prince, who would bear the title Cei Aia Harei (the Sun Prince), and a Cham individual as vizier, who would bear the title Panraong[40] Sa-ai (senior military officer).
A few Cham records indicate that Po War Palei was knighted not because he was Po Dhar Kaok’s brother-in-law, but because he belonged to the lineage of Po Rome (Churu tribe), who had founded the sixth dynasty of Panduranga-Champa, which had lasted from 1627 until its last king, Po Ceng Cei Brei (1783-1786). Faced with an insurmountable threat from the Nguyen Anh and the Tay Son, rival Vietnamese powers? who conspired to annex the Panduranga-Champa, he abandoned his throne and made his way to Cambodia to seek help. After ten years of wandering in Cambodia, he finally set foot in Cambodian-ruled Dong Nai in 1795.[41] From 1786 until the last vestige of the historical Kingdom of Champa was erased from the map in 1832, the throne was in the hands of Cham officials who did not belong to King Po Rome’s lineage. All of the officials who ran Panduranga-Champa were knighted either by the Tay Son or the Nguyen Anh[42] after Po Ceng Cei Brei vacated his throne. For this reason, Ja Thak Wa wanted to continue Po Rome’s dynastic lineage.[43]
After the birth of his united resistance front, Ja Thak Wa organized an elaborate ceremony in front of the Po Rome temple in Phan Rang. Thousands of people brought food and offerings to Po War Palei. After the sacrificial slaughter of a buffalo, the people murmured the well-wishing prayers with thundering drums in concert with a saranai (the name derived from Indian language means flute), topping it off with a marvelous show by traditional dancers. Po War Palei then publicly acknowledged his role as Po Patrai (king) of Panduranga-Champa. Together with his beloved wife, he would rebuild the Kingdom of Champa’s heritage and traditions.[44]
Ja Thak Wa’s establishment of military bases and knighting the king and officials proved that he intended to restore the kingdom to its former glory as a fully sovereign entity free of foreign occupation.[45] He believed that a kingdom ruled by a legitimate member of the royal family and following the traditional infrastructure would attract the popular support needed to fight the enemy effectively.[46] To the people of Champa-Panduranga, Po War Palei was the rightful king; however, the Vietnamese royal court in Hue considered this movement a ploy of “those savages who live in the corners of hills and valleys with the intention of robbing property and expelling the Vietnamese settlers who live in that area.”[47]
Ja Thak Wa’s Military Strategy
Before launching an all-out war, Ja Thak Wa personally oversaw the entire preparation process.[48] He converted the rugged mountainous areas west of Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, Binh Thuan, and Bien Hoa provinces into military bases that were supported and protected by the Central Highlanders, fierce fighters who were always on guard against the Vietnamese settlers who had entered their territory since 1832. Since Po War Palei was from the Raglai tribe and the crown prince was from Churu tribe, Ja Thak Wa’s effort to win their support was easily realized. For those Cham who lived in the lowlands controlled by Hue court, he initiated a political propaganda[49] campaign that accused the Vietnamese settlers and officials of committing crimes against the people of Panduranga-Champa.[50] He then informed them of his conclusion: rise up against the occupiers.[51]
When Nung Van Van launched his uprising in the north (1833-1835) and Le Van Khoi and his supporters rose up in 1832-1835[52] with Thailand’s[53] help in the south,[54] Vietnam was engulfed in crisis. Believing the time to be right, Ja Thak Wa made his first move (July 1834) by attacking the lowlands from Phu Yen to Phan Ri with the intent of destroying the Vietnamese bases. He also urged the people of Panduranga-Champa to stand up against Hue, to rise up and liberate their country.
Minh Menh’s Scorched-earth Policy
Faced with these serious threats, Minh Menh ordered an all-out war and decreed a “scorched-earth” policy. According to a historical record in the form of a poem, the Ariya Gleng Anak written in 1835,[55] the battle between Minh Menh and Ja Thak Wa was the bloodiest in history. Guns and cannons roared like thunder across the sky,[56] and numerous Cham villages were burned to the ground[57] to break the rebels’ will and force their submission. Minh Menh threatened to kill those who followed Ja Thak Wa on the spot. Their bodies would be dismembered and their guts would be ripped out and displayed on the trees to intimidate and demoralize the rebels.[58]
Using such savage tactics, the Vietnamese military thwarted Ja Thak Wa’s first attack. However, Ja Thak Wa thought that the success of Vietnamese offensive was due not to its might, but because the Cham tribes who lived in the lowlands had been too afraid to rise up, as he had expected. Maybe they were afraid of the Vietnamese, or maybe they were not being punished harshly enough for disobeying his orders.[59]
Ja Thak Wa’s Iron Policy
In preparation for second offensive planned for October 1835,[60] according to the Champa chronicle, Ja Thak Wa ordered the Churu and Raglai officers to punish those Cham who did not follow the rebels out of fear of Minh Menh’s retribution.[61] Once on the march, the Churu and Raglai became a powerful force that destroyed Vietnamese military posts and burned the villages of those Cham who did not support the uprising.[62]
The result was astounding: Ja Thak Wa liberated Panduranga-Champa from Vietnamese occupation. The Vietnamese chronicle[63] indicated that he captured numerous counties, such as An Phuoc, Hoa Da, Tuy Tinh, and Binh Thuan. As a result, the Vietnamese forces, suffering from low morale and defeat, retreated. In order to regain this lost territory, Minh Menh started recruiting more men from Binh Dinh, Phu Yen, Khanh Hoa, and Gia Dinh provinces.[64] Eventually raising over 3,000 men and convincing many thousands of local Vietnamese to join the central force, he sent them to fight Ja Thak Wa’s militia.[65]
Minh Menh could not afford to loose Panduranga-Champa, for this kingdom was the only link between the Vietnamese fatherland in the north and Gia Dinh, the newfound Vietnamese territory in the south. If Panduranga-Champa fell under Ja Thak Wa’s control, then Hue would certainly lose Gia Dinh, where Le Van Khoi’s uprising was still continuing. In addition, the thousands of Vietnamese troops stationed in Cambodia, a country under threat by Thailand, would receive no help from the north. Given that the stakes were so high for the Hue court, Minh Menh himself directed the assault against Ja Thak Wa in order to boost morale.
To achieve his goal, Minh Menh punished all high-ranking officers who had not foreseen Ja Thak Wa’s uprising. In February 1835/1836 he demoted Phan Phu, the senior officer in charge of Binh Thuan county, for his numerous “errors.” This official had offered plan after plan to restore peace and stability in Panduranga-Champa, but his plans kept failing year after year. As a result, he considered Phan Phu extremely incompetent. If Ja Thak Wa succeeded in capturing Panduranga-Champa, then Minh Menh concluded that such an unfortunate result could only be due to incompetent administrators who did not know how to fight and thus were afraid of Ja Thak Wa’s uprising.[66] He also demoted many junior officers, among them Duong Van Phong, assistant officers who looked after Binh Thuan and Khanh Hoa, and Le Nguyen Trung, the special envoy sent by Hue to Panduranga-Champa in 1832 to help the local officers run the country. Many more officers were demoted in the districts of Ninh Thuan, Tuy Tinh, and Tuy Phong.[67]
Retribution or Genocide?
Having punished his senior and junior officers for their failure to stop Ja Thak Wa, the next step was to turn the tide against the rebels.[68] To achieve his goal, Minh Menh informed his military officers and the local settlers that anyone who killed one rebel or anyone associated with Ja Thak Wa would be rewarded with three gold coins, upon which would be inscribed the respectable title of “Phi Long” (Flying Dragon). Anyone who killed an officer in the rebels’ organization would be rewarded with more prestigious medals. As a matter of fact, the Vietnamese chronicle recorded that Minh Menh decreed that every soldier must behead at least three rebels a day to receive his salary.[69]
Since three Phi Long coins were equivalent to a soldier’s monthly salary, those Vietnamese settlers who were tempted by the prospect of new wealth and status went on a killing spree that did not distinguish between innocent Cham bystanders and those who had joined or supported Ja Thak Wa. They justified the killing by claiming that the dead were rebels or associates of Ja Thak Wa in order to receive gold coins. As a result, this genocidal policy brought the Cham population to its knees.
As the genocide was going on in the lowlands,[70] Minh Menh devised a plan to deal with the rebels in the Central Highlands. For this effort, he ordered an extensive military campaign consisting of massive waves of elephants marching through the forest to crush the remaining rebels. Knowing that the rebels were not equipped with guns or cannons, he believed that elephant fighters were his best choice. One part of the plan was to destroy secret military bunkers where the rebels had stored supplies, weapons, rice, and salt so that future uprisings would not be possible.[71]
Despite the unprecedented cruelty and scorched-earth tactics, the uprising remained strong. Finally, Minh Menh had to summon Phan Thanh Gian, a senior confidant of Hue, back from Cambodia to plan another military campaign against Ja Thak Wa.[72] In addition, he sent more troops to Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa in response to his officers’ requests.[73]
Battle for the Cham’s Hearts and the Minds
Once Minh Menh realized that his army was bogged down in Panduranga-Champa, he pondered whether offering a political settlement would drive a wedge into the uprising.[74] In order to sow the seed of distrust between the people of Champa and Ja Thank Wa, he started to pacify the people of Panduranga-Champa by encouraging them to trust, rather than to suspect, the court at Hue. In addition, he issued a new decree to all Vietnamese officers who ran Panduranga-Champa: They were not to abuse their authority toward the Cham nor to arrest the innocent without due process.[75] At the same time, he actively pursued a propaganda onslaught of promising a general amnesty to Ja Thak Wa’s[76] followers and asked the Cham to trust the Vietnamese government. He even went so far as to state that Hue would forgive and protect those who had followed Ja Thak Wa as a result of having been oppressed by the Vietnamese government. And, as his final touch, he released all Cham political prisoners to show Hue’s sincerity.[77]
In April 1835, Minh Menh released over 200 Cham prisoners who confessed that they had joined Ja Thak Wa due to the oppression of Vietnamese officers. As a token of its sincerity, Hue gave them supplies and gifts on the day they left the prison and warned them that if they rejoined the uprising, they would be executed on the spot if caught. Minh Menh encouraged the Cham to cooperate closely with the Vietnamese military in order to put down Ja Thak Wa’s[78] rebellion.
Hue’s battle for the hearts and minds of the Cham people has a deeper reason than is at first apparent. After a careful study of the uprising in the north, which coincided with the one in the south (namely, Panduranga-Champa), Hue concluded that “the uprising among the Man and the Tho tribes in the north[79] must be caused by the incompetent and greedy officers who do not know how to rule and did nothing good, but oppressed the people.”[80] On the contrary, the governors of Binh Thuan and Khan Hoa confessed that the battle for the hearts and minds of the Cham brought no fruitful results.[81]
Divide and Conquer
Besides this battle for the Cham’s hearts and minds, Minh Menh worked hard to win draw influential members of the Cham royalty over to his side in the hope that they would influence their people to abandon Ja Thak Wa and turn the tide for Hue court. One of the royals Minh Menh had in mind was the older sister of Dhar Kaok, Panduranga-Champa’s former crown prince (1828-1832), who was married to Po War Palei, the very prince whom Ja Thak Wa had anointed king in 1834. Minh Menh captured her and then offered to set her free if she would use her influence to persuade people not to join the uprising.[82]
The Execution of Two Cham Leaders
The other influential person whom Minh Menh had in mind was Po Phaok The, the former ruler of Panduranga-Champa (1828-1832). It is interesting to note that Minh Menh imprisoned this person after the country’s destruction in 1832. However, the Champa chronicle records his presence in Panduranga-Champa in 1833-1834. No one knows whether he was released as part of an amnesty program or whether he escaped from prison. During this time, he joined Katip Sumat’s uprising but was soon captured. Sentenced to prison on the charge of conspiracy against the Vietnamese government, he was later released.[83]
Since Minh Menh desperately wanted to win over Po Phaok The,[84] he planned to knight him with the respectable title of Dien An Ba. However, Po Phaok The did not live long enough to see that title, for the Hue court sentenced him to suffer the slow-death punishment (the “Lang Tri” sentence) for conspiring to join Le Van Khoi’s uprising.[85]
His subsequent death left many unanswered questions. It is a fact that Po Phaok The was imprisoned when Panduranga-Champa fell in 1832. However, his presence there in 1833-1834 was noted, even though he did not join Katip Sumat’s Islamic movement or Ja Thak Wa’s uprising. He was the one whom Minh Menh wanted to knight and then executed. Was the whole story fabricated to discredit a former king who stood up and never submitted to a conqueror? On the other hand, Crown Prince Po Dhar Kaok of Panduranga-Champa was punished with the same death sentence and for the same reason. Why did Minh Menh decide to execute two influential Cham figures just two months after the deaths of Ja Thak Wa and Po War Palei in 1835?
Vietnamese history presents Minh Menh as a cunning politician. His plan to win Po Phaok The has its own merit. He knew that the Cham who were loyal to the kingdom of Panduranga-Champa would always respect their fallen king no matter what.[86] Furthermore, they would sacrifice themselves to protect his well being, for Po Phaok The was a living symbol of the nation and its culture.[87] Since Minh Menh’s strategy did not go according to his plan, the only choice left was to get rid of those who brought no benefit to Hue.
Cruel Punishment for Ja Thak Wa
Both the Vietnamese and Cham chronicles record many bloody battles between Ja Thak Wa and Minh Menh throughout Panduranga-Champa until April 1835, which marked the deaths of Po War Palei and Ja Thak Wa.[88] At the end, Cham records[89] indicate that Ja Thak Wa was injured in a rice field near Van Lam village in Phan Rang. When he was caught, the Vietnamese troops killed and decapitated him and then carried his body away to insult it further. The deaths of these two leaders were fatal blows to the uprising. Now that the tide had finally turned, Minh Menh ordered a final push to eliminate all other pockets of resistance.[90]
However, according to the Vietnamese chronicle, these two deaths did not end the uprising, but rather created two more pockets of rebels at Hoa Thuan and Long Ban provinces in June of the same year. Even though the uprising did not succeed, it left a deep scar in the mind of the Hue court. After Ja Thak Wa’s death, Minh Menh summoned his top military advisor to review the military plan and ordered the governor of Thuan Khanh county to pursue the rebels to the end.
As a result, the fighting continued even after June 1835. But it was only temporary, for the deaths of the two leaders had broken the rebels’ morale and ended their will to fight. The following month, July 1835, Fort Phien An, Le Van Khoi’s last hideout, fell under Hue’s control. Having finally reasserted total Vietnamese control over the south, Minh Menh implemented a policy of assimilation in Panduranga-Champa.
Obliterating the People and Their Past
To end the uprising once and for all, Minh Menh rained death and destruction upon Panduranga-Champa. Those terrible events, which have been recorded in the Cham’s historical memory, still send shivers up and down the spines of many Cham even today. Minh Menh gave the Vietnamese troops carte blanche to kill, deport, pursue, and imprison the rebels and those who had followed Ja Thak Wa. They immediately began to enslave[91] the surviving Cham, who were now completely at their mercy. They destroyed all that they could, set Cham villages on fire, confiscated Cham property, exhumed the resting places of their ancestors (kut), and destroyed the Cham royal tombs, including those of Po Klaong Haluw (1567-1591/1579-1603) and Po Saong Nyung Ceng (1799-1822).[92] In addition, they set many temples on fire, most notably the magnificent temple of Po Rome.[93]
Changing Panduranga-Champa’s Demography
After this phase of complete destruction, Minh Menh decided to change Panduranga-Champa’s demography[94] in order to prevent any future uprisings. He uprooted countless Cham villages and forced their inhabitants to live among the Vietnamese settlers. From then on, the Cham’s social structures were in complete disarray because they did not have a land of their own or their ancestral villages.[95] The disappearance of countless villages along the coast engendered many tales of sadness and endless destruction.
On the other hand, this destruction represented a golden opportunity for Vietnamese settlers. With the help of Hue and the new order, they now had the upper hand and behaved like victors. They seized the Cham’s fertile lands, properties, and wealth in the villages that the Cham had been forced to leave behind while being forcibly driven to Vietnamese-inhabited land … a bitter sentence for a lost people. The people of Panduranga-Champa thus became second-class citizens stripped of their land and property. As a result, they lost all will to fight and hoped only to survive. They became more disenfranchised with each passing day.[96]
Isolating the Central Highlands
Minh Menh issued further orders forbidding any relationship between the people of the lowlands and their ancestral brothers and sisters in the Central Highlands, like the Churu, Raglai, Kaho, and others. The goal of this policy was to control or even prevent, if possible, any relationship between these regions’ peoples that may blossom into a network of resistance, a very real chance, as they had always fought side by side against the Vietnamese throughout history.[97]
Again, Hue sought to destroy a people and their culture forever. Therefore, it implemented many genocidal programs to ensure that the Cham people, whether in the short term or the long term, would disappear. Forbidding all relationships between the peoples of the lowlands and the Central Highlands started to disrupt the continuity and feelings of relatedness between the two communities, both of whom had played vital roles in holding the kingdom’s traditions and beliefs. For example, Champa’s kings had traditionally lived and ruled in the lowlands, and the kingdom’s belongings, precious treasures, and royal documents had always been kept in the Central Highlands, especially among the Churu and Raglai tribes.[98] Both communities synchronized the kingdom’s harmony by performing such national religious ceremonies as the Kate. Once the relationship was cut-off, all remaining ties gradually disappeared, including traditional and national coherence.
****
After this brutal repression dismantled all of Champa’s traditional and historical economic structures, social fabric, and religious rituals that had been built up over a millennia of independent existence, Minh Menh still feared that the resistance would one day start again. To ensure this would not happen, he established a true Vietnamese power in Panduranga-Champa and implemented a Vietnamization policy toward all non-Vietnamese races. In theory, he wanted to enforce his policy to ensure that those in power would not abuse their power to oppress Champa’s people, even though, in reality, Vietnamese offices would be the judge and executioners. So no matter how just the case may be, the Cham would always suffer because they had become slaves in their own land. Without a patron, they had no courage to stand up against the accusers, who were the Vietnamese who had committed the crime.[99] They had no protector to turn to, and no money to pay for the court.
The king and the country were gone, and so the people of Panduranga-Champa lost all hope and spirit. In the end, they were overtaken by despair, living day to day without meaning or purpose, suffering day and night under a foreign occupying power. In the following pages, we will briefly go through a famous poem, the Ariya Gleng Anak (Glance Forward), which describes the pain and sadness of a people who have lost everything.
[1] QTCB, 158. For more information, see J. Sylvestre, 1915, 22-23.
[2] QTCB, 159.
[3] Nguyen Phan Quang, 1981-1982, 22.
[4] In July 1933, Nung Van Van attacked in the area of Tuyen Quang, Thai Nguyen, Cao Bang, and Lang Son. His movement, which had close connections with that of his brother-in-law Le Van Khoi, continued until March 1835. QTCB, 158; MMCY, volume V, 145. Tran Trong Kim II, 1971, 206.
[5] CM 32 (6), 113; CM 24 (5), 162.
[6] Malays still call Kalentan serambi Makah (the extension of The Holy Land of Makkah).
[7] MMCY, book I, 69; DNTLCB, book XII, 282-84; DNNTC, book XII (published in Hanoi, 1971), page 137-46. Also see Nghiem Tham (1960), 1359; H. Parmentier, BEFFEO, vol. V, 10; Buu Cam (1958), 1249.
[8] According to DNTLCB (book XVI, 280), Po Phaok The, the former ruler of Panduranga-Champa, was the only member of Katip Sumat’s organization to have a direct connection with Le Van Khoi. Dinh Mo, who had close contacts with Po Phaok The, was captured during one of the battles between Le Van Khoi and Hue and confessed that he was the courier who had delivered Le Van Khoi’s confidential letter to Po Phaok The requesting that the latter join his uprising to fight the common enemy from Hue. Po Phaok The agreed with this proposal. However, there are lingering questions as to why Po Phaok The made such an agreement? Why did he leave Katip Sumat to join Le Van Khoi? According to Cham chronicle CM 32 (6), Katip Sumat’s uprising had nothing to do with Po Phaok The, who was involved with the organization for only a very short time. Did his lack of a position within Katip Sumat’s organization lead him to join Le Van Khoi? So, when Minh Menh sentenced him to death in 1835, was it because f his involvement with Le Van Khoi or Katip Sumat?
[9] CM 32 (6), 113.
[10] According to the Champa chronicle CAM 29 (1), vol. 4, Po Phaok Tho was captured in March, the Year of the Dragon in the Cham calendar (1832) and brought to Hue, where he was imprisoned. If the Champa chronicle recorded that he joined Katip Sumat’s uprising, this would mean that he was no longer in prison in 1833.
[11] CM 24 (5), 162-63; CM 32 (6), 109-13.
[12] It is not surprising to know that few Vietnamese could speak Cham or the Central Highlanders’ languages during that time. Therefore, it was hard for Hue to recruit informers. On the other hand, may Vietnamese officers behaved like warlords during the occupation and thus could not capture the local peoples’ hearts and minds. As a result, they could collect intelligence in Panduranga-Champa.
[13] According to the Champa chronicle CM 24 (5), 163, and CM 32 (5), 109, Katip Sumat considered the Cham of Panduranga-Champa to be treacherous and of wanting to eliminate him. He thought that the struggle against Hue only brought defeat and death to those high-ranking Cham who worked in the Cham royal court. Since he could not gather much support, Katip Sumat decided to return to Cambodia, where he retired in peace.
[14] DNTLCB book XVI, 120, indicates that the rebels gathered at Chu Dien mountain in 1833. This information is accurate, for most Champa uprisings seem to start from upper Dong Nai, given that it was considered a safe location because Hue’s troops never dared to venture into this area.
[15] CM 32 (6).
[16] After King Ramathipati I (or Cau Banya Cand, 1642-1658) of Cambodia married a Cham or a Malay woman, he converted to Islam. The Cham who lived in Cambodia tried to establish an Islamic country in Cambodia. However, they did not succeed in their endeavor (Po Dharma, 1981, 170).
[17] CM 32 (6), 133.
[18] CM 32 (6), 105-06; CM 24 (5), 165.
[19] The Malay word tuan means “respectable” or “mister.” Since it was not common in Panduranga-Champa, we assume that Tuan Lik here is not a person from Panduranga, but maybe a colleague who went to study in Malaysia or someone who is from Cambodia.
[20] According to E. Aymonier, 1885, 194, Ja Thak Wa was a Muslim who belonged to the Cham Bani sect in Van Lam village, Phan Rang.
[21] Po Rosak (Malay word) is synonymous with Po Athur, Po Asur, Po Rasur, Po Rasulak (in some versions). All of these terms are used to designate Muhammad, the prophet of Islam.
[22] CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 32 (6), 104-05. According to DNYLCB vol. XVI, 20, this uprising should not have happened, for the Hue court favored the Cham: “For a few years, Hue did not force them to engage in hard labor nor enlist them in military service. Why do they join the uprising? Is it for revenge or because they hate the Hue court? Or perhaps they did it to prove their loyalty to their former king Nguyen Van Thua (Vietnamese name for Po Phaok The), who was captured in 1832 and because now they have forgotten all of the favors that Hue has bestowed upon them? This country (Panduranga-Champa) is rich in agriculture, but the people have a low level of education and are backward.”
[23] According to a hand-written record CM 26(14), 81, when Katip Sumat start the uprising, Minh Menh decided to assert his absolute control of life and death over the people of Panduranga-Champa. After Katip Sumat’s uprising ended, the country was destroyed and the people fell into starvation.
[24] Qur’an 3:133, “Fear not, despair not. Triumph will certainly come if you have faith.”
[25] CM24(5), 164.
[26] M. Gaultier, 1935.
[27] Po Phaok The’s political views at that time were quite confusing. According to the Vietnamese chronicle MMCY vol. I and DNTLCB vol. XII, in 1833, Po Phaok The accepted Minh Menh’s policy of cai tho qui huu, which involved replacing all Cham officers in the royal court with their Vietnamese counterparts in the occupied territories. On the other hand, he joined Katip Sumat and then went over to Le Van Khoi. Did he do this because he did not like the idea of liberating the country in the name of a holy war? The historical record indicates that he also wanted to work with Le Van Khoi in Gia Dinh, even though he had done nothing to support Le Van Khoi. On the contrary, he wanted to work with Minh Menh.
[28] DNTLCB, XII, 282-84; DNNTC, vol. XII (Hanoi 1), 36-37.
[29] A hand-written record of the Champa chronicle, CM 26 (4), 79, indicates that the uprising was totally suppressed in July, the Year of the Snake. In terms of the solar calendar, this would place it at the end of 1833 or the beginning of 1834.
[30] CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 32 (6), 103-05.
[31] E. Aymonier, 1885, 194; 1890, 181. Based on the report of An-sat (the Judge) Phan Duy Trinh related to the interrogation of a rebel captured in April 1835 (during Ja Thak Wa’s uprising), DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 197) recorded that the Cham Bani’s head priest was So Co, who lead the uprising in 1834 and then proclaimed himself to be Dien Su (The Priest of Mount Dien). He (Dien Su) used to liven in Tanh Linh, Tuy Dinh territory.? After cross-referencing the name between the DNTLCB and the CM during that era, we know that So Co and Dien Su was the same person. However, all the Champa chronicle indicates is that Ja Thak Wa was born in Van Lam, Phan Rang. Perhaps he moved to Tanh Linh, as the DNTLCB mentions.
[32] The term Cham Bani and Cham Awal denote those Cham who profess an un-orthodox version of Islam. They live in the Phan Rang and the Phan Ri regions. They only follow certain teachings from the five pillars of Islam.
[33] Po Dharma, 1987, 153.
[34] CM 24 (5), 167-68; CM 32 (6), 104-05.
[35] CM 24, 5.
[36] Po Dharma, 1987, 154.
[37] CM 24 (5), 18-169; CM 32 (6), 103.
[38] Po Tang Haok, an individual of Malay origin who was deified in some Cham traditions, was also called Po War Palei (Inrasara, 1996, 276). However, Po Tang Haok and Po War Palei (who was from Raglai tribe) were, in fact, two different persons.
[39] CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 32 (6), 103. According to the report of An-sat (judge) Bien Hoa in April 1835, DNTLCB (vol. XVI), Dien Su (Priest of Mount Dien, namely, Ja Thak Wa) knighted La Bon, the husband of Nguyen Van Nguyen’s elder sister.?? He was mentioned in the Champa chronicle CM 29 (1) as Dhar Kaok, titled “Kai Nduai Nguyen” (the crown prince of Panduranga-Champa). However, the DNTLCB did not mention his tribal affiliation. According to the Cham chronicle, CM 24 (5) 168-69 and CM 32, 103-04,the ruler appointed by Ja Thak Wa was from the Raglai tribe. The presence of a royal individual from the Raglai tribe in such a position in Ja Thak Wa’s organization was quite logical, for countless records from the Champa chronicle indicate that many high-ranking Churu, Raglai, and Kaho officers served in Panduranga-Champa’s court in previous generation. This is concrete proof that the Kingdom of Champa does not belong to Cham tribe alone, but rather consists of many different races who share equal rights and responsibilities. For example, King Po Rome, who comes from the Churu tribe, ruled Panduranga-Champa from 1627-1651. He is a shining example of this fact. (Po Dharma, 1987, vol. I).
[40] CM 32 (6), 103-04 and CM 24 (5), 168-69 state that Ja Yok Ai’s (from the Cham tribe) nomination to the organization was not welcomed by many, even though he was one of Po War Palei’s close associates. A few royal officers accused him of working for the Vietnamese. However, Ja Thak Wa brought him on board after both Po War Palei and the crown prince intervened. CM 24 (5), 169, also records that the appointment of Po War Palei (a Raglai), the crown prince (a Churu), and Ja Yok Ai (a Cham) to the supreme command made many people uneasy, because they lacked relevant experience. On the other hand, others criticize them for supposedly being under Ja Thak Wa’s control.
[41] According to Dorohiem and Dohamide, Dan Toc Cham Luoc Su (A History of Champa, 1965), and Inrasara (1994, 60), Po Saung Nhung Ceng, the last king in Sakarai Dak Rai Patao Cham, went to Cambodia for safety in 1822. But in fact, he died in Phan Ri in 1822 from old age (Po Dharma, 1987, vol. 1, 90).
[42] Po Dharma, 1987, vol. 1. Here is the genealogy of Panduranga-Champa’s rulers after the sixth dynasty of King Po Rome: Po Tisuntiraydapuran (1786-1793), Po Ladhuanpaghuh (1793-1799), Po Saung Nyung Ceng (1799-1822), Po Klan Thu (1822-1828), Po Phaok The (1828-1832). The royal bloodline of Ba Them in Phan Ri belongs to this genealogy. Therefore, she who? does not keep anything that belonged to Po Rome’s (Churu) royal line.
[43] A Cham author who had a close relationship with the royal family wrote a poem to discredit Ja Thak Wa as a person who had no talent and only known to trick the Raglai and Churu tribes to help him pursuit his dream.
[44] DNTLCB vol. XVI, 129, recorded that La Bon’s (Po War Palei) wife was placed under house arrest for a while because her husband had been proclaimed the ruler of Panduranga-Champa. She was later released under the condition that she had to favor the policy of the Hue court.
[45] CM 24 (5), 169; CM 30 (17), 49-53.
[46] CHCPI-CAM vol. 1, 1; CM 24 (5), 168-69; CM 26 (14), 84; CM32 (6), 103-04; CAM 30 (17), 50 state that the majority of the population supported Ja Thak Wa’s uprising and interim government, for they wanted to live in their predefined borders, as before.
[47] DNTLCB, XVI, 84.
[48] DNTLCB, XVI, 118-19.
[49] CM24 (5); CM24 (16); CM 30 (17); CM32 (6).
[50] One of Ja Thak Wa’s followers testified in DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 190) that “since the day that the Kingdom of Champa was dissolved, its people have been forced to be citizens of Vietnam, the ruling officers have oppressed them and forced them to wear Vietnamese clothes, not to mention that they must pay tribute in such precious items as rhino horns and the ivory tusks of elephants.”
[51] DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 198) records the statement by a follower of Ja Thak Wa who was captured by the Vietnamese: “The entire population of Panduranga-Champa joined Ja Thak Wa’s uprising because the ruling Vietnamese officers only knew how to rob them of their wealth, and those around them did nothing about it.” Furthermore, DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 71) admits that the Cham supported Ja Thak Wa because the Vietnamese settlers in Binh Thuan province pushed the Cham out of their land in order to grab it for themselves. In other words, those who joined the uprising had nothing else to lose.
[52] Even Le Van Khoi passed away in December 1834. The Vietnamese chronicle indicates that his followers continued to fight until the fall of Thanh Phien An at Saigon in August 1835. See DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 35, SG; QQTCB, 170, SG); Tran Trong Kim, vol. II, 1971, 205; Nguyen Phan Quang, 1981, 21. According to H. Parmentir (190, 10), Nghiem Tham (1960, 1960), Dorohiem and Dohamid (1961, 109), who? wrote that Le Van Khoi and Ja Thak Wa worked together. Was this because Le Van Khoi requested Po Phaok The’s support, as mentioned in the Vietnamese chronicle? Why does the Champa chronicle not mention this? In fact, Po Phaok The was not a member of Ja Thak Wa’s organization; rather, he worked against it.
[53] According to DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 121), Hue was extremely worried about the movement of Thai troops toward the Cambodian border.
[54] QTCB (169). In December 1833, Thai troops crossed Cambodian border and eventually reached Phnom Penh and Ha Tien. In June 1834, Minh Menh ordered Truong Minh Giang to place his the troops at Phnom Penh in order to stop the Thai army.
[55] CHCPI-CAM 1, Ariya Gleng Anak. Line 82 of this poem records that this poem was composed on February 10, 1835. At this time, the battle between Ja Thak Wa and Minh Menh has not died down yet. For more information about this poem, see the appendix.
[56] Ariya Gleng Anak, line 7.
[57] Ariya Gleng Anak, line 4.
[58] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 102.
[59] Ariya Gleng Anak.
[60] CAM 30 (17), 50-51. The Vietnamse chronicle mentions Dien Su’s (Ja Thak Wa) uprising only briefly.
[61] CHCPI-CAM, book 1, 3.
[62] CM 29 (1), line 20. MMCY, vol. V, 180, records Ja Thak Wa’s punishment meted out to the Cham people and the killing of Vietnamese settlers in Binh Thuan province. The text of two historical sources relates that his punishment of the first group of people was severe. He wanted to show them that if they disobeyed him, he would be even more severe than Minh Menh.
[63] QTCB, 195, 197-98; MMCY, vol. V, 180-81; DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 71.
[64] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 69, 131.
[65] CM29 (1), line 43.
[66] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 78-79.
[67] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 68-289.
[68] QTCB, 195; MMCY, vol. II, 147. Minh Menh issued an order to kill anyone who disobeyed the Hue court’s orders.
[69] CM 29 (1), line 43. Even though beheading three people a day seems to be out of proportion, we do not overlook that fact of the Vietnamese settlers’ long-standing animosity vis-à-vis the Cham. In CM 29 (1), before Champa-Panduranga was dissolved, the Vietnamese settlers were just “keepers of the market” or workers. After 1832, however the tide turned and they became the owners of Panduranga-Champa. Protected by Hue, they could do whatever they wished - even beheading three people a day. They considered the people of Champa-Pandurange to be savage, untamed.
[70] This genocidal policy was implemented against the Cham because they lived in the lowlands. However, those who lived in the Central Highlands, such as the Churu, Raglai, and Kaho peoples, did not even know who Minh Menh was.
[71] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 79. It seems that the Hue court did not know much about those people who participated in Ja Thak Wa’s uprising. As a matter of fact, the majority of them were native to the Central Highlands and were skilled in the art of taming wild elephants. They were never afraid of these elephant divisions.
[72] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 94.
[73] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 143. After having received an urgent message asking for reinforcement, Minh Menh declared these ruling officers to be completely incompetent. Month after month, they provided reports saying that the rebels were nothing but savages who livee in the mountains and that he did not have to worry about them very much. He said that the local government had over 3,000 skilled troops with advanced weaponry, and therefore should be able to suppress the rebels quite easily. He asked how many more troops were needed to finish the job. Since the governors of Binh Dinh and Khanh Hoa could not control the situation, he demoted them.
[74] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 69 ff.
[75] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 82. At the same time, Minh Menh executed all those who still had weapons or still joined Ja Thak Wa’s uprising.
[76] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 102.
[77] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 129; QTCB, 197-98.
[78] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 129.
[79] In Vietnamese, the ma’n denotes those who live in the north (The Ma’n, the Me`o). On the contrary, the man (savage) denotes the rebels, those who did not share the same culture as the Vietnamese. Therefore, records in DNTLCB, (vol. XVI, 197-98) called Ja Thak Wa and Po War Palei as the man.
[80] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 121. The record in DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 71, states that the Vietnamese ruling officers in the mountainous areas used to rob instead of ruling with justice. Their ill-behavior paved the way for the uprising. Information contained in the Vietnamese chronicle agrees with the record in the Champa chronicle that the Vietnamese officers constantly harassed the people of Panduranga-Champa or stole their lands. From this, we conclude that the Vietnamese discriminated against the non-Vietnamese races under their control. The people of Panduranga-Champa who sruvived the disaster of 1832 suffered far more hardship and discrimination than the Vietnamese settlers who lived in Gia Dinh in the south or the Vietnamese rebels who fought the Hue court.
[81] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 129
[82] Po Dharma, 1987, vol. I, 160.
[83] Po Dharma, 1987, I, 161.
[84] DNTLCB, vol. XII, 282.
[85] QTCB, 196; DNNTC, XII, 42; Buu Cam, 1958, 146-49; Nghiem Tham, 1960, 1570.
[86] Po Dharma, 1978, vol. II.
[87] CM29 (1).
[88] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 198.
[89] CAM 30 (17), 51.
[90] MMCY, V, 181; QTCB, 198; BTBNLT, 79; HVGTNB, 336.
[91] According to A. Shreiner (1901, I, 243), there were many different types of slaves: prisoners of war, those who sentenced to slavery, those who were in debt, born into slavery because their parents were slaves, and those who were enslaved. Many of the Cham, who fell into this last category, were then traded among the Vietnamese like any other commodity.
[92] CAM 30(17), 15. The Hue court also meted out a heavy punishment toward the Vietnamese rebels in the south, not to mention those who were executed when Fort Phien An fell and others who were executed in Hue. The Vietnamese chronicle records that 1,137 Vietnamese were executed in Gia Dinh and then thrown into mass grave, their bodies rising up like a hill. See Truong Vinh Ky, 1879, 265.
[93] H. Parmentier, 1905, 10.
[94] DNTLCB, vol. XVI, 289.
[95] Po Dharma, 1989, Frontiere…
[96] Po Dharma, 1987, 163,
[97] Po Dharma, 1987, I, 163-64.
[98] See H. Parmentier, 1905, 1-46; Nghiem Tham, 1960, 151-66. A few researchers argue that because of the risk of losing Champa-Panduranga’s national treasures to the Vietnamese, the royal family entrusted its belongings to the Raglai and the Churu tribes. However, this argument does not make sense, because Champa-Panduranga was a cohesive kingdom. If the Raglai and the Churu were not considered to be among its citizens, they would have no right to safeguard these properties. In fact, they belonged to the kingdom and had the right to keep their ancestor’s (King Po Rome) possessions.
[99] According to DNTLCB (vol. XVI, 144), the people of Champa-Panduranga were always the victims of Hue’s policy, for the ruling officers always got the upper hand under the law of their own government.
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The voting for this poll has ended on: August 20, 2014
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