President Obama and the Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Nayef at the White House, May 13, 2015. Jacquelyn Martin/AP/Corbis
Why Arabs Are Concerned About the Iran Nuke Bargain
Nabil Fahmy
July 08, 2015
U.S. Secretary
of State John Kerry and the other negotiators from the P5+1 (permanent members
of the UN Security Council plus Germany) have framed the proposed nuclear deal
with Iran as a necessary measure to inhibit Iran’s ability to build a nuclear
arsenal or quickly reach nuclear weapons breakout capacity. Arab leaders, members
of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), support
nuclear nonproliferation and disarmament. Consequently, in principle, they
would support any technically sound agreement. Yet, there is profound concern
palpitating the region and for good reason.
The
proposed agreement is far from sufficient in dealing with the Middle East’s
nuclear issues. It delays, but does not close the door on potential Iranian
breakout. Furthermore, the agreement completely ignores the nuclear program in
Israel, the only non-NPT party in the Middle East. Equally disconcerting is
that the “let’s be realistic” approach adopted in justifying the agreement is
testimony to a continuing and dangerous policy of nuclear non-proliferation
procrastination and exceptionalism in the Middle East, which exacerbates and
perpetuates security asymmetries. This procrastination in the short-run may
respond to some extra-regional, but not Arab security concerns and is
ultimately detrimental to all.
United
States and Iranian officials have outlined a framework agreement that has the
potential to become a major diplomatic accomplishment or an historic strategic
miscalculation, exacerbating an already tumultuous security paradigm. If fully
implemented and enforced, the specific measures outlined—such as major
reductions in the number of Iran’s centrifuges and its stockpile of nuclear
materials—would substantially curtail Iran’s nuclear capacity to weaponize for
the stipulated fifteen-year period.
However,
there are justifiable concerns about what Iran may do at the conclusion of this
period, when its nuclear program is no longer bound by the terms of an
agreement. It is noteworthy that all Arab countries are parties to the NPT and
have relatively limited peaceful nuclear programs. The agreement’s enforcement
period provides time for policy change in Iran, where changing political
dynamics and cleavages have been so clearly displayed in the 2009 election
protests and the differing approaches of former president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad
and the incumbent Hassan Rowhani. Nonetheless, the complexities of Middle East
dynamics augur against any consensus among analysts in projecting where the
region or Iran will be in the future.
There is
no basis upon which to assume that the risk of nuclear proliferation in the
region will have subsided at the conclusion of the agreement with Iran. In
fact, it is more likely that the asymmetries between the capacities of Arab
versus non-Arab states in the region will have increased. Israel, a non-NPT
party presumed to have nuclear weapons and with confirmed nuclear technology
and capacity, would remain beyond any regional or international
nonproliferation effort. Iran, albeit an NPT party, would then have the right
to enrich and repossess nuclear material, pursuant to the NPT itself (Article
4, Paragraph 1), thus creating an asymmetry in breakout time if it decides to
weaponize. Such asymmetry could spark an all-consuming and destabilizing regional
war that would intensify international security concerns.
A third
point of concern, particularly for the majority of the Arab Gulf states, is how
Iran will use the expected enhanced international and regional engagement after
the removal of sanctions. Many Arab states wonder whether Iran will embark on a
more aggressive, assertive regional foreign policy, emboldened by its
reacceptance into the international community. Iran’s evident and openly
pronounced influence in Lebanon, Syria, Iraq, and Yemen are cases in point.
In
addition to these intra-regional concerns, the Arab states are equally
uncomfortable towards U.S. policies in the Middle East, particularly regarding
present and future security policies in the Arab Gulf region. Consequently,
offering a U.S. nuclear umbrella or sophisticated hardware and defense systems
will not suffice or respond to Arab concerns. Nor will tactical responses—such
as a more assertive United States in Syria or more U.S. support in Yemen.
Neither of these approaches will respond adequately to Arab concerns over and
above what the Arabs received in security assurances and guarantees from President Barack Obama at Camp
David and the Arabs accepting them as enough would be a major mistake.
I am not
suggesting that the United States drop the agreement or that Iran should be
held to a higher standard than others. However, dealing with nuclear
nonproliferation in the Middle East should not be a choice between “realism”
and “nothing at all.” It requires a principled determination to deal with
nuclear nonproliferation in the region as a whole, the courage of conviction to
address these issues throughout the region without prejudice or exception, and
the maturity and wisdom to accept concrete steps in an incremental process,
provided they are within a serious, transparent, and publicly announced
strategy.
I believe
this can be done by engaging simultaneously on the following tracks to
recalibrate the regional political balance:
1. Arab
countries need to be more forceful in efforts to create a nuclear weapon-free
zone in the Middle East before the fifteen-year termination of the Iran nuclear
deal. These efforts would provide not only for a continuous Iranian commitment
in this regard, but would also include the Israeli program and resolve the
problem of deepening security asymmetries.
2. The
international community, particularly the United States, must engage Israel in
a more rigorous effort to have it revisit the logic of its nuclear program. One
wonders how George Shultz, William Perry, Henry Kissinger, and Sam Nunn can
initiate the debate about the utility of nuclear weapons for the United States,
yet the issue cannot be raised with Israel.
3. Arab
countries—and all members to the NPT—should insist on their right to enrich and
reprocess nuclear material under International Atomic Energy Agency safeguards,
even if they do not all have an intention to do so in the near future.
4. Arab
countries should also agree on the establishment of a regional nuclear fuel
bank under international safeguards.
5. Arab
states should take the initiative in providing political solutions to regional
hotbeds, particularly Syria, Lebanon, and Yemen. Use of force is a legitimate
means; it is not, however, an end in itself.
If Iran
shifts its stance toward more constructive foreign policy, the Arab World
should engage it in a regional dialogue with Iran about
the future of the Middle East. The dialogue would then extend to Israel, as stipulated in the 2002
Arab Peace Initiative. Needless to say, this dialogue would require more
intensive efforts to resolve the Palestinian-Israeli conflict on the basis of a
two-state solution, albeit the prospects for success are not promising.
Nabil
Fahmy, a former foreign minister of Egypt, is dean of the School of Global
Affairs and Public Policy at the American University in Cairo. This article
originally appeared on The Atlantic Council’s MENASource blog.