International Atomic Energy Agency inspector at an Iranian uranium enrichment facility, Isfahan, Aug. 28, 2005. Behrouz Mehri/AFP/Getty Images
July 09, 2013
Nuclear negotiations lasting more than a decade
between Iran and world powers have failed. The talks have been unable to reconcile
the concerns voiced by the United States and other parties that Iran is
developing a nuclear weapon with Iran’s insistence that its program is strictly
peaceful and only intended for civilian energy production.
The window for a diplomatic breakthrough will be most
opportune during the second term of President Barack Obama who, in his 2013
State of the Union address, called on Iran’s leaders to “recognize that now is
the time for a diplomatic solution.”1 The election of a new Iranian
president in June also offers the prospect of a fresh approach to negotiations.
There is, however, a risk that if the current
American/Western policy of pressure politics continues, we will inch toward a
military confrontation. In a broader sense, the outcome of the nuclear
negotiations will have a profound impact on vital issues such as global nuclear
non-proliferation, and the Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) and Weapons of Mass
Destruction Free Zone (WMDFZ) in the Middle East.
Publicly, the U.S. and other Western officials blame
the failure of nuclear talks on Iran. The key question, however, is whether
talks have failed because of the perceived Iranian intention to build a nuclear
bomb, or due to the West’s unwillingness to recognize Iran’s right to enrich
uranium under international safeguards. Former U.S. officials Flynt
Leverett and Hillary Mann Leverett, authors of Going to Tehran: Why the
United States Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran,
recently addressed this issue, which rarely is part of Iran policy debates in
the United States: “Washington’s unwillingness [to recognize the rights of Iran
for enrichment] is grounded in unattractive, but fundamental, aspects of
American strategic culture: difficulty coming to terms with independent power
centers (whether globally or in vital regions like the Middle East); hostility
to non-liberal states, unless they subordinate their foreign policies to U.S.
preferences (as Egypt did under Sadat and Mubarak); and an unreflective but
deeply rooted sense that U.S.-backed norms, rules, and transnational
decision-making processes are meant to constrain others, not America itself.”
2
Iran, as a sovereign state and a signatory to the
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), is entitled to uranium enrichment. I
believe that if Washington recognized Iran’s right to enrich, a nuclear deal
could be reached immediately. Without this recognition, no substantial
agreement will be possible.
Iran’s Nuclear Story
To assess whether Iran is building a nuclear bomb or
is simply pursuing its legitimate rights, and to find a solution to the
diplomatic stalemate, it is important to understand the evolution of Iran’s
nuclear program and the core dispute with the West. The Iranian nuclear program
has progressed through four major stages:
Nuclearization of Iran: Iran owes its entrance into the nuclear field largely to the United
States, which entered into negotiations with the young Shah Mohammad Reza
Pahlavi in 1957 as part of President Dwight Eisenhower’s Atoms for Peace
program. In the 1970s, the U.S. proposal to Iran was for the country to build
twenty-three nuclear power plants by the 1990s. The first Iranian nuclear
facility, the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR), was built by the U.S. in 1967.3
During this period, the Americans and Europeans were competing to win
lucrative projects to nuclearize Iran.
The United States and Europe had no objections to
either Iran enriching uranium on its soil or investing in enrichment plants in
Europe, despite the known fact that the shah had ambitions to
acquire nuclear weapons. When asked in 1974 if Iran would eventually have a
nuclear weapon, he replied, “without a doubt and sooner than one would think.”
After India tested a nuclear device that same year, he said, “[Iran had] no
intention of acquiring nuclear weapons but if small states began building them,
Iran might have to reconsider its policy.”4
The West fully supported the Iranian nuclear program
and without a doubt, if the shah were alive today, Iran would have multiple
nuclear power plants, industrial scale uranium enrichment facilities, and a
nuclear arsenal on a par with those of Pakistan, India, and Israel.
No rights for civilian power
plant: After the 1979 Iranian
Revolution, although Iran decided to cancel or shrink the shah’s ambitious
nuclear and military projects, the West withdrew from all nuclear agreements
and contracts, which cost Iran billions of dollars. At that time, policy in the
U.S. and the West was against Iran having a single civilian nuclear
plant and they pressed Germany to withdraw from its contractual agreement to
build the only Iranian civilian nuclear plant at Bushehr.5 In
effect, the West denied the rights of Iran under article four of the NPT, which
entitles signatory states “inalienable
right” to pursue the use of nuclear energy “for peaceful purposes” and calls
upon all parties to the treaty to facilitate the “fullest possible exchange of
equipment, materials, and scientific and technological information” on peaceful
uses of nuclear energy.6
No access to international fuel market: Following the 1979 revolution, Iran had no plans to have
uranium-enrichment activities on its own soil. Iran had paid $1.2 billion for a
joint venture with the French-based Eurodif consortium, to enrich uranium on
French soil and supply fuel to the Tehran Research Reactor and Bushehr.7
The United States pressured the French to pull out of the deal. At the time,
Iran even paid the United States to supply fuel for the TRR. The United States
neither supplied the fuel nor returned the money paid.8
During my tenure as the director general for Western
Europe in the Iranian foreign ministry in the mid-1980s and as Iran’s
ambassador to Germany from 1990 to 1997, I frequently insisted to German and
French interlocutors that Iran was not interested in having a domestic fuel
cycle and that it was counterproductive to deny Iran the right to civilian
nuclear power plants and access to the international fuel market. I repeatedly
forewarned them that such a position would leave Iran with no choice but to proceed
with efforts to reach self-sufficiency in the nuclear field, completing
unfinished and paid-for projects.
No enrichment right for Iran: In 2002, Iran mastered enrichment.9
Shortly afterwards, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) issued the
first resolution on Iran’s nuclear program. Subsequently, the EU3—France,
Germany, and the United Kingdom—began diplomatic negotiations with Iran in
October 2003, which lasted for two years.
Iran submitted different proposals to address the
concerns of the international community, covering all major transparency
measures and objective guarantees for non-diversion of Iran’s nuclear program
toward a nuclear bomb. Iran agreed to all international transparency arrangements, such as the Safeguard
Agreement, Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1, and Additional Protocol.
Furthermore, Iran, as a confidence building measure, agreed to suspend
enrichment for about two years, cap enrichment at 5 percent, and maintain a
limited stockpile of enriched uranium.10 Talks failed due to the
U.S. policy of denying the legitimate rights of Iran for enrichment under the
NPT.11 The “Nuclear Engagement Policy” came to an end, and Iran
resumed enrichment to preserve its right under the NPT.
Since 2006, there have been several lost opportunities
to achieve a breakthrough in talks between Iran and the so-called P5+1—the
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, plus Germany (a major
trade partner with Iran). These lost opportunities include: the swap deal in
2009 on the simultaneous exchange of 3.5 percent stockpile for TRR fuel rods;
Iran’s offer in 2010 to cap enrichment at 5 percent in return for fuel rods;
the Turkey-Brazil-Iran swap agreement in 2010; and Iran’s offer in 2011 to halt
20 percent enrichment for TRR fuel.
The most important initiative, the Russian
step-by-step proposal introduced in the summer of 2011, addressed all the
concerns of the P5+1. Iran welcomed the plan, but the West did not. The
proposal entailed the following points:12
- Implement the Additional Protocol
and Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 to ensure the maximum level of
transparency.
-
Limit the level of enrichment to 5 percent to ensure no break out toward
weaponization.
-
Halt installation of new generation of centrifuges.
-
Limit the number of enrichment sites to one.
- Address the IAEA’s concerns on all
technical ambiguities including Possible Military Dimension issues (PMDs).
- Suspend enrichment for three months in order
to address the requirement of the United Nations and the IAEA resolutions.
The aforementioned history suggests that the Iranian
nuclear dilemma is centered on the legitimate rights of Iran to enrichment
under the NPT and is not about building a nuclear bomb. Iran has signed onto
every Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) convention, such as the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC) in 1997; the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) in
1996; and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970. Such conventions
entail rights and obligations for all signatories.13 The West,
however, has chosen, contravening international law, to carry out a coercive
policy whereby Iran is pressed on obligations while its rights are denied.
The NPT, therefore, has been used by the West as an
instrument of pressure against Iran and to falsely accuse Tehran of seeking
nuclear weapons. Such tactics serve as a means to justify punitive measures and
eventual military action. The NPT is effectively serving as a platform to deny
the legitimate rights of Iran and to rally the international community in
endorsing and implementing the most draconian multilateral and unilateral
sanctions ever levied on Iran.
As a result, Iran is increasingly disillusioned with
international conventions that forego its rights but expect full commitment to
obligations. This has led Iran to view the NPT as a national security threat,
which is being used as an instrument by warmongers in the United States to
press for measures to achieve their ultimate goal—regime change.
A Fresh Approach?
The new Iranian president’s first priority in office
will be to manage the economic crisis. The nuclear standoff resulted in
unprecedented unilateral and multilateral sanctions being placed on the
country, a primary reason for its economic hardship. The new administration has
five options for handling the nuclear stalemate and thereby also alleviating
the effects of sanctions on the country.
Continue to seek a peaceful solution to the standoff. In recent nuclear talks, to prevent Iran’s breakout capability and to
ensure maximum level of transparency, the five major demands of the P5+1 were
for Iran to: first, suspend 20 percent uranium enrichment activities and
constrain the ability of Fordo, Iran’s second enrichment plant; second, limit
20 percent enriched uranium stockpile; third, implement the NPT Additional
Protocol; fourth, implement the Subsidiary Arrangement Code 3.1 and; fifth,
provide access beyond Additional Protocol to address Possible Military
Dimensions (PMDs) concerns of the IAEA.14
Iran, in return, had two major demands: lifting
sanctions and recognizing Iran’s rights under the NPT. Iran was ready to meet
the demands but the P5+1 did not reciprocate accordingly, as the world powers
were not prepared to lift substantial sanctions nor recognize Iran’s right to
enrichment. A peaceful solution will only be possible if the major demands of
the world powers and Iran are considered within a package, to be implemented in
a step-by-step manner with proportionate reciprocation.
Surrender Iran’s nuclear program. This move will be political suicide for any Iranian politician,
particularly since the country has endured such severe economic and political
ramifications. Reinforcing the importance of the nuclear program, Iranian
lawmakers signed a petition urging the nuclear negotiating team to defend national
interests. “The West must learn that Iran’s nuclear train, which moves on the
rails of peaceful goals, will never stop,” the petition read.15
Tolerate the barrage of sanctions and other punitive
measures. This would be neither bearable for Iran,
nor, for that matter, for the United States. Washington has made it clear that
it believes time is running out on nuclear negotiations. For its part, Iran
cannot long tolerate the current punitive measures, which include: six United
Nations Security Council (UNSC) sanctions resolutions;16 European
Union and U.S. sanctions beyond the scope of the UNSC resolutions on oil and
central bank assets;17 an intensifying cyber and intelligence war;
the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientists; and additional UN resolutions
on human rights and terrorism.18
Build a nuclear bomb as a tool for resolving the
crisis peacefully. This option would have the following
important benefits:
- Abandoning the notion of “all
options on the table”—an implicit warning of a military attack (a benefit
realized similarly by North Korea).
- Bringing an end to the U.S. regime
change policy.
- Forcing the United States to
recognize the rights of Iran for enrichment and end its wishful thinking that
Iran would only enrich below 5 percent.
- Convincing the West to lift all
sanctions in return for Iran dismantling the bomb.
- Realizing the “Mutual Assured
Destruction” theory of the eminent American political scientist Kenneth Waltz,
thus creating a strategic balance that reduces the possibility of war in the
Middle East.
- Pressing
Israel to accept a Middle East free from nuclear weapons and other WMDs.
Although Iranian proponents of
this option are in the minority, the prolongation of the nuclear dispute, which
continues to weaken Iran’s economy, will likely strengthen arguments for this
position. Furthermore, it could be seen as a viable avenue to convince the West
to recognize the rights of Iran for enrichment under the NPT. The Iranians
recall that the West only recognized their rights for civilian nuclear power
plant and access to the international fuel market when Iran mastered
enrichment. Currently, the West demands a halt to Iran’s enrichment activity in
return for support for civilian nuclear power plants and fuel guarantees from
the international market. This precedent may push Iran to build the nuclear
bomb and as a condition to disarm, demand that the West should alter its
position and recognize Iran’s rights for enrichment.
Withdraw from the NPT and all WMD treaties. Iran can substitute the treaties with the supreme leader’s religious
fatwa banning all WMDs. In this option, the West’s policy of “only obligations
and no rights” would force Iran to change its posture on WMD conventions. This
move will relieve Iran of its treaty obligations, which have been used by the
West to place further sanctions on Tehran.
Withdrawing from the NPT has
become an increasingly attractive option within the decision-making circles of
the country. Alaeddin Boroujerdi, chairman of parliament’s National Security
and Foreign Policy Commission, recently stated: “It is not acceptable to Iran
to respect the NPT and the Agency’s rules, while the U.S, and the West ignore
the NPT, including its Article 6 [which underlines decreasing the number of
nuclear weapons] and Article 4 [which stresses every country’s inalienable
right to use the civilian nuclear technology],” Boroujerdi added that “all
options are on the parliament’s table.”19
Hypocrisy and the NPT
The U.S. and Western punitive measures on Iran have
exceeded those placed on North Korea, a country that withdrew from the NPT,
built nuclear weapons, conducted three tests, and threatened to use them
against the United States.20 And, at the same time, the United
States and other Western countries have forged close nuclear cooperation with
non-NPT nuclear weapons states such as India, Pakistan, and Israel.21
It is no wonder that the Iranians are growing frustrated with such
international hypocrisy, which rewards violators and non-signatory states to
the NPT with strategic alliances. Iranians are reaching the conclusion that
they have paid a higher price for staying committed to the NPT and having no
nuclear weapons.
The reality is that since the 1979 Revolution, the NPT
has proven more harmful than beneficial for Iran. Instead, the NPT has
effectively become a national security threat, whereby the West has used it as
an instrument to bring Iran to the United Nations Security Council.
Hypothetically, if Iran was not part of the NPT, or even possessed nuclear
weapons (as Israel, India, and Pakistan do), there would be no legitimate and
legal grounds for using “non-compliance” as a gateway to bring the country
under such pressure. The main argument and justification in the West for
continuing their punitive measures rests in the premise that, because there is
suspicion over Iran’s intentions and perceived ambitions for nuclear weapons,
there is no need to extend Tehran enrichment and other rights under the NPT.
The history of Iran’s nuclear evolution and the
blatant use of double standards by the world powers to limit Iran’s nuclear
progress and deny its rights render the “non-compliance” argument as yet
another excuse to punish Iran. In 1979, Iran was in compliance with its NPT
obligations, yet its rights under the treaty for having civilian nuclear power
plants and access to international fuel market were denied. The IAEA found
South Korea and Egypt in “non-compliance” in 2004−05, but neither
country was referred to the Security Council, nor was sanctioned.
Ultimately, the Iranian nuclear issue is political in
nature and the heated debate over the nature of Iran’s nuclear program will
continue in the foreseeable future. On March 5, 2013, Hans Blix, head of the
IAEA for sixteen years and in charge of the UN’s Iraq nuclear monitoring and
verification group from 2000 to 2003, said:
So far Iran has not violated NPT and there
is no evidence right now that suggests that Iran is producing nuclear weapons.
The fact that Tehran has enriched uranium up to 20 percent leads to suspicion
of a secret weapons program, however, no action can be justified on mere
suspicions or intentions that may not exist.22
In 2011, Mohamed ElBaradei, another former head of
IAEA, similarly said: “During my time at the agency, we haven’t seen a shred of
evidence that Iran has been weaponizing, in terms of building nuclear-weapons
facilities and using enriched materials.”23
The IAEA position changed once the Japanese diplomat
Yukiya Amano became director general in December 2009. Amano said Iran had yet
to clarify “outstanding issues which give rise to concerns about possible
military dimensions to its nuclear program, including by providing access to
all sites, equipment, persons, and documents requested by the agency.”24
U.S. diplomatic cables published by WikiLeaks revealed Amano’s assiduous
courting of American support. In an October 2009 cable, the U.S. diplomat
Geoffrey Pyatt informed Washington that Amano is “solidly in the U.S. court on
every key strategic decision, from high-level personnel appointments to the
handling of Iran’s alleged nuclear weapons program.”25
Analyzing Amano’s policy, Robert Kelley, a former U.S.
weapons scientist who ran the IAEA action team on Iraq at the time of the
U.S.-led invasion, said:
Amano is falling
into the [former U.S. Vice President Dick] Cheney trap. What we learned back in
2002 and 2003, when we were in the run-up to the war, was that peer review was
very important, and that the analysis should not be left to a small group of
people… So what have we learned since then? Absolutely nothing. Just like Dick
Cheney, Amano is relying on a very small group of people and those opinions are
not being checked.26
The nuclear issue exemplifies Western attempts to deny
Iran its inalienable right to peaceful nuclear technology. But such cases have
been an ongoing saga since the 1979 revolution. Iran is signatory to all WMD
conventions and has been in full compliance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention (CWC) for the last fifteen years, since signing and ratifying.27
For example, Iran is a leading advocate for banning chemical weapons. The
country was a victim of chemical weapons at the hands of Saddam Hussein’s
regime during the Iran-Iraq war (and, it should be noted, Iran did not
reciprocate in kind). Iran is well versed on the effects of such weapons.28
Yet, the West has denied Iran its rights under the CWC to receive assistance
for the peaceful use and technology transfer within the chemical industry.
Iran commits to banning the use, acquisition, and
procurement of WMDs not because of international treaty obligations but rather
voluntarily based on the supreme leader’s fatwa. Since the 1979 Iranian revolution,
Iran’s most senior figures have reiterated the official position on WMDs. Imam
Ruhollah Khomeini, the founder of the Islamic Republic, enunciated his
religious opinion on the proliferation and use of nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons, stating:
If they—the then Soviet Union and the
U.S.—continue to make huge atomic weapons and so forth, the world may be pushed
into destruction and major loss will afflict the nations. Everybody wherever he
is, the writers, intellectuals, scholars, and scientists throughout the world,
should enlighten the people about this danger so that the masses of people will
stand up vis-à-vis these two powers themselves and prevent the proliferation of
these arms.29
During the 1980−88 Iran-Iraq War, when
100,000 Iranians were killed or injured by Saddam Hussein’s chemical
weapons—developed with material and technology supplied by the West—Iranian
military officials asked Imam Khomeini to permit them to reciprocate. He
refused to give permission as it would have transgressed Islamic belief. That a
country would, during wartime, refrain from responding in kind to the use of
such weapons, which killed tens of thousands of its own civilians and military
personnel testifies to the strength of such religious decrees.
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the
successor of Imam Khomeini, has followed the same policy on Iran’s commitment
to the eradication of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons. In August 2005
in an official statement, the Iranian mission to the IAEA stated:
The Leader of the Islamic Republic of
Iran, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei has issued a fatwa that the production,
stockpiling, and use of nuclear weapons are forbidden under Islam and that the
Islamic Republic of Iran must never acquire these weapons.30
The supreme leader has continued to reaffirm his
decree on many occasions, such as in the following statement:
We have often said
that our religious tenets and beliefs consider these kinds of weapons of mass
destruction to be instruments of genocide and are, therefore, forbidden and
considered to be haram [religiously banned]. This is why we do not believe in
atomic bombs and weapons and do not seek them… The Islamic Republic of Iran
considers the use of nuclear, chemical and similar weapons as a great and
unforgivable sin. We proposed the idea of ‘Middle East free of nuclear weapons’
and we are committed to it… I stress that the Islamic Republic has never been
after nuclear weapons and that it will never give up the right of its people to
use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes. Our motto is: ‘Nuclear energy for all
and nuclear weapons for none.’ We will insist on each of these two precepts.31
In January 2013, an Iranian Foreign Ministry spokesman
stressed that “there is nothing higher than the supreme leader’s fatwa to define
the framework for our activities in the nuclear field.”32 Iran can
therefore lay a new foundation for non-proliferation, based on Islamic values
and principles, embodied in the supreme leader’s fatwa, and not on the NPT or
other WMD conventions. In this way, the credit would go to Islam. As a goodwill
measure, Iran would provide unfettered access to inspectors and declare its
peaceful intentions. This would ensure Iran no longer permits the West to use
the NPT and other WMD conventions as a means to press Iran and inflict
economic, social, and political harm.
Seyed Hossein Mousavian is a former Iranian ambassador to
Germany (1990−97) and spokesman for Iran’s
team in nuclear negotiations with the European Union and the International
Atomic Energy Agency (2003– 05). From 2005 to 2007, he served as foreign policy
adviser to Ali Larijani, then secretary of the Supreme National Security
Council and chief nuclear negotiator. Mousavian was head of the Foreign
Relations Committee of Iran’s National Security Council from 1997 to 2005. He
is the author of Iran-Europe Relations: Challenges
and Opportunities and most recently The
Iranian Nuclear Crisis: A Memoir. He is
currently a research scholar at the Program on Science and Global Security in
the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs at Princeton
University.
1 http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/02/12/remarks-president-state-union-address
2 http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/opinion/2013/05/2013589151459212.html
3 http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities
4 http://isis-online.org/country-pages/iran
5 http://www.nti.org/facilities/184/
6 http://www.nonproliferation.eu/documents/nonproliferationpapers/giorgiofranceschini4f797cc11610d.pdf
7 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2006_01-02/JANFEB-IranEnrich
8 http://www.carnegiecouncil.org/studio/multimedia/20121213/index.html
9 http://iranprimer.usip.org/resource/timeline-irans-nuclear-activities
10 http://www.iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeairan/eu_iran14112004.shtml
11 Article
IV of the NPT states, “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as affecting
the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research,
production and use of nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without
discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.”
12 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Iran_Nuclear_Proposals
13 Fact
Sheets: Treaty Membership and Signatory Status
http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/
treatymembership
14 http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2013/04/whats-on-the-table-at-the-almaty-nuclear-talks/274702/
15 http://www.nytimes.com/2013/02/26/world/middleeast/iran-enters-nuclear-talks-in-a-defiant-mood.html?_r=0
16 http://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Security-Council-Resolutions-on-Iran
17 http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/RS20871.pdf
18 http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=%20A/RES/66/175
19 http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9107158720
20 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2013/02/05/world/asia/northkorea-timeline.html?_r=0
21 http://www.armscontrol.org/act/2003_12/MillerandScheinman
22 http://gulfnews.com/news/gulf/uae/environment/iran-s-nuke-threat-is-overhyped-un-official-1.1154727
23 http://www.wideasleepinamerica.com/2013/01/when-fact-becomes-opinion.html
24 http://www.csmonitor.com/World/Middle-East/2010/1202/WikiLeaks-cable-portrays-IAEA-
chief-as-in-US-court-on-Iran-nuclear-program
25 Ibid
26 http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2012/mar/22/nuclear-watchdog-iran-iaea
27 http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/iran/
28 http://cns.miis.edu/npr/pdfs/81ali.pdf
29 Communication dated 12 September, 2012, received
from the Resident Representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran concerning
“Facts on Iran’s Nuclear Policy,” IAEA INFCIRC/842, 12 September 2012,
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/2012/infcirc842.pdf
30 Iran’s
statement at IAEA Emergency Meeting, Mehr News Agency, 10 August 2005,
available at http:// www.fas.org/nuke/guide/iran/nuke/ mehr080905.html
31 Part
1: Khamenei on Nuclear Weapons, The Iran Primer, United States Institute
of Peace, 31 August 2012,
http://iranprimer.usip.org/blog/2012/aug/31/part-i-khamenei-nuclear-weapons
32 http://www.cbsnews.com/8301-202_162-57564199/iran-religious-decree-against-nuclear-
weapons-is-binding/