I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne (2015), recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the... more
I briefly review the three basic strategies for naturalizing intentionality discussed by Haugeland 4:383–427, 1990, and Hutto and Satne (2015), recounting their deficits. Then, I focus on Dennett’s version of what Haugeland calls the "second-base…neo-behaviorist" strategy. After briefly explaining Dennett’s proposal,
I defend it against four common objections: circularity, relativity, under-specified rationality, and failure to track robustly natural facts. I conclude by recounting the advantages of Dennettian neo-behaviorism over the neo-Cartesian and neo-pragmatist alternatives, as well as Hutto and Satne’s proposal that intentionality comes in two distinct kinds.

Keywords: Intentionality, Naturalization, Dennett, Neo-Cartesianism, Neo-pragmatism, Neo-behaviorism, Intentional stance, Natural selection, Haugeland, Hutto and
Satne
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En este trabajo se explora el problema de las explicaciones intencionales en la filosofía marxista de la mente, en particular contrastando la concepción de la praxis de Sánchez Vázquez con la del marxismo analítico. Para esta... more
En este trabajo se explora el problema de las explicaciones intencionales en la filosofía marxista de la mente, en particular contrastando la concepción de la praxis de Sánchez Vázquez con la del marxismo analítico. Para esta caracterización de la intención, se parte de un breve excurso comparativo entre algunos pasajes de la obra de Marx con otros de la obra de P-J. Proudhon, en particular en su alusión a la actividad práctica, el instinto y el particular ejemplo de las abejas, las que serán consideradas, también, más allá del mero ejemplo, en su matiz etológico. De esa manera, también se hará hincapié en la relación entre Marx y Proudhon, su correspondencia y las consideraciones que hacía aquél de la obra de éste. La consideraciones de las explicaciones intencionales implican que se visiten los conceptos de praxis o actividad práctica, intención, futurición y el materialismo monista versus materialismo dualista, es decir, los rasgos constitutivos de lo que podría llamarse una filosofía marxista de la mente.
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To understand PHENOMENON OF AROUSAL - SLEEP & DREAMS in Brain ( Physiology of PHENOMENON OF AROUSAL - SLEEP & DREAMS) and as regard information s ( Code PcPs ) , learning ( CCP – open eyes ) and memory ( Recall by atomic transcription ) ,... more
To understand PHENOMENON OF AROUSAL - SLEEP & DREAMS in Brain ( Physiology of PHENOMENON OF AROUSAL - SLEEP & DREAMS) and as regard information s ( Code PcPs ) , learning ( CCP – open eyes ) and memory ( Recall by atomic transcription ) , we have to understand Basic Building Blocks of the universe ( Fig- 1) ( mass – B.B.B Bit or B-Bit ) and Information s ( Code PcPs ) and Divine Mechanics Unit ( CCP , Code PcPs and CP ). PHENOMENON OF AROUSAL - SLEEP & DREAMS is the property of basic Building blocks and it is by virtue of Atomic genes part of reality. All dreams are fed thoughts and feeding was done in precreation era by the highest center of the universe . Dreams could be conditioned stimulation (mimic our real life )or unconditioned stimulation ( do not mimic our real life ) of thoughts .
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In my paper, I assess some of the categorical claims that over the years have been made regarding the relation between analytic and Continental philosophy. I will argue that many of these statements involve stupendous oversimplifications... more
In my paper, I assess some of the categorical claims that over the years have been made regarding the relation between analytic and Continental philosophy. I will argue that many of these statements involve stupendous oversimplifications and overlook many significant differences. I next compare ideas found in phenomenology with ideas found in analytic philosophy of language and analytic philosophy of mind respectively and ultimately argue that the right way to confront the analytic-Continental divide is by embracing plurality rather than unity.
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Dong Son bronze drum surfaces display cire perdue hieroglyphs of extraordinary artistry, orthographic fidelity and brilliance. It is for archaeometallurgical researchers to unravel the precise methods used to achieve such excellent... more
Dong Son bronze drum surfaces display cire perdue hieroglyphs of extraordinary artistry, orthographic fidelity and brilliance. It is for archaeometallurgical researchers to unravel the precise methods used to achieve such excellent embossed hieroglyphs.

An intimation of embossed hieroglyphic work is seen on Harappa copper tablets.
Copper tablet (H2000-4498/9889-01) with raised script found in Trench 43 Source: http://www.harappa.com/indus4/351.html  http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2015/08/indus-script-corpora-cipher-hypertexts.html

Daimabad seal. Hieroglyph: karava 'narrownecked jar'  Rim of narrownecked jar shown in a two-part message of a prism tablet m1429, Mohenjodaro describing the supercargo, karNI http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2015/08/indus-script-corpora-cipher-hypertexts.html
This hieroglyph may signify karuv 'embossed' on karuvi 'metal implements, weapons.' Ta. karuvi instrument, tool. Ma. kari, karivi, karuvi, karu tool, plough, weapon.(DEDR 1290) கருவி karuvi , n. prob. கரு³. [M. karuvi.] 1. Instrument, tool, implement; ஆயுதம். கருவி கொண்டு . . . பொருள்கையுறின் (சிலப். 16, 186). 2. Means, materials, as for a sacrifice; சாதனம். அறிவற்றங் காக்குங் கருவி (குறள், 421). 3. Armour, coat of mail; கவசம். (திவா.) 4. Shield; கேடகம். கருவித்தேன் (சீவக. 1606). 5. Saddle; குதிரைக் கலணை. (திவா.) 6. Horse-whip; குதிரைச்சம் மட்டி. (சூடா.) 7. Assembly, collection, flock, group; தொகுதி. (தொல். சொல். 354, உரை.)(Tamil)

Rebus: karavi 'mould' karuv-iḍu to put bosses or raised figures, mould, model

Ta. karu mould, matrix; karukku engraving, carving, embossed work. Ma. karu figure, mould; karukku-paṇi embossed work; karaṭu the original of a copy. Ka. karu embossed work, bas-relief;karuv-iḍu to put bosses or raised figures, mould, model. Tu. karu, garu, karavi a mould. Te. karugu, karuvu id. Kuwi (S.) garra form, mint; ḍālu- gara womb (for ḍālu, see 1123).(DEDR 1280) खडू (p. 193) [ khaḍū ] f A kind of pipeclay. 2 A composition (of pulverized millstone &c. with water) to rub over writing-boards. 3 f The protuberant portion of a piece of wood or stone, as left after the shaving or chipping away of the parts adjoining (as of a yoke, of the pannels of a door, the embossments, relief, or rising-work of a statue). G. korvũ ʻ to scoop, carve, bore a hole ʼ; M. korṇẽ ʻ to scoop, engrave, cut gradually off ʼ; N. kornu ʻ to scratch, tear, comb ʼ; A. koriba ʻ to hoe ʼ, korokiba ʻ to scoop out ʼ. <-> With expressive redup. H. kakornā ʻ to scrape ʼ.S.kcch. korṇū ʻ to bore (a hole) ʼ; WPah.kṭg. kornõ ʻ to bore, drill ʼ, kurnõ ʻ to be bored ʼ.(CDIAL 3530)

Remarkable narratives comparable to the hieroglyph narratives on Dong Son bronze drums are seen on some Indus Script epigraphs. Some examples:
Crocodile, tiger looking back, spy on tree

http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2015/06/meluhha-hieroglyphs-makara-torana-rope.html h1973B h1974B Harappa Two tablets. One side shows a person seated on a tree branch, a tiger looking up, a crocodile on the top register and other animals in procession in the bottom register. Obverse side (comparable to h1970, h1971 and h1972) shows an elephant, a person strangling two tigers (jackals or foxes) and a six-spoked wheel.

The following glyphics of m1431 prism tablet show the association between the tiger + person on tree glyphic set and crocile + 3 animal glyphic set.


Mohenjo-daro m1431 four-sided tablet. Row of animals in file (a one-horned bull, an elephant and a rhinoceros from right); a gharial with a fish held in its jaw above the animals; a bird (?) at right. Pict-116: From R.—a person holding a vessel; a woman with a platter (?); a kneeling person with a staff in his hands facing the woman; a goat with its forelegs on a platform under a tree. [Or, two antelopes flanking a tree on a platform, with one antelope looking backwards?]

One side (m1431B) of a four-sided tablet shows a procession of a tiger, an elephant and a rhinoceros (with fishes (or perhaps, crocodile) on top?).
kāru ‘crocodile’ (Telugu). Rebus: artisan (Marathi) Rebus: khar ‘blacksmith’ (Kashmiri)
kola ‘tiger’ Rebus: kol ‘working in iron’. Heraka ‘spy’ Rebus: eraka ‘copper’. khōṇḍa ‘leafless tree’ (Marathi). Rebus: kõdār’turner’ (Bengali) dhamkara 'leafless tree' Rebus: dhangar 'blacksmith'
Looking back: krammara ‘look back’ Rebus: kamar ‘smith, artisan’.

koḍe ‘young bull’ (Telugu) खोंड [ khōṇḍa ] m A young bull, a bullcalf. Rebus: kõdā ‘to turn in a lathe’ (B.) कोंद kōnda ‘engraver, lapidary setting or infixing gems’ (Marathi) कोंडण [kōṇḍaṇa] f A fold or pen. (Marathi) ayakāra ‘ironsmith’ (Pali)[fish = aya (G.); crocodile = kāru (Te.)] baṭṭai quail (N.Santali) Rebus: bhaṭa = an oven, kiln, furnace (Santali)

ayo 'fish' Rebus: ayas 'metal'. kaṇḍa 'arrow' Rebus: khāṇḍa ‘tools, pots and pans, and metal-ware’. ayaskāṇḍa is a compounde word attested in Panini. The compound or glyphs of fish + arrow may denote metalware tools, pots and pans.kola 'tiger' Rebus: kol 'working in iron, alloy of 5 metals - pancaloha'. ibha 'elephant' Rebus ibbo 'merchant'; ib ‘iron'.  Alternative: కరటి [ karaṭi ] karaṭi. [Skt.] n. An elephant. ఏనుగు (Telugu) Rebus: kharādī ‘ turner’ (Gujarati) kāṇḍa  'rhimpceros'  Rebus: khāṇḍa ‘tools, pots and pans, and metal-ware’.  The text on m0489 tablet: loa 'ficus religiosa' Rebus: loh 'copper'. kolmo 'rice plant' Rebus: kolami 'smithy, forge'. dula 'pair' Rebus: dul 'cast metal'. Thus the display of the metalware catalog includes the technological competence to work with minerals, metals and alloys and produce tools, pots and pans. The persons involved are krammara 'turn back' Rebus: kamar 'smiths, artisans'. kola 'tiger' Rebus: kol 'working in iron, working in pancaloha alloys'. పంచలోహము pancha-lōnamu. n. A mixed metal, composed of five ingredients, viz., copper, zinc, tin, lead, and iron (Telugu). Thus, when five svastika hieroglyphs are depicted, the depiction is of satthiya 'svastika' Rebus: satthiya 'zinc' and the totality of 5 alloying metals of copper, zinc, tin, lead and iron.

Glyph: Animals in procession: खांडा [khāṇḍā] A flock (of sheep or goats) (Marathi) கண்டி¹ kaṇṭi  Flock, herd (Tamil) Rebus: khāṇḍā ‘tools, pots and pans, and metal-ware’.

Hieroglyph: heraka ‘spy’. Rebus: eraka, arka 'copper, gold'; eraka 'moltencast, metal infusion'; era ‘copper’. āra 'spokes' Rebus: āra  'brass'.


See: http://bharatkalyan97.blogspot.in/2015/08/ancient-near-east-rosetta-stone-tell.html

Trunk of elephant hieoroglyph component on this combined animal signifies: karba 'elephant' Rebus: karba 'iron'. Hieroglyph: karabha 'trunk of elephant' (Pali)


Phoneme karba has two hieroglyph components which are semantic determinatives: kari 'elephant' ibha'elephant'


karin m. ʻ elephant ʼ. [See karabhá -- ]Pa. karin -- m., Pk. kari -- , °iṇa -- m., °iṇī -- , °iṇiyā -- f.; <-> Si. kiriyā ← Pa.(CDIAL 2803)

Hieroglyph: hand: kará1 ʻ doing, causing ʼ AV., m. ʻ hand ʼ RV. [√kr̥1]
Pa. Pk. kara -- m. ʻ hand ʼ; S. karu m. ʻ arm ʼ; Mth. kar m. ʻ hand ʼ (prob. ← Sk.); Si. kara ʻ hand, shoulder ʼ, inscr. karā ʻ to ʼ < karāya. -- Deriv. S. karāī f. ʻ wrist ʼ; G. karã̄ n. pl. ʻ wristlets, bangles ʼ.(CDIAL 2779)

Rebus: karba 'very hard iron' (Tulu) Tu. kari soot, charcoal; kariya black;  karṅka state of being burnt or singed; karṅkāḍuni to burn (tr.); karñcuni to be burned to cinders; karñcāvuni to cause to burn to cinders; kardů black;  karba iron; karvāvuni to burn the down of a fowl by holding it over the fire; karṇṭuni to be scorched; karguḍe a very black man; fem. karguḍi, kargi. Kor. (T.) kardi black. kabbiṇa iron (Kannada) kabïn iron (Toda) karum poṉ iron (Tamil)(DEDR 1278)

Allograph: pot with narrow neck: Koḍ. karava clay pot with narrow neck. Go. (Ma.) karvi narrow-mouthed earthen vessel for oil or liquor (DEDR 1273A)

Hieroglyph: ibha 'elephant' Rebus: ib 'iron' (Santali). kāṇḍā 'rhinoceros' Rebus: khāṇḍa ‘tools, pots and pans, and metal-ware’.  karā 'crocodile' Rebus: khar 'blacksmith' (Kashmiri) Note: Ib is the name of a station between Howrah and Nagpur. The Railway station is in the iron ore belt.

Hieroglyph: हेर [ hēra ] m (हेरक S through or H) A spy, scout, explorator, an emissary to gather intelligence. 2 f Spying out or spying, surveying narrowly, exploring. (Marathi) *hērati ʻ looks for or at ʼ. 2. hēraka -- , °rika -- m. ʻ spy ʼ lex., hairika -- m. ʻ spy ʼ Hcar., ʻ thief ʼ lex. [J. Bloch FestschrWackernagel 149 ← Drav., Kuiēra ʻ to spy ʼ, Malt. ére ʻ to see ʼ, DED 765]
1. Pk. hēraï ʻ looks for or at ʼ (vihīraï ʻ watches for ʼ); K.ḍoḍ. hērūō ʻ was seen ʼ; WPah.bhad. bhal. he_rnū ʻ to look at ʼ (bhal. hirāṇū ʻ to show ʼ), pāḍ. hēraṇ, paṅ. hēṇā, cur. hērnā, Ku. herṇo, N. hernu, A. heriba, B. herā, Or. heribā (caus. herāibā), Mth. herab, OAw. heraï, H. hernā; G. hervũ ʻ to spy ʼ, M. herṇẽ. 2. Pk. hēria -- m. ʻ spy ʼ; Kal. (Leitner) "hériu" ʻ spy ʼ; G. herɔ m. ʻ spy ʼ, herũ n. ʻ spying ʼ. Addenda: *hērati: WPah.kṭg. (Wkc.) hèrnõ, kc. erno ʻ observe ʼ; Garh. hernu ʻ to look' (CDIAL 14165) Ko. er uk- (uky-) to play 'peeping tom'. Kui ēra (ēri-) to spy, scout; n. spying, scouting; pl action ērka (ērki-). ? Kuwi (S.) hēnai to scout; hēri kiyali to see; (Su. P.) hēnḍ- (hēṭ-) id. Kur. ērnā (īryas) to see, look, look at, look after, look for, wait for, examine, try; ērta'ānā to let see, show; ērānakhrnā to look at one another. Malt. ére to see, behold, observe; érye to peep, spy. Cf. 892 Kur. ēthrnā. / Cf. Skt. heraka- spy, Pkt. her- to look at or for, and many NIA verbs; Turner, CDIAL, no. 14165(DEDR 903)



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Just like the first theories in physics viewed atoms as independent and surrounded by avoid, our bodies’ microscopic constituents are often portrayed as disconnected from the body as a unified organism, and from its cultural and social... more
Just like the first theories in physics viewed atoms as independent and surrounded by avoid, our bodies’ microscopic constituents are often portrayed as disconnected from the body as a unified organism, and from its cultural and social contexts.

In The Atomized Body the authors examine the relations between culture, society and bioscientific research and show how our bodies’ singularized atoms indeed still are socially and culturally embedded. In today’s medicine, the biosciences are entangled with state power, commercialism, and cultural ideas and expectations, as well as with the hopes and fears of individuals. Therefore,  biomedicine and biotechnology also reshape our perceptions of selfhood and life.

From a multidisciplinary perspective, with authors from art science to ethnology, this volume discusses the biosciences and the atomized body in their social, cultural and philosophical contexts.
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In this course, we survey contemporary treatments of collective intentionality. Situated amidst discussions of agency and intentionality in a social context, collective intentionality broadly refers to the kind of intentionality that... more
In this course, we survey contemporary treatments of collective intentionality. Situated amidst discussions of agency and intentionality in a social context, collective intentionality broadly refers to the kind of intentionality that allows people to experience, act, or think about something together, or as a group. Collective intentionality is manifested in a variety of phenomena. For example, joint attention is a basic form of intersubjective awareness of the world as perceptually available in the pursuit of shared engagements. Shared intentions allow people to carry out collaborative activities and tasks in a coordinated and cooperative manner. Collective acceptance is a key mechanism for the creation and maintenance of symbolic realities such as language, institutions, and power relations. Collective beliefs provide a common ground of normative commitments to regulate shared deliberative and evaluative practices. The power of collective emotions to fuel social conflicts, or to unite people, is evident from the history of mass gatherings, public rituals, and political movements. It is hard to exaggerate the extent to which collective intentionality permeates the social and cultural fabric of our lives. But what exactly does it mean to ascribe intentionality to people 'as a group' – provided that collective intentionality is not just a shorthand for the ‘summative’ or ‘aggregate’ intentionality of individuals?

The distinctive focus of the philosophical analysis of collective intentionality rests on the conceptual, metaphysical, psychological, and normative features which underlie the 'joint' or 'shared' character of experiences, actions, and attitudes, and the related question of how these features help constitute the social world. The resurgence of interest in collective intentionality began in the late 1980s, and substantially expanded in the 1990s, thanks mostly to the pioneering work of John Searle, Margaret Gilbert, Michael Bratman, and Raimo Tuomela. Today, collective intentionality is a rapidly growing interdisciplinary area of philosophical research which draws on, and has left its mark on, social ontology and epistemology, phenomenology, psychology, linguistics, cognitive science, sociology, political science, economics, legal theory, and cultural and evolutionary anthropology. Our goal in this course is to compare and contrast leading theories of collective intentionality by delving into specific debates over the nature of joint attention, collective intentions and beliefs, collective acceptance and shared evaluative attitudes, collective emotions, collective knowledge and rationality, as well as collective agency and responsibility.
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Nick Bostrom’s recently patched “simulation argument” (Bostrom, 2003, Bostrom and Kulczycki, 2011) purports to demonstrate the probability that we “live” now in an “ancestor simulation” – that is as a simulation of a period prior to that... more
Nick Bostrom’s recently patched “simulation argument” (Bostrom, 2003, Bostrom and Kulczycki, 2011) purports to demonstrate the probability that we “live” now in an “ancestor simulation” – that is as a simulation of a period prior to that in which a civilization more advanced than our own – “post-human” - becomes able to simulate such a state of affairs as ours. The paper argues that global-scale psychologically realistic simulations are likely necessary for a pre-post-human civilization like our own in order to first achieve and then to maintain a target post-human situation, with resulting post-human civilizations most likely to continue to use these simulations in the ways that they were originally intended up to and including extending simulated subjects a fully self-determining independence, i.e. confronted with post-human concerns and able to achieve a post-human condition. First off, as the simulations under consideration resemble "brains in vats" (BIVs) and may appear open to similar objections, the paper begins by reviewing objections to BIV type proposals, specifically those due a presumed mad envatter. In counter example, we explore the motivating rationale behind current work in the development of psychologically realistic social simulations. Further concerns about rendering human cognition in a computational medium are confronted through review of current dynamic systems models of cognitive agency. In these models, aspects of the human condition are reproduced that may in other forms be considered incomputable, i.e. political voice, predictive planning and consciousness. The paper then argues for the likelihood that simulations afford a unique potential to secure a post-human future. Long-standing philosophical interest in tools of this nature for Aristotle’s “statesman” and more recently for E.O. Wilson in the 1990s is noted, perceived threats to human existence at the State and individual levels are compared, and simulations are presented as uniquely informative in the cooperative and constructive resolution of both social coordination problems. In this context, the paper argues for a necessary dependence on large-scale psychologically realistic simulations in this effort, and Bostrom's basic argument for the conviction that we exist now in a similar simulation is reaffirmed.
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When people talk about “common ground”, they invoke shared experiences, convictions, and emotions. In the language sciences, however, ‘common ground’ also has a technical sense. Many taking a representational view of language and... more
When people talk about “common ground”, they invoke shared experiences, convictions, and emotions. In the language sciences, however, ‘common ground’ also has a technical sense. Many taking a representational view of language and cognition seek to explain that everyday feeling in terms of how isolated individuals “use” language to communicate. Autonomous cognitive agents are said to use words to communicate inner thoughts and experiences; in such a framework, ‘common ground’ describes a body of information that people allegedly share, hold common, and use to reason about how intentions have been made manifest. We object to this view, above all, because it leaves out mechanisms that demonstrably enable people to manage joint activities by doing things together. We present an alternative view of linguistic understanding on which appeal to inner representations is replaced by tracing language to synergetic coordination between biological agents who draw on wordings to act within cultural ecosystems. Crucially, human coordination depends on, not just bodies, but also salient patterns of articulatory movement (‘wordings’). These rich patterns function as non-local resources that, together with concerted bodily (and vocal) activity, serve to organize, regulate and coordinate both attention and the verbal and non-verbal activity that it gives rise to. Since wordings are normative, they can be used to develop skills for making cultural sense of environments and other peoples’ doings. On our view, the technical notion of common ground is an illusion, because appeal to representations blinds theorists to bodily activity and the role of experience. Turning away from how wordings influence the circumstances, skills, and bodily coordination on which interpersonal understanding depends, it makes premature appeal to reasoning and internally represented knowledge. We conclude that outside its vague everyday sense, the concept of common ground is a notion that the language sciences would be well advised to abandon.
This book comes to explain the nature of the mental matrices and dogmas. It will help you to understand the development of mind and will reveal how to identify and overcome the dogmas that restrict you. You will discover a new... more
This book comes to explain the nature of the mental matrices and dogmas.

It will help you to understand the development of mind and will reveal how to identify and overcome the dogmas that restrict you.

You will discover a new informational paradigm of mind and reality.
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Seringkali ketika berbeda dengan yang lain membuat kita kurang percaya diri, padahal lebih dari itu. sebuah perbedaan bukan berarti sebuah kesalahan.
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Throughout the course of this paper, I attempt to provide a new means for interpreting Anaxagoras’ cosmogony by way of a brief but formal analysis of phenomenological temporality. By drawing primarily on Robert Sokolowski's analysis of... more
Throughout the course of this paper, I attempt to provide a new means for interpreting Anaxagoras’ cosmogony by way of a brief but formal analysis of phenomenological temporality. By drawing primarily on Robert Sokolowski's analysis of the three domains of temporality (transcendent time, immanent time, and internal consciousness, respectively), in addition to the formal structure of the living present, I argue that Anaxagoras' Mind or _nous_ can be radically reinterpreted to accommodate, explain, and viably account for its characterization as pre-_kosmic_, "ruler of all things," an originary source of motion, as well as how we can avoid an apparent contradiction or paradox regarding Mind as a the only exception to his third principle: namely, that there is a Portion of everything in everything. After providing a critical exposition of Anaxagoras’ system and phenomenological temporality, I proceed by temporally analyzing the Eleatic notion of genesis and perishing in favor of Anaxagoras’ rejection of them, showing them to lead to strange paradoxes, and his rejection (as well as Parmenides’) to be well founded. I subsequently offer suggestions and analyses concerning potential reinterpretations of Anaxagoras’ Basic Ingredients, Portions, Seeds, and finally Mind via temporality. While much of this may be dismissed for various reasons by traditional pre-Socratic scholars, the goal of this paper is to challenge the physicalist, reductionist, and literalist interpretations of Anaxagoras that have dominated the literature, as well as open them up to renewed criticism and philosophical examination.
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In this paper, I would like to outline and defend Noam Chomsky’s dismissal of the mind-body problem in its Cartesian formulations, while clarifying the implications of some of Chomsky’s methodological remarks. The structure of the paper... more
In this paper, I would like to outline and defend Noam Chomsky’s dismissal of the mind-body problem in its Cartesian formulations, while clarifying the implications of some of Chomsky’s methodological remarks. The structure of the paper will be as follows: I begin by outlining Descartes’ concept of body and its relation to other aspects of the Cartesian system. I then present Chomsky’s dismissal of the mind-body problem based on a rejection of Cartesian mechanics and their replacement with Newtonian notions. My overall discussion adds very little to Chomsky’s, though I attempt to further clarify some rather more technical points of the Cartesian natural philosophy given the latter’s immense importance for any coherent formulation of the mind-body problem. Lastly, I entertain possible objections and examine alternative formulations of the mind-body problem. I conclude that, in light of Chomsky’s remarks, these objections either a) are misguided, b) should simply be understood as plausible hypotheses, or c) have little relevance to scientific inquiry and the problem of unification.
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