January 28, 2013
The
bloody end to the hostage crisis at In Amenas has led to widely competing
assessments as to the wisdom of having so swiftly and violently attacked the
facilities to rescue foreign hostages being held by elements of Al-Qaeda in the
Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). For the French, for example, this was the only viable
option however tragic was the loss of lives. For others, like progressive elements
within the United States, negotiations should have been pursued more seriously
and with a longer time frame. What both perspectives fail to fully appreciate
are the broader national, economic, and security imperatives that dictate
Algerian political behavior. Indeed, it is impossible to separate the country’s
foreign policy orientation from existing Algerian configurations of power
particularly the role of its military-industrial complex.
Despite
the presence of formal authority structures operating within a
constitutionally-defined system of rule involving elections, parties, and other
manifestations of “democratic” governance, Algeria remains under the control,
as it has since the coup d’état of
1965, of an intricate complex of military, intelligence, and industrial forces
that monopolize state power in both its domestic and foreign policy dimensions.
The
ability of Algeria’s intelligence service (Département du Renseignement et de
la Sécurité
or DRS), headed by its
long-serving General Toufic Mediane, to maintain its supremacy over the
country’s political economy is intimately related to its unofficial
control of Sonatrach, the national oil
and gas company, that provides the bulk of Algeria’s national wealth. During
the whole decade of the civil war (1992-2002) involving the military’s savage
struggle against an Islamic insurgency that left over 200,000 dead, the
security services were able to successfully shield the vast oil and gas
operations spread across Algeria’s Saharan expanse against “terrorist” attacks
with only one or two instances where facilities and personnel suffered losses.
This was not the case in the coastal and pre-Saharan regions where the majority
of Algerians reside but where hydrocarbon resources are not found. In these
populated areas thousands of innocent Algerians lost their lives in the absence
of sufficient military and police protection. This outcome was not accidental
as the decision was made to prioritize oil and gas, a relatively secure source
of foreign-generated income, over the fate of the country’s citizens whose tax
base is miniscule as a percentage of the national budget.
On the
political front Algeria remains an authoritarian state despite the introduction
and implementation of constitutionally defined structures of governance
including a national assembly, an elected president, and a seemingly
competitive political party system. Yet all national level decisions involving
the country’s “strategic” sectors fall outside the purview of representative
institutions and the formal authority of government. This is particularly the
case on matters of national security and the control over Sonatrach. In these
areas there are no structures of accountability, transparency, or
representativeness. Behind the opaque wall of le pouvoir (the military-industrial complex) operates the true
reins of power.
It is
these two principle features of contemporary Algerian political life that help
explain the how, why, and when the Algerian authorities decided to attack the In
Amenas facilities. The terrorist assault on one of the country’s central
natural gas processing plants posed a direct challenge to le pouvoir’s political and economic hegemony. This then was no simple
hostage crisis or terrorist event as both have been and continue to be a
regular feature of current Algerian life with AQIM staging frequent attacks
throughout the country and often capturing hostages as a way by which to
collect ransom and thereby provide the financing for future attacks.
Regional
instability (Western Sahara), civil wars (Sudan), ethnic conflicts (Mali), or
the disintegration of existing systems (Libya) raise serious questions about
the extent that external relations may impact negatively on le pouvoir’s ability to maintain a
stranglehold on Algeria’s political economy. As the leading hegemon in the
Saharan-Sahelian region of northern Africa, Algeria’s military-industrial
complex demands stability which helps explain its consternation over Gadhafi’s downfall
in Libya and, initially at least, its opposition to foreign intervention in
Mali that might have the potential of compromising its hegemonic status.
The
confluence of regional instability spilling over into Algeria itself proved decisive
in explaining the military assault on the gas facilities. The “rescue” mission
was not to save the lives of hostages or kill terrorists or even prevent damage
to gas installations; the mission had a greater imperative—saving le pouvoir itself. To have done
otherwise would have raised serious questions about the legitimacy of the
Algerian state as currently constituted with its high army command serving as
the self-defined defender of the Algerian revolution. Compromising the oil and
gas industry would not only have affected the “goose that lays the golden eggs”
but would have frightened away future investors and partners in an industry
that is being severely challenged by global competitors. Finally, to have acted
indecisively on the terrorist issue, for which over 200,000 people have already
died, would have deepened the already prevalent view that le pouvoir itself was implicated in many of those killings during
the dark decade of the country’s civil war.
John P. Entelis is a professor of political science and director of the Middle East
Studies Program at Fordham University.