August 12, 2013
The
degree of uncertainty that prevailed in Egypt’s political scene during the last
ten days of June has certainly been unprecedented. The expectations of the
political elite, both those occupying the seats of power and those standing on
the front lines of the opposition, are wildly divergent. Everyone misread the
popular reaction—one that is characterized by a large degree of variation and
polarization—that paved the way for the events currently being witnessed by
Egypt.
The
Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research, Baseera, has systematically conducted
opinion polls during the last week of every month, and disseminated its
findings to all media outlets irrespective of their political or ideological
inclination. Thus, we have been able to ensure that the results reach ordinary
Egyptians citizens at the same moment that they reach both governing and
opposition elites. Given the particular importance of the moment—the first year
of the first president elected after the January 25th Revolution—Baseera has
taken great care to measure the president's performance at the governorate
level. This has necessitated the trebling of the sample size from 2,000
interviews in previous surveys conducted throughout the year, to approximately
6,000 interviews.
In
addition, three Media institutions—the Al-Shorouk
newspaper, Al-Hayat TV, and Al-Jazeera TV—requested that we conduct an opinion
poll during the last ten days of June, to provide their readership/viewership with
empirical data on public opinion trends. The questions in each of these surveys
varied, an issue that was not difficult to arrange given the multiplicity of
difficult questions that impose themselves on the political scene.
What
follows are the most noteworthy results from the four surveys, with no
commentary attached. I leave it to the reader to interpret these findings as they
appear to him or her.
Evaluation of Morsi’s
Performance
1. A
decline in the proportion of those who approve of the president's performance
to 32 percent, compared to approximately 42 percent at the end of May, and 78
percent by the end of his first one hundred days in office.
2. A widening of the gap between those who
approve and disapprove of the president's performance to 29 percentage points,
by the end of June (32 percent approve versus 61 percent who do not).
3. A drop
in the percentage of those willing to re-elect Morsi to just 25 percent, with a
particular decline among youth (19 percent compared to 30 percent among those
above the age of 50).
4. Wide
variation among governorates in terms of the proportions who intend to re-elect
the president (ranging from 11 to 43 percent). The governorates wherein less
than 20 percent would re-elect him include Port Said, Damietta, Suez,
Alexandria, Daqahlia, Cairo and Kafr Al-Sheikh. In contrast, the proportion of
respondents willing to re-elect the president rose to above 30 percent in the
more peripheral governorates of Assyuit, Sohag, Beni Suef, Qena, Aswan, Minya
and Fayoum.
5. In a
related context, 64 percent of respondents perceived the Muslim Brotherhood's
governance as being worse than they had expected; 15 percent replied that it
was as they had expected; 8 percent replied that it exceeded their
expectations.
The Political Crisis
1. Eighty-four
percent of Egyptians believe that Egypt is in the grips of a political crisis,
with the perception reaching 92 percent among university-degree holders. In an
attempt to identify Egyptians’ expectations of how this crisis might be
resolved, early presidential elections was the most frequently cited response.
The other most popular responses, respectively, were military intervention, the
formation of a Presidential Council and the continuation of the president's
term.
2. Regarding expectations of the country’s situation had the transitional period
continued over the last year with the Supreme Council of the Armed Forces in
power, 53 percent replied that the situation would be better, 10 percent that
it would be no different, and 18 percent that it would be worse.
3. When
asked about the likelihood of resolving the crisis by conducting elections to
appoint a parliament, opinions were divided. The biggest proportion (36 percent)
opined that it would not be enough, compared to 21 percent who expected the
elections to resolve the crisis, and 27 percent who answered that it would
depend on the composition of such a parliament.
4. Asked
about the reason for Egypt's instability, 43 percent blamed the ‘counter-revolution.’
While the definitions of counter-revolution differed, the majority of
respondents tied it to the ruling regime prior to the outbreak of the January
25th revolution.
June 30th
Demonstrations
1. Thirty
percent of Egyptians replied that they intended to participate in the June 30th
demonstrations, while 6 percent stated that they were unsure, and the remainder
of respondents replied that they would not participate. The proportion of those
planning to participate among youth, however, was 40 percent.
2. When
asking respondents about their support for the Tamarod (or Rebellion) campaign versus the Muslim Brotherhood's
counter-campaign, results indicated that 39 percent support the Rebellion
Campaign, 6 percent support the counter-campaign, and 35 percent support
neither. In urban areas, the percentage of support for Rebellion rose to 49
percent.
3. Thirty-nine
percent of respondents believe that the crisis would not be resolved without
violence and fatalities; 23 percent replied that June 30th will witness
demonstrations and nothing more, and 12 percent said that the demonstrations
would lead to the ouster of the president. The perception that the
demonstrations would result in violence was greatest among university graduates
and urban residents.
I believe
that a careful and objective reading of these results point to the missed
opportunities that, had they been taken advantage of, would have allowed Egypt
to side-step consequences—of which their impact remains unclear. More
importantly, these results make it clear that Egypt does not belong to any one
faction. The seat of power must be wide enough to hold all.
Magued Osman is the CEO and
managing director of the Egyptian Center for Public Opinion Research, Baseera. This article originally appeared in Al-Shorouk.