November 23, 2013
The
downfall of Egypt’s elected Islamist president, Mohamed Morsi, in July 2013 has
not resulted in the separation of religion and state in the country. Indeed,
something quite different seems to be occurring: religion is being
nationalized. Under the leadership
of Al-Azhar—a complex of Islamic schools, university faculties, and
research institutes—the country’s religious establishment appears to be
coalescing internally, aligning itself firmly with the post-Morsi road map, and
asserting its leadership of religious life throughout Egypt.
That will
be good news to many who view Ahmed El-Tayeb, the current grand sheikh of Al-Azhar,
as an enlightened figure, but it is already causing controversy among
Salafists, the Muslim Brotherhood, and others in Egypt. In the past, Al-Azhar’s
struggles for centrality in Egypt’s religious life and for autonomy from the
state have sometimes worked against each other. Over the years, pushing for
greater influence has entangled the institution in political clashes that have
affected its coherence and independence. Now, El-Tayeb’s dexterity, combined
with emergent institutional changes in the religious establishment, offers the
possibility that Al-Azhar can finally pursue all its goals simultaneously.
Given
these developments, it seems clear that the result of Egypt’s post-Morsi
political reconstruction will be a state that weaves religious structures into
its bureaucratic fabric every bit as much as it did in the past. Islam will
hardly be excluded from public life. But the vision of Islam is emerging as more
coherent and more susceptible to guidance by Al-Azhar’s senior leadership.
Al-Azhar After Mubarak
Since the
time of Muhammad Ali in the 1800s, Egypt’s leaders have regarded Al-Azhar as an
influential tool in shaping and promoting the government’s domestic and foreign
policies. Accordingly, they have gradually extended their control over the
institution.
Then
president Gamal Abdel Nasser moved ambitiously to reorganize Al-Azhar through
Law 103 of 1961, which placed the entire institution and its endowments under
the formal jurisdiction of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. The same law
also made the appointment of the grand sheikh the prerogative of the Egyptian
president, just as the appointment of any other state official. In subsequent
years, the regime worked to ensure that Al-Azhar would act as a strong
counterbalance to the growing religious influence of both internal forces such
as the Muslim Brotherhood and Salafists and external forces like Saudi Arabia’s
Wahhabism.
The
social and political vacuum in Egypt that followed the fall of then president
Hosni Mubarak in February 2011 created space for Al-Azhar to escape this tight
control. Although Al-Azhar was in some ways above day-to-day politics, it was
still part of the Egyptian state. And it took advantage of the new political
context to push for greater autonomy.
Al-Azhar
presented a contrast to rising Islamist political groupings, including the
Muslim Brotherhood’s Freedom and Justice Party and Salafist groups like the
Nour Party. Unlike the Islamists, Al-Azhar was scholarly and not mired in
politics. Unlike the Salafists, its approach to religion could be presented as
more consistent with the needs of a twenty-first-century society. And unlike
both, Ahmed El-Tayeb posed as a promoter of consensus, leading national
dialogues and issuing widely supported statements and documents to guide the
tumultuous political process.
In 2012, Al-Azhar’s
break from state control was formalized to a degree. The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, the body
that governed Egypt after Mubarak’s fall, made a hasty move days before the
first meeting of the parliament that had been elected in late 2011 and early
2012. It unilaterally promulgated amendments to Law 103 that effectively granted Al-Azhar
quasi-independent status. This status was then reinforced by article 4 of Egypt’s 2012 constitution, which
stipulates that Al-Azhar is “an encompassing independent Islamic institution
with exclusive autonomy over its own affairs.” The amendments to the 1961 law
restored the Council of Senior Scholars of Al-Azhar and the council’s right to
elect the grand sheikh and nominate the mufti. The 2012 constitution mandated
that the council be consulted on matters of Islamic law.
These
changes offered more than autonomy; they also cemented El-Tayeb’s position
within the institution. He was allowed monopoly control over the initial
composition of the Council of Senior Scholars. Because the council was given the power to name the mufti, a traditional
rival position was effectively brought within Al-Azhar’s orbit. Moreover, the
amendments confirmed that the law was intended to keep the existing leadership
of Al-Azhar in place and empower El-Tayeb to act in the best interests of Al-Azhar
without further discussion among the institution, save among those the grand
sheikh himself designated.
Despite
the major steps made toward autonomy, there is still some distance to travel.
The amendments failed to address the issue of financial independence—Al-Azhar
remains dependent on the government in this area. Other possible reforms within
Al-Azhar—such as long-expected attempts to develop its educational
curriculum—have also had to wait.
The Rise and Fall of Brotherhood Rule
Morsi’s
election as president in June 2012 represented a possible challenge to the new
arrangements concerning Al-Azhar’s relationship to the Egyptian state. Morsi
was backed by the Muslim Brotherhood. So his rise meant that a religious
movement formerly independent of the state—the Brotherhood—was taking the
political reins of power through the Freedom and Justice Party. The Brotherhood
also had some support among the faculty and especially the student body of Al-Azhar.
The differences
between the Brotherhood and Al-Azhar were not necessarily doctrinal—the
Brotherhood, after all, claimed to be a centrist movement and had long called
for Al-Azhar’s independence, the resurrection of the Council of Senior
Scholars, and a restoration of Al-Azhar’s prestige. But many Al-Azhar leaders,
in particular El-Tayeb, clearly regarded the Brotherhood as more of a political
movement than a religious one. They were suspicious that the Brotherhood would
gradually place its own figures in key positions in the state religious
establishment. And indeed, while charges that Morsi was “Brotherhoodizing” the
Egyptian state were often exaggerated, there does seem to have been some
attempt by the Ministry of Religious Endowments to fill state ranks with Brotherhood
figures.
But as
Morsi settled into the presidency, the leadership of Al-Azhar avoided a full
confrontation. Indeed, it maintained a generally cordial public relationship
with the presidency. Some tiffs occurred—such as a perceived snub of El-Tayeb
at Morsi’s inauguration—but no clashes followed. On some occasions, when the
Muslim Brotherhood issued a statement on women’s rights, for example, or when
the upper house of parliament passed a law on Islamic financial instruments, Al-Azhar’s
leadership used the opportunities to present its independent voice. But it
never did so in a tone that suggested a direct challenge.
Yet by
the end of June 2013, as public discontent with Morsi’s rule ran high, the
grand sheikh apparently felt he could no longer stand above the brewing
confrontation in Egyptian politics. On July 3, Minister of Defense Abdel Fattah
El-Sisi announced that Morsi had been deposed and the 2012 constitution
suspended. El-Tayeb (along with the Coptic pope) was by El-Sisi’s side, clearly
endorsing the move. Al-Azhar’s position as a symbol of national unity and
consensus was a critical part of the military’s pitching of the ouster as a
broad public rejection of Brotherhood rule rather than a military coup.
Al-Azhar
strove to make the move appear nonpolitical and a continuation, rather than a
repudiation, of its position of standing above the fray. “It was clear that we
had to choose between two bitter choices,” said
El-Tayeb. He went for the less harmful option of removing Morsi from
power and supporting the Egyptian military’s post-Morsi
political road map. Yet, despite the enduring respect for Al-Azhar
among the majority of Egyptians, its credibility and neutrality were tainted,
at least in the eyes of Morsi and Brotherhood supporters.
Since
Morsi’s ouster, Al-Azhar has called for a comprehensive and inclusive national
dialogue to plan and complement the political agenda. However, these calls have
not produced any concrete results, in part because the Brotherhood’s Freedom
and Justice Party boycotted the dialogue, blaming Al-Azhar for siding with the
coup leaders. The other reason for the dialogue’s failure is the lack of
interest from the military and the interim government in making any concessions
or even discussing elements of the transition plan. In addition, almost
immediately after Morsi’s ouster, the interim government and media began
championing a “war against terrorism” campaign against the Muslim Brotherhood,
which has made it even harder to bring the differing parties together.
In
response, an alliance of the Muslim Brotherhood and some Islamists has been
calling for a restoration of the 2012 constitution and decrying the July 3
regime change. These forces have been leading weekly rallies and protests to
condemn the coup leaders and the interim government.
Last
August, large public demonstrations were forcibly dispersed, and they have
since subsided. But campus protests have become a daily occurrence since the
beginning of the academic year. Interestingly, they have been most marked at Al-Azhar
University, an institution where the students are far less hostile to Islamists
than on other campuses. Since classes began on October 19, student
demonstrators have called for El-Tayeb to be dismissed and have denounced the
coup against Morsi. University officials have dealt uncertainly with the protesters,
whom they decry as an unrepresentative minority of students.
But the
close proximity of the Al-Azhar campus to the Rabaa Al-Adawiya mosque, where
pro-Morsi protesters camped out before being forcefully dispersed, fuels the
students’ motivation to march from the campus and attempt to stage sit-ins.
Despite warnings from the university’s president against politics on campus,
protests escalated to the extent that the university called in the police on
October 30.
Whether
it wanted to or not, Al-Azhar has thus been caught up in the post-2011
political upheavals. And it has been divided internally as well, as the student
demonstrations illustrate most forcefully.
Uniting the Religious Sector After Morsi
Despite
the short-term tumult, over the longer term, the institution may reap handsome
rewards from the post–July 3 environment.
In the
months since Morsi’s overthrow, there have been two notable developments
concerning the place of religious institutions in Egyptian public life: more
unified leadership in the main state religious institutions and the promise of
a greater role for these establishments in public life. These developments have
primarily occurred not within Al-Azhar but in the structure, personnel, and
scope of the Ministry of Religious Endowments. Yet they offer a leading role
for Al-Azhar in shaping religious life in Egypt.
Long
regarded as a foe of Al-Azhar’s authority, the Ministry of Religious Endowments
is now working with Al-Azhar to implement regulations to recruit preachers,
bring mosques under the ministry’s jurisdiction, and regulate the content of
sermons and the issuing of fatwas. Last month, the minister of endowments,
Mohamed Mokhtar Gomaa, declared that prayers would be allowed only in mosques
controlled by the ministry and that only Al-Azhar-qualified imams would be
allowed to preach in mosques. The minister also stripped thousands of imams of
their preaching licenses, closed mosques smaller than 80 square meters (860
square feet), which are often led by independent imams, and banned the
collection in mosques of donations that “go to those who do not fear God.”
What’s more, Gomaa ordered that the boards overseeing state-owned mosques be
reformed.
As
reasoning for the moves, he cited misuse of mosques during Morsi’s rule,
incitement of violence and apostasy, and the recent clashes inside mosques
because of the polarized political situation. Moreover, according to a source
within the ministry, the minister before Gomaa had appointed Muslim Brotherhood
members to high-level positions. Gomaa dismissed these Brotherhood appointees,
and afterward some observers called for second- and third-tier ministry
personnel to be removed as well on the basis of their membership in the
Brotherhood and other Islamist groups.
These
decisions stirred up controversy among preachers and religious groups. The
Salafist Nour Party criticized the ministry’s move, calling for preachers to be
chosen according to “scientific criteria, not loyalty to the authorities or
security considerations.”
While the
Ministry of Religious Endowment’s steps may seem to simply be an attempt to
dismantle and weaken the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamist groups, the
situation is in reality more complicated. The regulations in fact suggest a
plan to nationalize religious practice in Egypt.
But the
plan may not be feasible. This is hardly the first time the Egyptian government
has tried to extend its supervision over the country’s mosques; past attempts
have foundered because the task is immense. How can the ministry ensure that
the mosques are following the preaching guidelines or that Friday prayers are
only taking place in mosques bigger than 80 square meters? How can the ministry
deal with the “popular” preachers who do not have a degree from Al-Azhar? Is
the ministry going to seek help from the police to implement policies and
arrest the violators? Another concern is the backlash these policies might
invite from groups that have long been building, teaching, and preaching in
mosques all over Egypt.
In a
recent interview, an Al-Azhar official acknowledged the challenges of carrying
out these policies. The institution fully supports the changes pursued by the
new minister as long-needed reforms that have been delayed due to the
dismissiveness of the former governments and the religious leadership at Al-Azhar
and the ministry. But Al-Azhar also recognizes the magnitude of the task.
Al-Azhar’s
intention is still modest: not to control the religious apparatus, only to
regulate and promote its centrist interpretation of Islam. As a first step, the
ministry and Al-Azhar decided to establish a Supreme Council for Preaching
under the leadership of the grand sheikh. The council would be responsible for
training imams and preachers and overseeing all matters related to preaching.
Gomaa, who was a member of the grand sheikh’s technical office until his
appointment, has been leading efforts to send Al-Azhar-educated preachers into
remote villages and communities, like Upper Egypt and North Sinai, to overcome
the influence of other extreme visions of Islam.
Nonetheless,
the most visible forum for Al-Azhar’s new predominant role is the Committee of
50, which is currently working on a comprehensive revision of Egypt’s
constitution. Al-Azhar has three representatives on the committee (the mufti
and two others), and those representatives are in a far more powerful position
than their predecessors were in the 2012 drafting body.
In 2012, Al-Azhar
was in more of a defensive and reactive position, seeking to defend the
institution’s interests and vision while non-Islamist, Salafist, and
Brotherhood committee members battled over various religious clauses. The
result was a document that gave the institution more than it might have wished
for. One clause gave Al-Azhar a consultative role over issues relating to the
Islamic sharia principles, while another adopted Al-Azhar’s definition of those
principles.
Such a
powerful role seems a bit more formal than what the body’s current senior
leaders desire. They seek supreme moral authority, not definitive and codified political
authority. In the 2013 constitution, the clauses in question are likely to be
watered down or eliminated, hardly reducing Al-Azhar’s influence but making it
less a matter of constitutional text.
Al-Azhar and the New Order
However
gradual its efforts and however modest its stated vision, Al-Azhar is now
leading Egypt’s religious establishment into a new era. Traditional rival
institutions have been brought into far tighter coordination, and the grand
sheikh and the Council of Senior Scholars stand at the head of the more unified
apparatus. The mufti and the Ministry of Religious Endowments work more closely
with Al-Azhar, and all seem to acknowledge the moral authority of Al-Azhar’s
approach to Islam.
Not all
dissident voices have been silenced—the demonstrations by Al-Azhar students and
the continued presence of Salafists in public debates make that clear. But the
position of the grand sheikh and Al-Azhar remains secure, with dissident voices
losing some of their force and influence without being suppressed.
Perhaps
the most telling symbol of the new order is Yusuf Al-Qaradawi, one of the most
prominent Islamic scholars active today. Although Egyptian and trained by Al-Azhar,
Al-Qaradawi is based in Qatar. He has championed his own centrist approach to
Islam but makes no secret of his support for the Muslim Brotherhood. Al-Qaradawi,
characteristically unrestrained, was openly critical of Morsi’s overthrow, and
he extended his criticism to the position taken by El-Tayeb. But Al-Qaradawi
also sits on Al-Azhar’s Council of Senior Scholars. Though the council reacted
with outrage to his comments and even met to discuss how to respond to them, in
the end, Al-Qaradawi retained his seat. He shows some signs of having tamed his
voice but remains isolated within that body.
Not only
has Al-Azhar gained coherence; it has also been able to enhance its prestige
and centrality. El-Tayeb’s appearance at El-Sisi’s July 3 announcement may have
appeared to be a political move, but it also cemented Al-Azhar’s position as the
conscience of the Egyptian nation.
For
Egyptians of a wide variety of stripes, Al-Azhar represents the true and best
face of Islam as it is understood and practiced in Egypt. Those opposed to
Islamist rule have rallied around Al-Azhar as an alternative and have reacted
positively to Al-Azhar’s enhanced post–July 3 voice as a repudiation of the
Brotherhood. The Brotherhood bears considerable resentment toward El-Tayeb, but
it still claims to support Al-Azhar as an institution.
The
current moment is one of tremendous opportunity for Al-Azhar. The institution
seems to be on the brink of achieving more autonomy and influence than it has
ever had in the modern era.
This article is reprinted with permission from the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace. It can be accessed online at: http://egyptelections.carnegieendowment.org/2013/11/08/egypt%E2%80%99s-al-azhar-steps-forward
Ahmed Morsy is a nonresident
research associate in the Democracy and Rule of Law Program at the Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace.
Nathan Brown is a non-resident
senior associate at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and
professor of political science at George Washington University.