May 09, 2015
Traveling to Iran in May 2014 and again
last month, I felt the sense of anticipation over the nuclear negotiations, which
people hope will conclude by July and will lead to a significant easing of
economic sanctions and political isolation. Iranians are excited to meet tourists
from the United States, seeing these visitors as an indication that some Americans
are ready to discover Iran on its own terms.
Iranians laugh at the image of America
as the “Great Satan” and at the faded Down-With-the-US murals still visible on
a few buildings. Memories of the Shah have receded over thirty-five
years. It is fascinating to see Iranians
visit sites such as the Niavaran palace, where they can admire Empress Farah
Diba Pahlavi’s evening gowns and check out the stuffed animals in her
children’s bedrooms.
Instead, it is the eight year war
launched by Saddam Hussein in 1980 that is deeply imprinted in the collective
memory. The faces of young men who died
in that grueling conflict stare from street-side placards. People recall the terror of the aerial
bombardments that rained down on them without there being any shelter. The
exhibit that we saw at Tehran’s Aaran Art Gallery displayed Nasser Bakhshi’s haunting
images of loss, coupled with affirmations of the bonds that soldiers forge as
they fight side by side in the trenches. Iranians can’t forget that Washington
provided crucial military assistance to Iraq throughout those terrible years,
even though Iraq initiated the conflagration.
Fear of returning to such deep
insecurity is one reason for people to support the negotiations and seek a
reset in foreign relations, after years of Washington threatening military
action, directly or via Israel. That fear also propels Iranians to seek strong
air and naval defense systems, which the country lacked in the 1980s. But fear
is not the main motivation. Many hope for an end to stifling restrictions and
the return of freedom to trade and travel. They want to be able to use credit
cards and transfer funds, and they wonder when they will catch a direct flight
to JFK or LAX.
For the governments involved in the
negotiations, there’s too much baggage from past and present conflicts for them
to view reconciliation as a simple process. Washington remains angry at the
1979 hostage crisis and Iran’s support for attacks on the American embassy and
Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983; is antagonized by Iranian support for Bashar
Al-Assad’s regime, Hizbollah and Hamas, and wary of its involvement with the
Houthi movement in Yemen; resents Iran’s arming Iraqi militias that attacked
American troops during the U.S. occupation; and decries the detention of American
citizens—most recently the Washington Post’s
Jason Rezaian. Iran resents Washington’s past efforts to foment regime change,
threats to launch military strikes, and (tacit) support for Israel’s assassination
of Iranian nuclear physicists, sabotage of missile-testing and enrichment sites,
and cyber-attacks on nuclear facilities. These deepen the sense of being
surrounded by enemies, a perception exacerbated by the U.S. invasions of neighboring
Afghanistan and Iraq. These fears cannot be ignored, and must be taken into
account when listening to the rhetoric about Iranian expansionism.
We reached Tehran a few days after the framework
for a nuclear agreement was signed in Vienna and wished we had been there to
see crowds greet Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif. Those with whom we
spoke stressed that some “95 percent of Tehran residents” backed the agreement,
even with the tough conditions that limit Iran’s uranium enrichment to Natanz and
to a 3.67 percent level, block uranium enrichment at Fordow and plutonium
enrichment at Arak, and tighten International Atomic Energy Agency surveillance
of uranium mines and mills, as well as centrifuge-production, energy-generation,
and research. As people tend to agree with the government’s stated opposition
to nuclear weapons, their concern is to ensure the country’s right to medical
research and ample electricity.
There’s strong support for the
government’s efforts to undo the ill-conceived policies (and huge corruption)
of the Mahmoud Ahmadinejad era (2005-2013), and to create a knowledge-based
economy that will focus on the export of value-added products rather than raw
materials. International companies seek contracts to help
develop the vast South Pars natural gas field, whose reserves will last for
seventy years even without new discoveries. Executives from BP, Total, Eni,
Lukoil and other companies meet (informally) with oil ministry officials. Other
companies seek to invest in the power-generating plants, wind-turbines, and
transmission lines that Iran plans to expand for domestic needs and for export
to its neighbors. Meanwhile, the government offers tax incentives in order to
attract foreign investment in manufacturing, not only trade. And Europeans seek
to reopen joint production operations—such as Peugeot-Citroen’s vehicle
assembly plant—that were forced to close in 2012. As Iranian businessmen open high-end
hotels and the government spruces up long-neglected hostelries, there’s hope
for an infusion of cash from abroad into the tourism sector. Isfahan, for
example—the most prized destination aside from Persepolis—struggles to
accommodate foreign visitors as it only has two five-star hotels.
There are many worries too. Iran needs
to confront its high levels of pollution in the cities and its dire water
crisis. As 97 percent of its surface water is exploited, rivers and lakes are drying
up and cities face alarming shortages. Technical fixes won’t be enough,
however. To bolster a knowledge-based economy integrated into the global
economy, Iran needs a strong private sector, enhanced IT, and intellectual
freedom. At present, the companies
affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) dominate not only
military industries but also construction, oil and gas production, public transportation,
and telecom—not to speak of IRGC control over internal and cross-border security.
That poses severe constraints on the possibilities of reforming economic and
financial systems and of reining in corruption.
Moreover, promoting IT and intellectual
freedom run counter to state guardianship over morals and behavior. President
Hassan Rouhani says that the government should not interfere in peoples’ lives,
affirms women’s equality, and criticizes the security police for arresting
improperly-clad women. But he does not control the police and cannot prevent
the IRGC from arresting people. Police even raid concerts that are licensed by
the Ministry of Culture. Each city’s IRGC-linked security force calls the shots:
for example, live music is allowed in restaurants in Tehran and Shiraz, but not
in Isfahan. Whereas Rouhani’s minister of communications and information speeds
up the Internet to facilitate global access, Internet police arrest people
based on their social media posts and the judiciary orders the government to
shut down WhatsApp, Viber, and Tango because of their allegedly immoral content.
There’s hope that a successful
conclusion of the nuclear negotiations will reinforce Rouhani’s authority,
enabling his government to push back on these issues. But that hope is tempered
by the reality that it is Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei who controls
the state TV and radio stations, the judiciary, and the Friday prayer leaders—and
the IRGC cadres who control the streets. Perhaps the parliamentary elections,
scheduled for February 2016, will strengthen the reformist political trend. Given
the government structure, change will be limited and piecemeal. Nonetheless, a
successful conclusion to the nuclear negotiations will open up new
possibilities in both domestic policies and foreign relations. Failure—especially
if failure occurs in the current context of heightened regional tensions—will entrench
the IRGC and regime-hardliners, risk the return to political and economic
isolation, and renew fears for the future, fears that remain close to the
surface.
Ann
M. Lesch, former Dean of Humanities and Social Sciences and former Associate
Provost for International Programs at the American University in Cairo,
escorted tours to Iran in May 2014 and April 2015. This essay reflects her personal views.