August 13, 2015
Since July 2013, Egyptian
authorities have undertaken a campaign of repression against dissidents. Over the past two years, the scope and
severity of this campaign has surpassed any that Egypt saw under Hosni Mubarak.
Most notably, security forces attacked
mostly peaceful Muslim Brotherhood protesters in Rabaa al-Adawiya Mosque and
al-Nahda Square in 2013, killing at least 817 people; initiated a campaign of
mass arrests of over 40,000 political prisoners (compared to 5,000-10,000
political prisoners near the end of Mubarak’s rule); and issued 509 mass execution sentences in 2014, an increase of 400 sentences compared to 2013. In
addition, the nature of repression shifted from a measured, calculated approach
under Mubarak to an unrestricted and systematic campaign under Abdel Fattah
el-Sisi. The authorities have killed unarmed civilians; used sexual violence against women, men, and children with greater impunity; and
conducted forced disappearances at unprecedented levels.
Although repression was
widespread during Mubarak’s tenure, it was more subtle and was used relatively
sparingly as a politically expedient tool to stabilize the regime. The Mubarak
regime was careful to maintain a liberal veneer through the National Democratic Party (NDP), which Mubarak and
his allies used to project a democratic image to domestic and international
audiences. For example, in 2005 the NDP presided over constitutional amendments
that allowed for the first multi-candidate presidential elections in the
country’s history. But further amendments in 2007, which seemed to strengthen the power of the elected
parliament, offered little substantive reform. By contrast, after more than
four years of upheaval, the Sisi regime seems far less able or willing to
curtail its repression and violent tactics. A few exceptions include President
Sisi’s June 2015 apology for
police brutality—which could be interpreted as a rare display of disunity with
the security forces—and Al-Ahram newspaper’s April 2015 report, also condemning ongoing police brutality.
The shift toward more
repression is likely a result of the change in the composition of the ruling
elite, particularly the dominance of the military over the NDP-backed business
elite that had been their partner during the Mubarak era. The regime’s
ideological base has changed from liberalization and economic progress to
political stability, containing the Muslim Brotherhood, and fighting terrorism.
Unlike the Sisi regime,
the ruling NDP had formally condemned torture, limited the use of state
violence, and sought to maintain a semblance of judicial independence. But the
Sisi regime has crossed a number of previous red lines, offending the
sensibilities of some of the urban middle classes. For example, the use of
sexual violence, although present during Mubarak’s rule, has taken new, more
severe and systematic
forms, and the rape of men in police custody has become a widespread
and an ongoing
tactic. The regime also crossed a line in killing poet Shaimaa al-Sabbagh, who
was shot while laying flowers in Tahrir square on the fourth anniversary of the
January 25 Revolution. Finally, the regime continues to detain Mahmoud Mohamed
Hussein, a 19-year-old arrested
on the third anniversary of the revolution for wearing an anti-torture t-shirt.
Some argue that Sisi’s
tactics simply reflect the reality of Egyptian politics after four years of
upheaval, but this ignores other alternatives to the current campaign of
repression. For instance, directly after the coup, the Muslim Brotherhood had
expressed the desire—whether genuine or not—to find a peaceful solution before
negotiations ended and the military moved to disperse the sit-ins. But the
military elites chose to eliminate the Brotherhood as a possible contender,
thereby allowing the officer corps to consolidate its control over the
political scene.
While the Sisi regime has
used physical repression as its primary tactic to deal with both secular
activists and Brotherhood members, as attested by the draconian sentences
against members of both groups, it has primarily used economic and political
marginalization to deal with the business elite. In the aftermath of the 2011
uprisings, business tycoons were imprisoned on corruption charges. Ahmed Ezz, a
steel tycoon and the right hand man of Gamal Mubarak, although eventually
released from prison in August 2014, was barred from
running for parliament in 2015. On the macro level, the military has asserted
its dominance by aggressively expanding its economic empire at the expense of the business elite, awarding large government contracts
to military-controlled businesses rather than the private sector. The key role
that the military played in the new Suez Canal project attests to this increased influence.
As its economic influence
grows, and with the NDP and the Muslim Brotherhood eliminated, most checks on
the army’s power have been removed. The judiciary in particular has fallen in
line with the military’s politics and no longer exhibits the independence that
it had during the Mubarak era, when reformist judges participated in opposing
the regime during the 2005
elections. Similarly, the verdicts meted out against Brotherhood members for
“insulting the court” show a high level of animosity toward the Brotherhood
within the judiciary itself. As part of this vendetta, they also infamously sentenced
fourteen peacefully protesting teenage girls to eleven years in jail—later
commuted to a one-year suspended sentence after domestic pressure.
Repression in Egypt is
likely to remain the preferred tactic of Egyptian authorities. There are signs
of this already becoming the norm. The new terrorism law approved by the
cabinet in June 2015 contains many draconian articles, including ones that criminalize news reporting that
contradicts the government’s official accounts. In addition, a proposed amendment to the judicial law could open up a legal path to carry out the
hundreds of mass execution sentences. But unlike during the Mubarak era,
repression is no longer centrally directed or easily controlled. The military might be attempting to centralize power in its
own hands, but competition persists among different security agencies to maintain their
institutional autonomy and privileges. The military’s efforts to consolidate
power in its own hands—without the use of a civilian facade like the NDP—will
subject it to greater public scrutiny and criticism, jeopardizing its long-term
stability. The military’s accumulation of wealth and contradictions within the
system can provide a powerful rallying cry against it, opening up the way for
another uprising.
This article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/08/11/repression-in-egypt-from-mubarak-to-sisi
Maged Mandour is a
political analyst and writes the “Chronicles of the Arab Revolt” column for Open Democracy. On Twitter @MagedMandour