September 05, 2015
Now that President Barack Obama has secured more
than enough votes in the U.S. Senate to assure the implementation of the
agreement with Iran on nuclear issues and sanctions, we can focus on the
lessons learned from the process’ intense political dynamics. Three in
particular stand out: U.S.-Israeli, U.S.-Saudi Arabian/Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC), and GCC-Iranian relations. U.S.-Israeli bilateral ties get the most
attention these days, but all three are equally important, and turbulent in
their own ways.
The Iran agreement heightened sensitivities all
around, and significantly increased the fears of Israel and the Arab GCC states
about Iranian capabilities and intentions. History will clarify if these fears
are justified or wildly exaggerated (I see them as exaggerated); today we can
only assess the implications of the dynamics of the past two years.
The American and Israeli media are full of
accounts of the fallout of Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s all-out
effort in the United States Congress and media to thwart the agreement’s
approval in Congress. That effort failed, and left behind considerable
irritation, and some anger, among Americans who felt Israel went too far in its
direct attempt to manipulate American foreign policy. Most damaging was
Israel’s very public campaign to turn American members of Congress against
their own president’s determination of the best interests of the United States.
I suspect the core, strong strategic and
emotional bonds between the United States and Israel will remain unchanged.
Political men and women—as is their vocation—will quickly put ill feelings
behind them as they seek allies and assets for the approaching next election.
Obama also will increase American military and technical assistance for
Israel’s security needs, as his way of showing that he disagrees with Netanyahu
but loves and is committed to the security of Israel. None of this is new, so
none of it is important, either.
What is new and important is that the Israeli
prime minister, with his considerable American allies and assorted instruments
of influencing American public opinion (like pro-Israel lobby groups and policy
institutes in Washington) lost a battle that he said related to the existence
of Israel, and lost it in a very public manner. This confirms two basic truths
that we have long known—that Israel has extraordinary influence in the U.S.
Congress, but also that the American president can defeat the pro-Israel lobby
groups when he takes his case to the American people. So none of this is new,
either.
I do see some noteworthy aspects here, though.
Some American members of Congress and other public figures felt uncomfortable,
even offended, that they were being asked to choose to support their own
president or the Israeli prime minister. The appropriate response to this is
essentially, “tough luck.” According to the rules and the law of politics in
America, all interested parties are free to lobby for their views, using votes,
money, congressional visits, fear-mongering, advertising, and public speeches.
Lobby groups for Israel or others will digest this lesson and perhaps be more
subtle in their activities in future.
More troubling, many American Jews will be
uncomfortable if they feel that because of the political actions of some fellow
Jews in Israel, they will be seen as Americans with split loyalties, which
always creates openings for vile anti-Semitic attacks, which should be thwarted
by all available means because they are a catastrophe for all concerned.
Another unclear aspect of this experience is how
pro-Israel lobby groups, including American Christians, might adjust their
behavior in the United States following this defeat. Some of this may be
clarified in the behavior of such groups towards American members of Congress
who supported the Iran deal. Will these groups—as some of them have done in the
past—try to defeat vulnerable incumbent congressmen or women, by supporting
pro-Israel candidates? This, too, would be totally normal and legal in the
world of American politics and public life; so anyone who dislikes this process
is best advised to learn how to play the game and get in the ring—with the
confirmation that American special interests groups that support Israel are not
all-powerful, and can be defeated in a public battle.
The two other important dimensions of the Iran
agreement—Arab GCC relations with the U.S. and Iran—are more complex, and
conducted almost totally behind closed doors. So perhaps one lesson here is
that Saudi Arabia and the Arab Gulf states, who find their wellbeing more
closely tied to the interests and policies of both the United States and Iran,
should come out of the shadows and start to master the mechanics of public
politics and diplomacy around the world.
Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly in
the Daily Star. He was
founding director and now senior policy fellow of the Issam Fares Institute for
Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut. On
Twitter @ramikhouri.
Copyright
©2015 Rami G. Khouri -- distributed by Agence Global