November 21, 2013
Yemen
remains the only country to have gone through the Arab Uprisings with neither a
descent into civil war nor an abrupt course reversal. The good news is that
Yemenis from all factions and regions are still talking; the bad news is that a
couple of large bumps on the road need to be dealt with before the political
dialogue reaches fruition.
A violent
regime crackdown on protesters and clashes between supporters and opponents of
President Ali Abdullah Saleh defined the beginning of the uprising, from
January 2011 through the handover of power to Abed Rabbu Mansour Hadi on to the
February 27, 2012. But it stopped short of an all out conflagration. The new,
interim president and cabinet have, under UN guidance, moved along a fairly
civil national dialogue (ND). Though not yet fully successful, the negotiations
have already tackled some of the thorniest issues in the country. The National
Dialogue process is nearing completion, and the UN Security Council is seized
with the issue.
The good
news is on several fronts. A group of donor countries, known as the Friends of
Yemen (the Gulf Cooperation Council, plus EU, the UN and the U.S.), just
concluded a meeting in New York, with a reaffirmation of pledges of assistance
and renewed vigilance over the transition process in what is arguably the
poorest and least developed of the Arab countries. Eight billion dollars have
been pledged by the Friends of Yemen, and an executive bureau has, at least in
principle, been established to oversee and coordinate how the assistance is
disbursed. Closer to home, the U.S. government has seriously upped its civilian
assistance and promised to support the ND process politically and financially.
So what is the catch?
The
National Dialogue, expertly and patiently chaperoned by the UN special envoy,
Jamal Benomar, was supposed to produce a new constitution for Yemen, to be followed
by a referendum and elections. The process has now gone into overtime,
ostensibly to allow the drafters time to refine the finished product. In
reality, the time is needed to iron out serious differences that remain between
northern and southern delegates to the ND. Secessionist sentiment in the south
remains strong and even the moderates among them are only willing to accept a
federated union if the south remains unified as a large component of the whole,
with an option to secede at a future date should a plebiscite indicate that
that remains the strong wish of the people of the south. The north and south of
Yemen have already fought a civil war in 1994 over this question, with the
north prevailing in that conflict. The secessionist sentiment has not
disappeared but rather simmered on a slow burner, flaring up again during the
uprising in 2011. North of Sanaa, the Zaidi Houthis, who have accepted to stay
in the union, are facing an amalgam of Salafi Islamists, including odd
bedfellows from the mainstream Islah party and Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula. These regional issues are the main obstacles facing the National
Dialogue, and are far more serious than a mere refinement of the language of
the final document.
The U.S.
government has supported the GCC transition plan for Yemen, which eased out
president Saleh and ushered in the current transitional process. U.S. diplomacy
complimented Benomar’s efforts and, in consultation with Saudi Arabia,
encouraged the main parties in Yemen to participate in the ND. The U.S. also
supported the ND process with 10 million dollars and has pledged to help fund
the needed institution building to follow.
A U.S.
2012 aid package amounted to $356 million, of which roughly a 100 million went
to humanitarian, civil society and democracy building programs. This is many
times what USAID’s budget was for the years 2004-2008, and reflects a
realization in Washington of the importance of a peaceful transition in Yeme.
The U.S. is beginning to recognize that long-term security comes from democracy
and stability.
All that
constitutes a step in the right direction. The main challenges, however, remain
the same: keeping the country together and keeping the deteriorating security
situation from scuttling the good efforts of the UN and the Friends of Yemen.
U.S.
Policy in Yemen, despite the praiseworthy increased emphasis on the civilian
side of assistance, continues, nonetheless, to suffer from ambivalence,
uncertainty and conflicting goals. On the diplomatic front, the U.S. is not heavily
invested in the mediation efforts between north and south and not at all
involved in helping to end the fighting in the north. Further, the short term
security strategy against Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, relies heavily on
drone strikes. This risks further inflaming an already delicate security
atmosphere in the country and turning the entire population of Yemen against
the U.S.
UN
special envoy Benomar needs all the assistance he can get from Western
governments to help keep north and south Yemen together and to end the violent
clashes between Salafis and Zaidis in the north. But U.S. diplomacy has, thus
far, shied away from engaging southern leaders, both on the ground in Aden and
outside Yemen. The fighting in the north involves a complex set of internal and
regional alliances, requiring very delicate negotiating. Short of dedicating a
full time envoy from Washington, the U.S. may not be able to conduct such
negotiations directly. It could, however, encourage regional players who enjoy
closer relations with the fighting parties to do the heavy lifting. In the end,
the U.S. national interest, and Yemen’s, would be better served with more
skillful diplomacy and far less firepower.
Nabeel Khoury is Senior Fellow for
Middle East and National Security at the Chicago Council on Global Affairs. He
previously served as Deputy Chief of Mission in Yemen (2004-2007), Deputy
Director of the Media Outreach Centre in London (2002-2004), and Consul General
in Morocco (1998-2002). In 2003, during the Iraq war, he served as Department
spokesperson at U.S. Central Command in Doha and in Baghdad.