October 22, 2013
There is
a tradition that states that the Prophet Muhammad, (PBUH), once gestured
towards his Persian companion Salman and said:
"لو كان الإيمان عند الثريا لناله رجال من اهل فارس"
“Even if
faith were near the Pleiades, men from among the Persians would attain it.”
This
tradition points to a few fundamental truths about Persian history and
identity. In the ancient world, the Pleiades constellation represented the
universe’s beauty and mystery, and its distance in the sky was a reminder of
the vastness of creation. In invoking the Pleiades, the Prophet (PBUH) was
testifying to the power of the Persian’s faith—that there was no obstacle large
or far enough to prevent the Persians from attainment of true knowledge.
We can
also read this tradition as a testament to the Persian tradition of scientific
and cultural achievement—that if anyone were able to grasp at the Pleiades, it
would of course be the Persians. In the Prophet Muhammad’s time, Persia was a
fading imperial power, holding on to the glories of its civilization as it
prepared to embrace a new era. Even today, Iran is caught between pride in its
ancient and complicated history and the ambitions of its religious regime.
In the
pre-Islamic world, the Persian Sasanian Empire, the Persian Sasanian Empire,
founded in 224 BC and extending from Turkey and Egypt to the Indian
subcontinent, was a cultural and political force rivaling that of ancient
China, India, Greece, or Rome. The Sasanians were envied by the Romans for
their advanced military technology, Sasanian artists and musicians were
welcomed by the royal courts of imperial capitals and the Sasanian government
was widely praised for its humane and effective style of rule. The Persians of
the ancient world could even lay claim to one of the world’s monotheistic
religions: Zoroastrianism, a faith based on the teachings of Zoroaster, who
lived over 3,000 years ago.
By the
seventh century A.D. the golden age of the Sasanians had long since passed
away. When Muslim Arabs arrived shortly after the death of the Prophet (PBUH),
Persians came to accept Islam and adjust to life under Arab rule. The Persian
language adopted its own version of the Arabic script and borrowed heavily from
Arabic vocabulary. Ancient fire temples were converted into arched mosques with
beautiful, serene courtyards. The Persians of greater Iran adopted the
political ideals represented by the Islamic caliphate and became participants
in another Golden Age, one with far more geographic breadth and cultural
diversity than the Persian kingdoms of ancient times.
During
the medieval flowering of Islamic civilization, Persian people and Persian
culture helped raise the Islamic World to greater heights of scientific and
artistic power. As Europe struggled in its Dark Ages, Persia produced some of
the Islamic world’s most famous scientists, mathematicians, theologians, and
poets. Al-Ghazali, the theologian, scholar and mystic often referred to as one
of the most important Muslims after the Prophet Muhammad (PBUH), was from a
city near Mashhad in present-day Iran. The legendary polymath Avicenna (or Ibn
Sina) the greatest scientist and medical scholar of his age, the author of over
400 texts and a master of the Greco-Roman and Indian scholarly traditions, made
time to compose poetry in his native Persian. Hafez Shirazi is still one of the
world’s most famous and influential poets, and Persian poetry left an indelible
stamp on South Asian literature and art. Omar Khayyam is well known not only
for his quatrains but also for his astronomical and mathematical genius.
Al-Khawarismi gave us algebra and introduced the zero into mathematics.
In the
later Middle Ages, newer Islamic dynasties like the Mughals, the Timurids and
the Ottomans took their cue from Iranian art and literature to cultivate their
own civilizations. The flowing Nastaliq script of written Persian, known
for its beautiful long and sloping letters, was adopted by the Urdu language
and revered by Ottoman artists, who used it as an inspiration for their own
styles of calligraphy. Persian architecture set a new standard for physical
beauty in houses of worship in the Islamic world.
But even
in the Islamic Golden Age, Persians held some nostalgia for the purity and
power of their culture and history. The poet Ferdowsi’s Shahnameh, or Book
of Kings, an epic of Persian legends and history from the dawn of time
until Islam, was written around the year 1000 AD and Ferdowsi was careful to
avoid Arabic influence on his vocabulary—he wanted a Persian epic to be
represented in undiluted Persian prose.
With the
rise of the Safavid dynasty in the sixteenth century, Persia experienced
another great shift. The Safavids installed Twelver Shia Islam in their
kingdom, and Persia became a majority Shiite country as well as a locus of
Shiite religious scholarship. The ancient city of Qom was Safavid Persia’s
crowning intellectual jewel, a site of religious pilgrimage, which became the
largest center for Shi’a Islamic scholarship in the world. Under Safavid rule,
Persia grew in religious prestige as its reputation as a center of aesthetic
innovation declined.
By the
1800s, Persian artistic and intellectual elites no longer delighted in the
poetry of the Shahnameh or studied the mysticism of Al-Ghazali but
instead sent their sons to French finishing schools or took long vacations to
European museums and salons. Iran’s 1905 Constitutional Revolution laid bare
the corruption of the crumbling Qajar dynasty: in the early twentieth century,
Persia was vulnerable to Soviet expansion and colonial European influence,
caught between larger powers. Reza Shah Pahlavi, who came to power in the
aftermath of a 1921 coup, was able to rescue Iranian pride of place from a
geopolitical morass. His modernization programs—Western-style university
education, better health care, the development of railways and
infrastructure—helped the nation to join the developed nations of its era as a
peer. The Shah was aware of his peoples’ need to feel pride in a uniquely
Persian heritage, and he capitalized on that need to bolster support for his
regime. It was Reza Pahlavi who insisted that foreign nations refer to Persia
by its ancient name of Iran. In doing so, the Shah was intentionally evoking
thousands of years of Aryan lineage and framing the modern Iranian state around
its ancient ethnic identity. The Shah’s son went by the honorific Aryamehr,
or “light of the Aryans”; while the name might sound antique, it was an
innovation meant to remind Iranians of their roots, to restore the dignity of
the concept of a specifically Iranian, rather than Islamic, government.
The
Shah’s regime represented a step forward for Iran in many ways, but at the same
time, Pahlavi’s secular and authoritarian rule alienated the country’s more
religious current. In 1971, the Pahlavi government spent vast amounts of time
and money to celebrate the 2,500th anniversary of the Persian Empire founded by
Cyrus the Great. It was a lavish affair, with food catered from Paris and giant
tents equipped with the latest technology. The event was broadcast on
international television. As the Shah paraded his wealth and lineage in front
of the world, some Iranians grew angry: the religious right called the
celebration “The Devil’s Festival,” Shiite clergy and the religious faithful
were marginalized by the Shah’s secular regime, while many leftists in Iran
protested the methods of the Shah’s secret police and what they saw as the
increasingly repressive tone of political discourse. The Islamic Revolution of
1979, which installed the powerful yet polarizing Khomeini as Supreme Leader,
was a new and different articulation of Iranian identity.
Khomeini’s
claim to rule was based on his interpretation of the concept of “the
guardianship of the jurists,” a Shiite doctrine articulated in the late
nineteenth century which gave varying degrees of civil authority to religious
scholars trained in Shiite Islamic law. Khomeini drastically expanded popular
understanding of the doctrine enforcing his own interpretation of
“guardianship,” giving himself, as the country’s premier religious leader,
unchecked authority over Iran’s political affairs.
When the
Islamic Revolution of Iran replaced the Shah’s elegant but fallen regime, some
Iranians rejoiced at the prospect of Iran’s resurgence as an Islamic power.
Others dreaded a move that they felt would divorce Iran from the rest of the
world. Iran’s Islamic Revolution was a worldwide media sensation: in 1979,
Ruhollah Khomeini became not only the leader of a nation but Time
magazine’s “Man of the Year” and the singular face of Islamic rule worldwide.
While Khomeini’s “guardianship” did not extend politically beyond Iran’s
borders, his words and actions sent a message of an ambitious and wide-reaching
claim to Islamic leadership; a new caliphate, but with Shia practice.
Khomeini
combined the Persian imperial ambition of the Shah with the more recent Shi’ite
authority of his intellectual ancestors in Qom. This was an Iranian empire like
no one had ever seen: insular, combative, and eschewing cultural exchange in
favor of a claim to universal truth. It took on a pugilist’s stance, not an
embracing one. Many Muslims around the world were dismayed by Khomeini’s sudden
claim to speak for them and what seemed like callous disregard for other
Islamic traditions and ways of life. Muslims who followed theological
traditions very different from the Twelvers’ and lived in countries with rulers
who were nothing like Khomeini were disturbed to have their religion so closely
linked with Khomeini’s image, and to witness Khomeini embrace the role as the
Supreme Leader not just of Iranians but of the entire Islamic world.
In 1980,
and after miscalculating the extent of the political struggle that followed
Khomeini’s return to Tehran, Saddam Hussein launched his abortive attempt to
topple Khomeini. For two years and until Saddam’s troops were pushed back into
Iraq, none of the Arab Gulf States supported him. Unfortunately, Khomeini vowed
revenge and launched a counterattack on Iraq. He also miscalculated and the
Iraqi people, Sunni and Shia alike, united in opposing Khomeini’s aggression. Only
then did the Arab Gulf states come to the aid of Iraq.
Khomeini’s
intention may have been to unite Muslims under a single banner, but, like
Saddam, the aftermath of his actions 30 years later have only served to further
divide the Muslim world.
Today,
the lofty beauty of the Pleiades can seem very far indeed from the reality of
daily life in Iran. The country is marked not by worldliness or even by
religion but by isolation; in contrast to the travelling artists of the
Sasanians and the multilingual scholars of the Islamic Golden Age, many famous
and well-respected Iranian artists today have trouble even getting on a plane
to another country. Khomeini’s imperial ambitions have restored Iran’s Islamic
identity, but they have also doomed the country to a cramped and narrow
existence. Interaction between Iran and its Muslim neighbors is limited and
often hostile. In the aftermath of Khomeini’s death, Iran’s leaders have chosen
to expand its nuclear program, a move that has further damaged Iran’s relationships
with the international community. The sanctions arising from Iranian leaders’
decisions have severely strained the country’s economic and political
opportunities and forced its citizens to close themselves off from much of the
outside world. And yet clerical authorities in Iran still tend to act as if
they lead the Islamic World; issuing ultimatums, intimidating their neighbors,
and inciting dissidence and revolution.
Iran has
the right to use nuclear power for peaceful purposes, but brinksmanship policies
and the construction of secret facilities do nothing to serve the country’s
best interests; nor do these policies allay the world’s suspicions. All member
countries of the United Nations, not just the West, are bound by the Security
Council’s sanctions on Iran. If Iran’s leaders seek equitable treatment on this
issue, they must come clean about its nuclear program. The best way to move
forward fairly on this issue is for Iran’s leaders to follow the policy set
down by the Shah in 1974. The establishment of a Weapons of Mass Destruction
free zone in the Middle East will ensure a level playing ground for all nations
in the region. Iran’s leaders claim to support the zone. That support should
not be by lip service only.
Iranians
can be proud of their history and heritage. Arabs have the greatest respect for
the faith and culture of Iranians, as well as the indelible Persian
contribution to the marvels of Islamic society. But like all worthwhile
achievements, Persia’s greatest masterpieces were the product of cooperation
and education, of learning from and with people of other backgrounds. Just as
Arabs, Africans, Europeans and Asians continue to be enriched by Persian
knowledge and culture, Iran has been greatly enriched by its Arab, Asian, and
European partners. Pushing away these interlocutors, dividing Muslims with
bombastic claims to religious leadership, threatening their neighbors with
false claims to Bahrain, and refusing all rational solutions to the dispute
over the Emirati islands, will not restore the former glory of Iran; it will do
just the opposite. Khameni’s meddling in Iraq is the cause of the daily
killings and suffering that the Iraqi people are enduring. The situation in
Syria, in which the Iranian government has chosen to support the butcher Al-Assad,
is a case in point. Ruhollah Khomeini was famous for his claim as the champion
of the “mustazafin.” Today, Khomeini’s successors have chosen to support the
oppressor, not the oppressed.
Khomeini
wore the black turban that signified his pride in his long and noble Arab
lineage. Khamenei, Khatami, and even Nasrallah wear it also. But the Iranian
leadership’s meddling in Arab countries is backfiring. Arabs will not be forced
to wear a political suit tailored in Washington, London, or Paris. They also
reject even the fanciest garb cut by the most skillful tailor in Tehran.
The
Iranian leadership has the opportunity to share so much of Iran’s heritage and
wisdom with other Muslims. But if they wish to gain the respect of other
countries, they must first show respect to the traditions, heritage, and
political identity of their peers. The election of Hassan Rowhani, who does not
claim Arab lineage, may be an opportunity for Iran to trim its sails and steer
a new course in the turbulent waters of the Middle East; or it may not. After
all, Rafsanjani and Khatami came to office with progressive ambitions only to
be stymied by Khamenei. The 2009 election upheaval was a sign that things are
not as usual; nor is the tranquility of the 2013 election. Rowhani will have to
deliver before others take him seriously. King Abdullah welcomed Rowhani’s
election and wished him well, the King also invited the new President to
perform Hajj this year, which unfortunately, he has declined to accept. Saudi
Arabia favors engagement with Iran, and President Obama’s overture to Rowhani
will hopefully lead to Iran’s return to the International community as a
contributor to peace and stability. Rowhani’s sensible discourse is in distinct
contrast to Ahmedinejad’s bluster and bombast. With the world community opening
its arms to embrace Rowhani, his major obstacle lies in the forces of darkness
in Qum and Tehran. He has to shed Khomeini’s interventionist legacy and, like
his own discourse, adopt sensible policies.
In the
holy month of Ramadan, last year, and with the Holy Kaaba in sight at the Mecca
Islamic Summit, King Abdullah, with the support of all Muslim countries,
including Iran, launched the formation of the Center for Dialogue Among Islamic
Schools of Thought, in Riyadh. That is where Iran’s contribution can make a
difference in establishing its credibility with its Muslim peers.
The
Islamic conversation is richer with the Iranian voice in it—but theirs cannot
be the only voice we hear.
Prince
Turki Al-Faisal, a former Saudi ambassador to the United States and to the
United Kingdom, is chairman of the King Faisal Center for Research and Islamic
Studies. This
essay is adapted from Prince Turki Al-Faisal’s remarks
to the National Iranian American Council in Washington, DC, on October 16,
2013.