August 15, 2015
On July 14, the Badr
Organization held a funeral procession in Baghdad for several of its leaders
who had died fighting the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in Anbar,
including Abu Muntadhar Al-Muhammadawi, Badr’s national operations chief; Abu Habib
Al-Sakini, commander of Badr’s Fourth Brigade; and Abu Sarhan Al-Sabihawi, head
of the Fourth Brigade’s operations. The procession was similar to that which a
general in the Iraqi army might receive, and alongside
Badr leader Hadi Al-Ameri marched key figures of Iraq’s Shia political establishment—Vice
President Nouri Al-Maliki, Deputy Prime Minister Bahaa Al-Araji (the Sadrist
Movement’s highest-ranking official), Islamic Supreme Council of Iraqi (ISCI)
leader Ammar Al-Hakim, Abu Mahdi Al-Muhandis (a long-time Iranian asset who
oversees the part of Iran-backed militias in the war effort), and National
Security Advisor Faleh Al-Fayyad, among others. During the procession Badrists
carried the Iraqi flag and their own militia’s flag, a yellow-and-green design
of a rifle overlaying a picture of Iraq, reminiscent Lebanese Hezbollah’s.
Badr—founded in the 1980s
in Iran, its continued supporter—is not only the most important of the various
armed groups composing the Popular Mobilization Forces (Hashd). It also
symbolizes how Iraqis’ hopes for a democratic country governed by the rule of
law have given way to a political system that is expressly sectarian and
increasingly resembles a garrison state. No other militia-political party was
better prepared to capitalize on the collapse of Iraqi security forces in
northern Iraq last June. Badr’s military commander, Ameri—who tried and failed
to get an appointment as minister of defense or interior, in part due to U.S.
opposition—has been transportation minister since Maliki’s second cabinet and
is now a parliamentarian. Under the new government of Haider Al-Abadi, Ameri
was able to get a member of his party, Mohammed Salem Al-Ghabban, confirmed as
interior minister. Prior to leaving office, Maliki had made Ameri the military
governor of Diyala—an informal appointment usually described euphemistically as
al-masuul al-amani (the security official)—which he remains to this
day.
Ameri, now on leave from
parliament, has captured far more renown in his militia commander role than he
ever did as a cabinet minister. In October 2014, Ameri was often described as
the “leader” of the militia-led offensive to subdue Jurf Al-Sakhr, a mostly
Sunni area south of Baghdad, and consolidate Shia control around the capital.
By February 2015 Badr had secured Diyala, whose narrow Sunni Arab majority is
nestled between Baghdad and Iran. Badr and other militias sustained criticism
that they were engaging in retribution attacks and attempting to cleanse the
Sunni population from these areas. But the ministry of human rights—also held
by a Badrist, Mohammed Mahdi al-Bayati—sent a senior official to speak at Badr’s February 16 celebration of their victory in
Diyala and defend the conduct of the Badr-led Hashd.
Ameri’s military
preeminence continued in March with the launch of the operation to liberate
Tikrit and northern Salahuddin. Iran, through Badr, initially played more of a
role in the offensive than Iraqi leaders did, and photos of the infamous Quds
Force commander Qassem Soleimani sometimes appeared alongside Ameri himself,
dominating media coverage. Yet the militia-led offensive was forced to step
back from Tikrit to let the U.S.-led international coalition conduct airstrikes
against dug-in jihadis, allowing the formal security services—army and federal
police—to lead the liberation of the city. Although Prime Minister Abadi
initially held back the militias in Anbar out of fear of sectarian conflict, he
gave way after the security forces defending the provincial capital of Ramadi collapsed
on May 17. Ameri promptly took the lead as “field commander” of the new Anbar
offensive, only to decide in early June—apparently entirely on his own—to shift
focus to Fallujah, which lies between Ramadi and Baghdad.
Badr is also the only
militia-political party that dominates a specific province (Diyala), a fact
that cements its role in the country. Badr’s grip on the province entered a new
stage after Muthanna Al-Tamimi, a Badrist who had been chairman of the
provincial council, was elected as governor of Diyala on May 26. This is
controversial because Diyala is, or at least has been, a majority Sunni Arab
province. Using the 2009 provincial elections, in which all demographic groups
participated strongly, as a proxy for a census, Diyala was over half Sunni Arab
and roughly one-third Shia, with Kurds making up most of the remainder. The
2013 provincial elections resulted in a twenty-nine-seat council with fourteen
Sunni Arabs, twelve Shia, and three Kurds. The Kurds’ alliance with the main
Sunni coalition allowed the election of a Sunni Arab as governor in 2013, but
the war has since driven the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK), the dominant
Kurdish party in northern Diyala, closer to Iran. Tamimi’s election was the
fruit of this renewed Shia-Kurd alliance.
Governor Tamimi gave an interview on Al-Sumaria on July 23 that provided a revealing look
at Badr’s military hold on the province. Tamimi naturally denied accusations
that Badr has engaged in the systematic cleaning, kidnapping, or killing of
Sunnis, but he seemed proud that he took direction from Ameri and that “Badr
brigades in particular,” not just the Hashd, maintained security in Diyala.
Many displaced Sunnis have been prevented from returning to Diyala, and the
Shia parties may win about half of the council when provincial elections are
again held in 2017—with the Kurds, they should be able to shut Sunni Arabs out
of power permanently.
Because the role of Shia
militia parties in the current war could impact the future electoral balance of
power, the July 17 terrorist attack against Shia in Diyala’s town of Khan Bani
Saad has become a matter of national attention. The attack, which killed over
200, put Badr in an awkward position: Badr is known to be responsible for the
province’s security, and if it cannot protect Shia residents, then Badr’s role
is called into question. Ameri quickly made a video statement expressing outrage at the attack, insisting that in “retaliation,” those behind it
must be detained and executed at the site of the attack. Ameri also used the
moment to criticize the government, claiming that foreign governments had already
condemned the attack but Iraq’s had not. The attack also coincided with Sunni claims of
kidnappings by militias, which given Badr’s control would at least indirectly
implicate it. Governor Tamimi appeared on the Sunni-oriented Al-Sharqiya
to address the issue and dismiss the allegations, saying flatly, “There are no abductions in the province.”
Ameri’s focus on
criticizing the Iraqi government—of which he is a part, but which in context
clearly referred to the part of it Abadi controls—points to how Badr’s
credibility is at stake. Beyond the impact of this on strategic military goals
of dominating Diyala and Samarra in southern Salahuddin, the respective
standing of the Shia factions will determine the country’s balance of power
when national elections are held again in 2018. Because of the war in Anbar,
the 2014 parliament is more sectarian and more Shia Islamist than the 2010
parliament. Badr won twenty-two seats (out of 328 total and 183 reserved for
Shia blocs), and Ameri’s star has risen dramatically since then. Although continued
militia failures combined with increased efficiency among other parts of the
government could change things, right now new elections would see a militia
party surge, with Hadi al-Ameri as kingmaker.
In response to a question
about whether Ameri could be prime minister, Governor Tamimi, having praised
Ameri effusively throughout his hour-long interview
with Al-Sumaria, said, “No office is higher than Sheikh al-Mujahid…
including prime minister.” And so Iraq’s future may follow the Lebanon model,
with Ameri heading the informal Shia militia state and someone friendly to Badr
in the prime minister’s office.
This article is reprinted with permission from
Sada. It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/08/13/badr-at-forefront-of-iraq-s-shia-militias
Kirk H. Sowell is a
political risk analyst and the publisher of the biweekly newsletter Inside
Iraqi Politics. On Twitter: @uticensisrisk.