April 30, 2013
The traditionally agricultural nature of
Egypt's economy and the attachment to the land that it had fostered in Egyptian
culture entrenched the idea, in the Egyptian as well as regional psyche, that
Egyptians hardly ever emigrate, that the country can always draw on its immense
pool of talent.
But in the last half-century, two very
significant waves of emigration out of Egypt took place. The first, in the
period from the early 1950s to the mid-1960s—the heydays of the country’s first
republic—was led by Egypt’s top industrialists and financiers, the bulk of the
country's Jewish community, and a significant percentage of the upper crust of
Egyptian Christians. These groups were not mutually exclusive; and in their intermeshed
fabric, represented some of the most powerful and conspicuous driving forces in
the Egyptian economy. Their exodus from Egypt in that period was a direct
result of the socialist policies that President Gamal Abdel Nasser had affected
in the early 1960s. Also many of them, correctly, expected the Nasserite
variant of Arab nationalism to get entangled in a severe confrontation with the
West, one that they shrewdly envisioned would close many economic opportunities
for them as well as threaten existing interests. This wave of emigration cost
Egypt some of its brightest, most entrepreneurial, and best internationally
connected capitalists.
The second wave was exactly the opposite.
The 1970s’ oil boom and the dramatic riches it endowed the Gulf with gave rise
to an unprecedented demand (in the Arab world) for developing—and in some cases
building from scratch—the services infrastructure of that region. Between the
mid 1970s and the late 1980s, the Gulf, and mainly Saudi Arabia and Kuwait,
absorbed over four million Egyptians in sectors such as education, public
administration, health services, accounting, and low-end banking. The vast
majority of those who opted to immigrate to the Gulf in that period belonged to
the lower segments of the middle class, ones whose socioeconomic circumstances
had not allowed them a great exposure to the richness, openness, and tolerance
of Egypt’s liberal age from the mid-nineteenth to mid-twentieth century.
This wave of emigration coincided with a
severe retraction in Egyptian competitiveness across several industries as well
as a series of large fiscal deficits that later compelled President Mubarak to accept
a difficult financial and budgetary reform program. The reform measures and the
weakening competitiveness diluted the economic power of segments that had
traditionally formed the backbone of the country's middle class, at a time when
the purchasing power of the Egyptians in the Gulf was increasing considerably. Medium
level salaries in Kuwaiti Dinars or Saudi Riyals resulted in relatively large
spending power in Egyptian pounds back at home.
Slowly but decisively, the structure of the
Egyptian middle class was being transformed, with an accompanying change in
social norms: rising religiosity, more conservativeness, and a shift in
cultural orientation from Europe and the Mediterranean to the Gulf. These new
values were increasingly conspicuous in Egypt’s cultural production (cinema, TV
series, and theatre—the country’s main expressions of soft power in the Arab
world) in the 1980s and early 1990s.This second wave of emigration had arguably
enriched the country economically (especially in terms of job creation and
linking Egypt to one of the most dramatic experiences of wealth accumulation—the
Gulf), but its social consequences continue to shape Egyptian politics to this
day.
Egypt’s 2011 uprising has triggered a third
emigration wave, which could have perilous social and economic outcomes.
Credible numbers are difficult to come by, but according to the testimonies of several
Egyptian community leaders in the Gulf and Western Europe, there is an
exponential increase in the interest and numbers of Egyptians moving out of the
country over the last year and half, seeking to settle in these societies. But
unlike in the previous two waves of emigration of the past half century, this
one cuts across the board. Leading business people with considerable experience
and assets in the country have been quietly restructuring their economic
interests with the objective of moving to places such as Dubai and London.
Thousands of young successful professionals
in the fields of finance, engineering, telecoms, informatics, and health
services (including many promising doctors) are applying to highly skilled
migrant worker schemes in Europe, the U.S., and Australia. And there is
considerable concern within wide segments of Egyptian Christians regarding,
what they see as, the ascent of socio-political Islam and its implications on
Egypt’s social milieu and their personal freedoms. Stabilisation in Libya would
re-open this country’s labour market to Egyptians, especially low-income
workers. That this wave of emigration spans different and economically-active
segments is a grave danger to the availability of talent in Egypt as well as to
the overall competitiveness of the economy.
Socially, the more internationally well-connected
young Egyptians opt out of their country, the poorer the overall society—and
almost certainly, the less open-minded and tolerant it will become. This will
have direct implications on Egyptian politics, but crucially it will gradually
strengthen the social polarisation Egypt has been witnessing in the last few
years. Social disconnect will emerge, not just between the political elite and
the rest, but among different social segments. Not only political religiosity
and liberalism will clash. More importantly, communities will become less dynamic,
and we could start seeing social divergence—in terms of values, ways of living,
and even the ‘feel’—of different places in the country’s major urban centres
such as Cairo and Alexandria.
The most important social development in
Egypt in the past three decades has been the almost doubling of the population
from roughly 45 million in the mid 1970s to circa 90 million in the second
decade of the twenty first century. This development continues to have
transformative impacts on Egyptian politics, economics, and culture. If this is
coupled with the emigration of the best of that generation, the Egyptian
society would lose a lot of its potential.
Tarek
Osman is the author of Egypt on the Brink: From Nasser to Mubarak. He has published
articles on Egypt and the Middle East in leading international newspapers.