November 11, 2014
Over
the summer, diplomatic activity at the highest levels resumed between Saudi
Arabia and Qatar, which may very well end the two countries’ historic row and
the worst intra-GCC dispute since the founding of the council. The fallout
between Qatar and several GCC states, particularly Saudi Arabia, has limited
the council’s ability to coordinate a concerted response to growing security
threats in the region. Should reconciliation efforts succeed, it will
facilitate greater cooperation on a range of security initiatives in the
region.
Qatar
and Saudi Arabia have mistrusted each other in the past, originally stemming
from the latter’s territorial claims during Qatar’s pre-independence period.
Although the border issue was settled in March 2001, sporadic
disagreements over the past decade have continued to overshadow their
“brotherly” relations. Yet at the height of revolutionary zeal in the Arab
world, a new GCC security agreement was penned in November 2012. Although
an end to the rift was sought, reconciliation attempts were cut short by the
Arab uprisings and what they revealed about the two countries’ diverging
foreign policy agendas.
Qatar’s
backing of the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) in Egypt and elsewhere, amid a clampdown on the group in the GCC, was a red
line for Saudi Arabia. A mini summit, mediated by the Kuwaiti Emir Sheikh Sabah
al-Ahmed, was held last November in which Qatar committed to changing course
and revising its foreign policy. The move temporarily assuaged Saudi concerns.
Yet the tipping point finally arrived in March 2014 when Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
and the UAE withdrew their ambassadors from Qatar. In a joint statement, Qatar’s continued support of the MB
was deemed destabilizing, as it allegedly contradicted a commitment to “not
support any party aiming to threaten security and stability of any GCC member.”
The unprecedented move against Qatar forced the country to the negotiating
table, and a road map to ending the row was reached in
April.
Since
then, irregular yet frequent high-level visits have taken place between the two
nations, including the Qatari Emir’s visit to Saudi Arabia on July 22, a visit by Saudi Minister of the National
Guard to Doha on August 5, and a meeting between the Saudi Foreign Minister
Prince Saud al-Faisal and the Qatari Emir on August 27 in Doha. A breakthrough
seemed to come during a meeting between the GCC’s foreign ministers in late
August, where Kuwaiti foreign minister Sheikh Sabah Al-Khalid Al Sabah explained April’s
opaque Riyadh Agreement as an establishment of “principles and criteria” to
overcome obstacles. Although these “criteria” have not been made public, the
overall terms are widely understood as Qatari curtailment of their support to
the MB.
It is
therefore no coincidence that no more than one month later, leading MB figures
being sheltered in Qatar were asked to leave the country. As one member of the
group said, the request was honored “to avoid causing any
embarrassment for the State of Qatar.” Though the extent to which Qatar has cut
back its support for the MB is yet to be seen, it must now tread a more careful
path. Significantly, on October 13, Qatari Emir Sheikh Tamim bin Hamad Al Thanimet with Saudi King Abdullah bin
Abdul-Aziz in Riyadh to propose a formal end to the rift between the two
states. If that is the case, the near future could witness increased
cooperation between the two and a smoother implementation of the GCC security
agreement of 2012.
All of
this bodes well for ensuring a coordinated GCC security response to growing
threats in the region. Already, Qatar was one of ten Arab states that met in
Riyadh last September and pledged to join the fight against the Islamic
State of Iraq and al-Sham. The coalition, including all six GCC states,
involves efforts to curb funds and fighters being funneled to the outlawed
group. In the same vein, a Saudi-backed initiative to train “moderate” Syrian rebels
suggests further room for immediate cooperation opportunities, all of which
would be more effective with a more united GCC.
Nevertheless,
and despite mounting tensions between Saudi Arabia and Qatar in recent years,
the GCC’s approach to solving the rift highlights the Council’s continued
ability to influence individual member states. The recent episode is a reminder
of this ability, despite Qatar’s rise in international prominence over the past
decade through its diplomatic moves and considerable financial means. The case
is also revealing in another manner: despite Qatari attempts to move out of the
Saudi orbit, there are limits to how far it can pursue an independent foreign
policy at the expense of the majority members states’ interests—Saudi Arabia in
particular.
This article is reprinted with permission from
Sada. It can be accessed online at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/10/31/brotherly-love-in-gcc/ht8t
Suliman Al-Atiqi is a PhD candidate at St Antony’s
College, University of Oxford, and a former analyst for the UNDP. He is a
regular contributor to Sada.