December 08, 2014
After
a long wait, Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis (ABM)—a group active in northern Sinai—has
moved from the stage of sympathizing
with the Islamic State (IS) to being a part of the international organization.
It has sworn allegiance to IS and changed its name to Wilayat Sinai. This is
but one reflection of the growing radicalization among Egyptians, particularly
Islamist youth.
The
formal announcement of the pledge of allegiance was delayed—after ABM’s
preacher prayed for IS
during this year’s Eid Al-Fitr prayers—because the group held a consultation
between all jihadi factions in Sinai. While some of them objected to the
pledge, given that they had already sworn allegiance to Al-Qaeda leader Ayman Al-Zawahiri,
in the end they agreed to support IS leader Abu Bakr Al-Baghdadi, according to
sources close to the group.
This
announcement of allegiance has intensified ABM’s confrontation with the
Egyptian government and reflects the use of more aggressive methods to counter
its crackdown in Sinai. ABM released subsequent statements saying it
considers any individual in the army to be a target. These remarks coincide
with an escalation
in the year-and-a-half campaign waged by the Egyptian state to confront
militants in northern Sinai, particularly following the October 24 attack on
the Karm Al-Qawadis
checkpoint in Sheikh Zuweid, during which 28 Egyptian soldiers were
killed in the bloodiest attack since the ouster of President Mohamed Morsi in
July 2013. The state has evicted residents of Rafah and established a buffer zone
on the border with Gaza. A three-month state of emergency has been imposed in the
area and a curfew put in place from 5 p.m. to 7 a.m.
Despite
these intensified security measures and the ongoing military campaign, jihadi
attacks continue. The Egyptian army’s popularity is declining daily in Sinai,
which has aided the group’s support and helped it attract recruits amid an
increasing number of civilian deaths. In a recent incident in Rafah, ten members
of the same family were killed, including three children and three women.
A
growing number Islamist youth, in light of the military’s crackdown on
religious parties, are welcoming ABM’s pledge of allegiance to IS. For the
first time, chants
in support of the group were heard in Cairo’s demonstrations on Friday,
November 21. Some protesters carried
the black flag of IS and renounced peaceful means, something they had called
for over the past year and a half, under the pretext that adopting a peaceful
approach was a key reason the new regime is even more authoritarian than Hosni
Mubarak’s.
The
Salafi Front, which until yesterday
was part of the National Alliance to Support Legitimacy (an Islamist political
coalition that opposes Morsi’s ouster), organized the “Muslim Youth Uprising”
protests that took place on Friday, November 28; demonstrators raised black
flags in the Matriya
district of Cairo. On the same day, ABM, to show support for the “Uprising,”
carried out three attacks in Cairo,
Qalyubiyah, and North Sinai that killed an army officer and three recruits and
injured two officers and dozens of policemen. Some of the Brotherhood youth
announced that they would participate in the “Uprising” as well, only to back out
the night before to hold their own separate protests.
The
following day, November 29, a judicial ruling was issued that acquitted
Mubarak, his two sons, former Interior Minister Habib Al-Adly, and the latter’s
aides of charges of killing protesters. This ruling heightened the anger these
youth felt, pushing them further toward supporting a local affiliation for
ISIS. Meanwhile, thousands of those who participated in and called for the
January 25 Revolution languish inside prisons, and hundreds of others have been
sentenced to death. Following the verdict, a number of youth—particularly from
the Brotherhood—launched the hashtag campaign #ISIS_is_the_solution
on Facebook and Twitter.
This slogan played on “Islam is the solution,” a well-known slogan of the
Brotherhood’s from the Mubarak era.
Rising
support for IS in Sinai and elsewhere represents the small but growing
conviction that the state’s violence can only be met with counter-violence.
This gradual shift toward violence began with the breakup of the Rabia Al-Adawiya
sit-in in August 2013, which led to the death of as many as 1,000 people,
according to Human Rights Watch. Some Brotherhood youth have since immersed
themselves in the writings and ideology of Sayyid Qutb and shared
his articles and writings on social networking sites. They now mock peaceful
slogans they themselves had adopted in the past, such as “our peacefulness is
stronger than bullets.” Some have also begun to express intent to join IS and
participate in extending the caliphate so that Islamic conquerors can enter
Egypt.
These
days, the Brotherhood is split between those who call for an “Islamic
Revolution” that entails allying with jihadis and focusing on Morsi’s return to
power and those who support a “Popular Revolution” that entails allying
with liberal movements and garnering the international community’s support for
removing Sisi and his government. The Brotherhood’s recent statements
about participation in the “Muslim Youth Uprising” illustrate these internal
tensions. Party leaders—as well as leaders of Al-Gama’a Al-Islamiyya and other
Islamic parties, such as Al-Wasat and the Homeland Party (Al-Watan)—declared
they would not participate in the Salafi-organized protests and that demands
and slogans must be unified among the various strata of Egyptian society.
While
the Muslim Brotherhood still officially rejects violence as an approach, it has
encouraged resisting the authorities
and security services in “innovative ways”
by cutting off roads, burning government buildings, and exhausting the regime
economically and politically. While many among the Brotherhood’s youth continue
down the radicalization path, some of the group’s leaders are trying to
position themselves as an alternative, a centrist force between the jihadis and
the security services that can play a role down the road to placate both
jihadis and liberals. In the meantime, many among the group’s leadership
continue to promote the idea that allowing the Brotherhood to participate in a
democratic process—despite the group’s mistakes during its experience in
government—would have been better than the country sliding into this cycle of
violence and counter-violence.
As the
government continues its repressive
approach, there is a growing feeling among youth that they have lost
their dreams of “freedom and human dignity” three years after the January 25
Revolution. More than 47,000 people languish in Egyptian prisons, according to
a member of the Egyptian Coordination of Rights and Freedoms (ECRF), who said
that 3,000 people were arrested just in the one week before the “Muslim Youth Uprising.”
It seems that real political dialogue is all but gone in Egypt amid the growing
expansion of state oppression and the subsequent uptick in terrorist activity
in response. An increasing number of Islamist youth and sympathizers are
embracing violence. If the political landscape continues to retract and the
Sisi government refuses to release detained youth, including Islamists, more
trouble will follow, because Egyptian prisons are notorious as breeding grounds
for extremism. Tensions in Egypt could evolve into more violence, making the
country more susceptible to terrorist attacks.
This article is reprinted with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2014/12/05/sinai-campaign-boon-to-isis/hw1t
Mostafa
Hashem is an Egyptian journalist specializing in jihadi movements, political
Islam, and youth issues.
This
article was translated from Arabic.