January 29, 2015
The
first of the Houthi wars started, in 2004, while I was the chargé at the U.S. Embassy in Sanaa. John Abizaid, then the general
running U.S. Central Command, came to visit. On the ride to the presidential
palace, to meet the former president of Yemen, Ali Abdallah Saleh, Abizaid
asked me, “What is going on in north Yemen, and is this something we should be
involved in?” My reply was in the negative. “The Houthis are not Al-Qaeda, and
this is not about international terrorism,” I explained. Yemen needs our
economic and political assistance to overcome this insurgency, I went on to
say, because if the Houthi rebellion succeeded it would encourage or provoke
other regional rebellions. Chaos would ensue, and Yemen would turn into
something worse than Afghanistan—then the United States would have to
intervene. A decade later, the Houthis have taken over Yemen’s capital, pushing
the fragile country toward an uncertain fate.
The
Houthis are the largest Zaidi tribe in the northern Saada region of Yemen,
abutting the Saudi border to the north. For years, the central government in
Sanaa had marginalized the Houthis. Sunni Salafis from the north had meddled
and proselytized the Zaidi tribe, which is an offshoot of Shia Islam. In 2004,
the Houthi leader Hussein Badreddine Al-Houthi declined a summons to the
capital by President Saleh. In response, Saleh sent troops to bring the Houthi
leader by force, sparking off a six-year war that culminated in Saudi Arabia’s
failed incursion into northern Yemen, in 2009 to 2010, to assist Saleh against
the motley Houthi army.
At the
time, the Houthi political movement was known as Al-Shabab Al-Mumin—the
Believing Youth. Saleh had supported the
Houthis until they adopted the slogan, ‘Death to America, Death to Israel,’
after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003. The Houthi demands back then were
regional and sectarian: They wanted some autonomy within their region, to run their
schools and mosques as they saw fit. They also wanted to see a fair share of
the national budget spent on projects in their governorate.
After
years of fighting a larger more organized army, the Houthis transformed from a
regional ragtag militia into the most effective fighting force in Yemen—from a
tribe totally preoccupied with local, sectarian goals into an ambitious party.
The Houthi leader now makes reference to regional and international issues as
he claims to speak on behalf of Islam and Muslims everywhere. The Houthis have
transitioned from the insignificant, scarcely-known Believing Youth to Ansar
Allah—the Defenders of God—a name derived from a Koranic verse. The Houthis
have drawn help from Iran and Hezbollah—and the attention of the world in the
process. In the words of Abdelmalek Al-Houthi in a recent speech, “Our
ambitions are limitless.”
Yemen’s
2011 uprising succeeded in ejecting President Saleh from office and into Saudi
Arabia, for treatment from burn wounds following an attack on his palace. This created
a momentum that promised, for at least a year, to bring a new federal democracy
to Yemen, a system representing all factions and regions of the country. In the
process however, a power vacuum was created under the interim and later the
elected presidency of Abdrabbu Mansour Hadi, a quiet unassuming man. Hadi, who
is genuinely liked by most Yemenis, lacked the tribal power base or the wile
and cunning leadership skills of his predecessor. The vacuum was too much for
the Houthis to resist. The huge sucking sound that followed was that of Houthi forces
sweeping through all northern districts in the spring and summer of 2014. By August
and early September, Houthi forces were on the edges of Sanaa.
As
they surrounded the capital, the Houthis were ostensibly applying pressure on
the new government in Sanaa to stop corruption. Their sit-ins sought to reduce
the price of diesel fuel to help alleviate the poverty of the common man and to
assist the uprising’s youth in achieving the goals of the 2011 revolt. When UN
envoy Jamal Benomar orchestrated a year-long National Dialogue Conference, a
Houthi representative had signed off on the document aimed at national unity. Yet
the Houthis remained opposed to the idea of a six-district federated Yemen,
leaving the impression that they wanted a simple two-way division between north
and south. These declared demands were all issues that could have been resolved
either in conference or after in smaller meetings with President Hadi and other
power brokers. It was quite unnecessary for the Houthis to forcefully seize the
capital to accomplish these goals, unless the hidden ambition all along was
indeed to take over the government. The incongruity of their stated demands and
their actions was one indication of their real intentions. The second indication
was an inadvertent mention by a Houthi follower of military plans for the
takeover of Sanaa that sounded exactly like the way Hezbollah took over West
Beirut, in a matter of hours, in 2008.
The
Houthis, despite being the largest of the Zaidi tribes and, as such, related
historically to the Shia sect of Islam, did not merit Iran’s attention until
the Saudis entered the fray against them alongside President Saleh. Iran then
saw the conflict within the prism of the regional struggle for power between them
and the Al-Saud. Iran hurriedly established contact with the Houthis and sent
funds and weapons. Hezbollah, taking on the Yemen file from Iran, sent trainers
and advisors. This attention and help, combined with the opportunity presented
by 2011, led the Houthis to start thinking of themselves as potential heirs to
the entire Yemeni republic instead of mere supplicants for favors to their
region.
The
Houthi takeover has coincided with international indifference toward Yemen. Washington
has exhibited a nonchalance to the internal problems of the country. The
chastened Saudis lack enthusiasm for another foray into Yemen. The
international community has been willing to send envoys and convey messages and
resolutions that condemned the Houthis, but the UN lacks force to back up such condemnations.
After
the resignations of President Hadi and his prime minister, the Houthis are now
faced with a choice: To rule Yemen indirectly, the way Hezbollah makes sure no
Lebanese government can go against their wishes and interests; or to take the
reins of power directly. They also have the choice between stopping their
military campaign in place and consolidating power in Sanaa, or continuing to
press east and south of Sanaa. Outside of the capital, the Houthis are being met
with stiff resistance from eastern tribes, from the southern Hirak movement
which is skeptical about Abdelmalek’s overtures, and by Al-Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP), which has a strong presence in the south east of the country.
Pragmatism would dictate the former choices on both fronts. With adrenaline
running high right now and the young charismatic leader of the Houthi tribe
feeling on top of the world, the Houthis may continue their campaign. It would
be wiser to truly heed the lessons from Hezbollah’s experience in Lebanon, to
tread carefully and not engage in unnecessary battles.
The
U.S. is in a quandary—not an unusual place to be for the Obama administration
in foreign affairs. Washington does not like the Houthis’ slogans, friends or
ambitions. Nevertheless, the administration has thus far refused to call the
Houthi takeover a coup, fearing, as it did in the Egyptian case, that using the
term triggers a cut-off of aid and counter-terrorism collaboration, as
stipulated by Congress, something that has been ongoing between the security
agencies in Washington on those in Yemen under both presidents Saleh and Hadi. The
quandary cannot go on for long, however. If Iranian guns reach Bab Al-Mandeb,
the gateway to the Red Sea, U.S. and international shipping along that
strategic waterway will be threatened. Washington would then have to fish or
cut bait.
Nabeel Khoury is a visiting
associate professor at Northwestern University’s Program in Middle East and
North African Studies and a non-resident senior fellow at the Atlantic Council
in Washington, DC.