Iranian President Hassan Rowhani at a news briefing, Tehran, Iran, April 3, 2015. Ebrahim Noroozi/AP/Corbis
June 17, 2015
While
unprecedented diplomacy has changed the face of United States-Iran relations
over the past two years, the opposite has plagued Iranian-Saudi Arabian
relations. A diplomacy deficit between the two regional powers has exacerbated
volatility across the Middle East. According to a well-connected Gulf
Cooperation Council (GCC) analyst, President Barack Obama was frank with his
Saudi counterparts on this issue, telling them: “We’re solving our problems
with Iran. You should do the same.” Instead, misperceptions about Iran’s
regional ambitions and its domestic powerbrokers have caused Riyadh’s leaders
to shun regional integration and collective security in favor of unnecessary
attempts to counter Iranian power.
To
hear some Saudis tell it, relations between Tehran and Riyadh were trouble-free
until Shah Mohammad Reza Pahlavi was overthrown in 1979. “After the 1979
revolution, Iran started to interfere in internal Arab affairs of countries
around them,” a Saudi official told me at a recent conference. “Before the 1979
revolution, there was no conflict between Sunni and Shia. We want to live in
peace and harmony, but Iran will not allow the region to do so.” Putting aside
this generous historical interpretation of Iranian-Saudi and Sunni-Shia
relations, Saudi officials routinely emphasize both publicly and privately that
Iran should stay out of “Arab affairs.”
This
overtly sectarian policy toward Iran (where are the Saudi government protests
against Turkey openly intervening in “Arab affairs”?) is at worst racist and at
best dishonest. Riyadh’s zero-sum mentality fuels misperceptions that could
cause it to miss the best opportunity in over a decade to build durable
regional security.
Iran’s Regional Ambitions
Saudi
misperceptions about Iran’s regional ambitions cannot be overstated. “Iran
seeks to be a hegemon. This is the real source of instability in the Middle
East,” another Saudi official told me. “Iran is trying to occupy Iraq, Syria,
Lebanon, Bahrain, and Yemen. If it truly demonstrates its desire for peaceful
relations, we will of course reciprocate—but not until it ceases its occupation
of Arab lands.” With the possible exception of Israel, no other country in the
world shares Saudi Arabia’s extremist reading of Iran’s regional policy.
From
Iran’s perspective, it has long suffered from strategic loneliness because it
is a majority Shia, Persian state in a Middle East dominated by Sunnis and
Arabs. It has no obvious regional partners or allies. Despite this, Iran is not
striving to become a regional power, as Saudi officials suggest—it is a regional power, based on its size,
demographics, resources and culture alone. From monarchist to mullah,
decision-makers in Tehran have believed for decades that Iran is first among
equals when it comes to regional security issues.
However,
Iran has also learned the hard way that neither hard power nor soft power alone
can produce regional acceptance of
Iranian power. In the 1970s, the shah understood that conventional military
superiority and record oil revenues could not establish a sustainable position
as a regional power broker. Iran also needed its Arab neighbors to accept
Iranian power. To that end, he sought legitimacy in the region by either
befriending regional governments or seeking to resolve outstanding issues of
tension. The shah succeeded up to a point, settling border problems with Saudi
Arabia and Iraq, and improving bilateral relations with Egypt after President
Anwar Sadat realigned the country with the Western bloc. Yet, he did not fully
gain acceptance of Iran’s regional power status because he neglected soft power:
bridging the Sunni-Shia and Persian-Arab divides.
After
the revolution in 1979, the Islamic Republic’s leadership recognized the shah’s
neglect of soft power and sought to bridge regional divides through political
Islam. In doing so, they traded successes and failures with the shah: Iran’s
blend of political Islam and anti-imperialism won it valuable support on the
Arab street, but simultaneously destroyed relations with many Arab monarchs and
strongmen—Saudi Arabia above all else—who feared political Islam more than the shah’s
military and economic power. Today, a cornerstone of Iran’s regional power
status continues to be its support for Arab and Muslim constituencies that seek
to push back against perceived marginalization at home and in the region.
From
Palestine to Lebanon, Iraq to Yemen, Iranian support has been directed to
ethnic and religious groups whose domestic persecution predates the
establishment of an Islamic Republic in Iran. Rather than pushing for an
overthrow of the existing political systems in these respective countries,
Tehran believes it can achieve its strategic objectives by committing varying
degrees of money, weapons, intelligence and political advice to these
communities. Contrary to Saudi assertions, Iranian decision-makers do not need
to interfere in “Arab affairs” because they know they can outsource the fight
to marginalized constituencies who have self-motivating grievances. As Iran’s
allies in these respective countries empower themselves domestically, Tehran’s
hand is strengthened as it jockeys with Riyadh over regional power.
Iran’s
regional power is already a reality. Saudi Arabia fears that Iran’s reintegration
into the global political and economic systems will tip the regional balance of
power in Tehran’s favor. “Sunni Arab countries do not want to see the emergence
of close relations between the U.S. and Iran,” a Saudi official told me. “Saudi
Arabia does not want Iran to become a U.S. ally.” However, an examination of the
men behind Iran’s regional ambitions once again tells a different story.
Iran’s Power Brokers
Saudi
misperceptions about Iran’s regional policy power brokers are no less
pronounced. “Divide and conquer is an Iranian strategic approach, so why should
we play into Iran’s hands by trying to improve relations?” another Saudi
official told me. It would be useless to talk to President Hassan Rowhani or Foreign
Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, he said, because “they are not the real
powerbrokers.” Instead, he believed Qassem Suleimani, head of Iran’s Quds
Force, and Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei “wield the real power in Iran.”
It is frightening for a regional power and a neighboring country to have such a
fundamental misunderstanding of decision-making processes within Iran.
Contrary
to Saudi assertions, political power in Iran runs through a complex and
multilayered structure. Most decisions are made in conjunction with diverse and
sometimes competing power centers. Iran’s Supreme National Security Council
(SNSC) is responsible for defining the country’s defense and security policies
and priorities. In a 2011 book, President Rowhani explains that key decisions
are made in a small circle of SNSC members, including mainly Ayatollah Khamenei
and the heads of the three branches of government.
The
current secretary of Iran’s SNSC, Admiral Ali Shamkhani, is a former defense
minister in the Mohammad Khatami administration, an ethnic Arab, and perhaps
most importantly, enjoys the confidence of Ayatollah Khamenei. He was appointed
Khamenei’s representative on the SNSC in 2013, which should be noteworthy to
Saudi Arabia given his demonstrated regional policy preferences: In 2004, he
brokered and implemented a security agreement between Iran and Saudi Arabia,
and was awarded the Order of Abdulaziz Al-Saud by the late Saudi King Fahd
Abdulaziz Al-Saud—the only Iranian minister to ever receive such an award. At
that time, Rowhani was Khamenei’s representative on the SNSC, Zarif was Iran’s
ambassador to the United Nations, and Soleimani had held his position as
commander of Iran’s Quds Force for approximately six years.
The
apex of Iran’s cordial relations with Saudi Arabia came at a time when the same
Iranian officials were driving Tehran’s policy a decade ago. And since late
2013, Shamkhani, Khamenei, Rowhani, Zarif and Soleimani have once again been
working together in an effort to improve ties with Iran’s Arab neighbors. For
the past two years, Iran has publicly promoted a narrative that its own
national security goals require peace and cooperation with regional powers, which
in turn requires a certain degree of accommodation between Iran and the West.
From
Palestine to Lebanon, Iraq to Yemen, Iran's philosophy in the region is that
everyone should be included in the process. Even in Syria—the one example where
Iran is backing the regime rather than a marginalized minority—Iranian
decision-makers have long acknowledged the need for political solutions based
on negotiated settlements between domestic political actors and regional
powers. It is Saudi Arabia that has rejected such negotiations, instead issuing
preconditions to diplomacy and preferring to exclude Iran politically,
diplomatically and militarily.
For
its part, Iran has tried to repair relations with Saudi Arabia from the outset
of Hassan Rowhani’s presidency. One month after taking office, he called for
closer Iranian-Saudi ties, hailed the kingdom as a friend and brother, and said
improving relations with neighboring countries is a top priority. Last year,
Iranian Deputy Foreign Minister Hossein Amir Abdollahian travelled to Saudi
Arabia to meet with then-Foreign Minister Saud Al-Faisal. One month later,
Zarif took the initiative to visit his Saudi counterpart at the United Nations
General Assembly. Zarif again extended an olive branch by traveling to Saudi
Arabia for the late King Abdullah bin Abdulaziz Al-Saud’s funeral. According to
two European Union officials, Iran has also tried track-two diplomacy efforts
in their respective European capitals but Saudi Arabia is not prepared to take
them seriously.
Simply
put, Tehran’s efforts to repair relations have not borne fruit because Riyadh
does not want them to. When I recently asked a State Department official why
the Saudis continue to rebuff Iranian overtures, he shrugged and said, “They’re
not interested.” When Saudi officials finally negotiate seriously with Iranian
officials, their false portrayal of Iranian ambitions will collapse, and they
do not want it to collapse. Thus, they will likely refrain from engaging Iran
in any meaningful way for the foreseeable future.
In
the meantime, Iran is unlikely to impose heavy costs on Saudi Arabia for its
policies because Iranian decision-makers believe the Saudis are already paying
heavy costs for their own mistakes. If Iran takes action against Saudi Arabia,
it will only help justify false arguments against Tehran emanating from Riyadh.
Perhaps more importantly, Iran’s regional policy power brokers will continue to
leave the door open for diplomacy because they know that if Iran’s regional
power is not accepted by neighboring countries, Iran cannot guarantee its own
security.
Moving Towards Collective
Security
Saudi
Arabia is correct when it points out that regional stability—elusive over the
past four years—requires Riyadh’s participation. If the new cast of Saudi
characters running the kingdom believes that stability can be achieved without
Iran playing an equal role, they are doomed to repeat the ideological mistakes that
plagued the region throughout the 1980s, when Iran sought to export its
revolution and Saudi Arabia bankrolled Saddam Hussein’s eight-year war against
Iran. As nuclear negotiations between Iran and the world powers near
conclusion, the time is ripe for Saudi Arabia to find a face-saving way to
switch gears and reciprocate Iran’s offers of engagement.
Saudi
officials told me that a big overture from Iran could help jumpstart a thaw
between Tehran and Riyadh, but when I pressed them for specifics, they reverted
back to unrealistic talking points: withdrawing Iranian support for Bashar Al-Assad
in Syria as a precondition to, rather than an outcome of, negotiations. A more fruitful
approach would be quietly commencing high-level diplomacy between the two
countries in an effort to accommodate legitimate Iranian security objectives in
return for Iranian policy modifications. Trading concessions of equal value can
serve as a force for regional stability by breaking down the hostility and
misperceptions that paralyze bilateral relations.
For
Riyadh, this would include recognition that: one, neither Saudi Arabia nor
global powers can contain Iran indefinitely; and two, it can better influence
Iran by helping integrate the Islamic Republic into the region’s political and
economic structures rather than trying to keep it out. Adopting a policy of
integration would better reflect the region’s natural balance, which in turn
would make it more stable. Saudi Arabia’s current winner-take-all approach has
left it in a weaker position, while its policy of détente changed Iran’s
pattern of conduct as recently as 2004. There’s no reason to believe that it
will produce different results today.
For
its part, Tehran must alleviate Saudi concerns by detailing how its regional
ambitions do not, and will not, outstrip its post-sanctions role and resources.
Iran should also detail steps to reduce its use of asymmetric warfare as a
political tool in the region as Saudi Arabia takes steps to reintegrate the
Islamic Republic. Together, these measures will demonstrate Tehran’s commitment
to being a regional power that is a force for stability and collective
security.
This
approach was advocated by Saudi Arabia as recently as 2004. At the Manama
Dialogue in Bahrain, Saud Al-Faisal announced “an urgent need for a collective
effort aimed at developing a new and more solid framework for Gulf security.”
He went on to say: “A regional security
framework that includes all the countries of the region is the best guarantee
for peace and stability in the Gulf. Such a framework should be based on four
pillars: the GCC, Yemen, Iraq and Iran.” He continued, “Iran should play a vital
role in maintaining the security of the region. To do so our Iranian friends
need to come to terms with the requirements of developing high levels of
political, economic, cultural and security cooperation with their neighbors
based on common interests and the mutual refrain from interference in the
domestic affairs of others.”
The Iran that Saud Al-Faisal
was describing eleven years ago is the Iran of today. Second chances don’t come
often. Ending
the Iranian-Saudi cold war, and building a collective security framework for
the Middle East—one in which security is built and sustained together rather at
the expense of one another—is the only option that has not truly been tried. It
is also the option most likely to succeed.
(Author’s
note: The conference was held under the Chatham House Rule, which requires that
identities of speakers not be revealed. Accordingly, I have not identified
speakers by name in this article.)
Reza Marashi is research director at the National
Iranian American Council in Washington, DC. He previously served in the Office
of Iranian Affairs at the U.S. Department of State. His articles have appeared
in the New York Times, Foreign Policy, Atlantic, and National Interest. On Twitter: @rezamarashi.