July 10, 2015
In recent months, the Muslim
Brotherhood (MB) has been rethinking its organizational approach and
considering the use of violence as a response to state oppression. The violent
discourse that MB members used in the first days of the July 2013 coup was spontaneous
and went far beyond the ideology that the group has adopted for decades. But
the Rabaa massacre that killed at least 817 people, according to Human Rights Watch, along with increasing regime repression, has brought the
question of using violence against the state to the fore.
The debate is yielding
nuanced—and at times contradictory—arguments about the use of violence. At the
same time that some Brotherhood members say it is a tactical response to
day-to-day police violence; the MB’s old guard seems unable or unwilling to
find a political alternative to what young members are proposing: “smart
violence.” These MB activists1 support a specific kind of violence
that targets certain elements of the regime—not the indiscriminate sort
employed by radical organizations. Indeed, this narrow and tactical approach
reflects how far violence is from the core of Brotherhood doctrine; it’s also
garnering more support among the group’s ranks.
For its part, the MB
leadership appears wary of losing ground to its youth wing by outright opposing
the use of violence. But gradually, party elites have shifted from issuing a
number of statements affirming the pacifist nature of
MB political action to offering justifications for its limited use. However,
such rhetoric is not yet as prevalent in recent MB discourse as to represent a
major strategic overhaul.
For example, Yahya Hamed,
a thirty-six year old MB leader and former investment minister during the Morsi
period, used vague words to describe the party members’ “right to self-defense.” Hamed’s remarks are not part of a long-term strategy to
ensure the group’s existence, but rather more of an angry response to regime
repression that has become commonplace. On July 1, for example, security forces
killed thirteen MB leaders shortly after being detained, searched, and
fingerprinted. These Brotherhood members were reportedly meeting to discuss
supporting the families of jailed MB members when police stormed the building.
Responding to the incident, the Brotherhood criticized Sisi’s
Egypt for moving toward a new and dangerous phase where “no one can control the
rage of the oppressed people.”
Nonetheless, the MB’s
official statements are still contradictory and reflect its lack of consensus
about the use of violence. Prominent leader and former minister of
international cooperation, Amr Darrag, is one of many questioning the pacifist
approach: “the main lesson I learned is that gradual change will no longer
work.” Moreover, in late January, the movement released an online
statement that many perceived as a sharp turn from non-violence: “We are at the
beginning of a new phase where we summon our strength and evoke the meaning of
jihad.” It continued, “[We] prepare ourselves, our wives, our sons and
daughters, and whoever follows our path for relentless jihad where we ask for
martyrdom.” Several commentators have argued that this was not an official
statement. They point out that the MB was quick to condemn the
June 29 assassination of Egypt’s prosecutor general “the Brotherhood is
affirming its refusal to all killings.” Yet these conflicting statements,
beyond reflecting the mixed views on the issue, still indicate that senior
officials are increasingly willing to consider the merits of formally adopting
violence as a tactic to confront the Egyptian state.
Recent changes to the
Brotherhood’s internal structure reflect this shift. In April, the official spokesman
of the party announced the election of a new seven-member executive bureau
outside Egypt. Convening in Istanbul, these members commenced meetings with
political activists and academics to discuss their views of the group’s
predicament and about how to improve the movement’s political vision and
discourse. The group’s leaders are trying to end the party’s isolation by
engaging in more open discussions with political analysts and activists from
diverse backgrounds, including some foreign officials. These discussions
include heated debates over the question of violence as a tactic and
revolutionary strategy.
On MB social media
platforms, the increasing shift toward violence is more clear. Members and
supporters are calling military personnel and regime officials mortaddin
(or “apostates”), reflecting the rise of Salafi-jihadist discourse among
Brotherhood members. Furthermore, the “effective violence” adopted by groups
such as the Islamic State of State in Iraq and Syria and its Egyptian branch
(Wilayat Sinai previously known as Ansar Bayt Al-Maqdis), along with the
state’s inability to crush these groups, is an inspiration to many within the
group. The state media’s insistence on linking the Brotherhood to the
Salafi-jihadist camp is further alienating many rank-and-file MB members, most
of whom are middle-class professionals. Stigmatizing these individuals as
jihadis is pushing many to turn to violence.
One female member of the
Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, who spoke on condition of anonymity2,
described growing dissent within the MB over its “pacifism.” She noted that
members are beginning to organize themselves to prepare for attacks against
security and military interests in Egypt. It’s not clear whether these attacks
will be directed at facilities such as headquarters and vehicles or against
personnel, but it’s still an important turning point that needs to be
monitored. The trials against the former president Mohamed Morsi and the
group’s leaders, in addition to the lack of legal recourse, are enhancing the
appeal of violence as a tactic. In the meantime, Brotherhood leaders continue
to refuse reconciliation with the regime and as such are unlikely to be part of
the political scene or achieve change through existing channels.
Although the tide is
turning in favor of violent tactics, it is clear that the matter has yet to be
settled. Given the Brotherhood’s long history of non-violence, many members
don’t find it easy to accept it now even in response to the Sisi regime’s
clampdown. But the fear of losing ground is occupying the minds of Brotherhood
leaders. The way many Brotherhood leaders are framing this is that if there is
a war between society and the state, and if the society has taken a stance, the
Muslim Brotherhood should not hinder society’s fight for freedom. “We should
not stand silent in this battle,” said an Istanbul-based consultant for the
newly-elected executive bureau. “The vacuum should be filled by a powerful
organization, and we will not repeat the mistakes of the Syrian Muslim
Brotherhood (SMB),” he added. The consultant was referring to the fact that the
SMB lost their support in Syria because they distanced themselves from the
chaos during the early stages of the revolution.
This article is reprinted
with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/07/09/brotherhood-s-post-pacifist-approach/
Abdelrahman Ayyash is an
MA student in the school of social sciences at Bahçeşehir University in
Istanbul. His research focuses on the Egypt’s Islamists. On Twitter
@3yyash.
1. Interviewed by the author.
2. Interviewed by the author, April 1, 2015.