February 08, 2015
Jordan’s public opinion, political leadership
and regional and international dynamics today offer very useful insights into
the current condition of the entire Arab world, and should be studied carefully
by anyone interested in how things operate in this region and where it may be
heading.
The immediate mass-anger emotional reaction among Jordanians to the brutal
killing of air force pilot Muaz Kasasbeh is totally understandable and
justified; but behind the current wave of enraged sentiments and demands for
revenge is a complex matrix of emotions, ideologies and state-building
realities that reveal the deeper challenge that faces King Abdullah. Three
particular elements shape this kind of analysis of Jordan, which also apply to
most other Arab countries. They are 1) the nature of national political and
strategic decision-making, 2) the role of public opinion and limited
involvement in governance, and 3) the socio-economic condition of the country
and its reliance on foreign support.
All three of these dimensions are active this week as Jordanians come to terms
with the massive hurt they feel at the gruesome and cruel Kasasbeh killing, and
ponder options on how to respond. Public opinion has swung strongly behind King
Abdullah and the armed forces, reflecting the understandable desire to hit back
at ISIS and cause as much death and damage in their ranks as possible. This is
a sharp reversal from the situation weeks ago, when Jordan enjoyed a lively
debate about the wisdom of the country joining the American-led coalition to
fight and defeat ISIS. Vocal critics of the Jordanian armed forces’ involvement
in the actual attacks as well as in other aspects of the anti-ISIS campaign
included personal criticisms of the king’s role in such decisions.
The important point here is not whether the Jordanian decision to join the
anti-ISIS fight is sound (I personally believe it is sound, given the real
threat ISIS poses to the whole region) but rather the manner in which such
fateful national decisions are made in Arab countries without any credible
popular consultations or participation by the spectrum of indigenous
ideological views. This legacy has led to state ruin in places like Libya,
Yemen, Syria, Iraq, Somalia, Sudan and a few other Arab states.
Jordan is not in that situation, and remains tightly managed from above by a
determined leadership supported by a capable security and military sector — but
also with little if any credible popular participation. This is evident in
Jordan on controversial issues like relations with Israel — with whom Jordan
has a stable peace treaty — or cooperation with the United States and other
powers in military arenas.
When things return to normal, Jordan will once again have to confront the big
issues that its citizens have long debated, such as the central role of the
security sectors in national governance and decision-making, whether or not the
elected lower house of parliament accurately mirrors the views and interests of
the entire citizenry, how development funds are managed, or why the parliament
has no oversight of military-security spending in the national budget.
Other factors at play here should be considered, including Jordan’s existential
reliance on foreign aid for its national wellbeing. Foreign grants keep Jordan
afloat, and the kingdom relies heavily these days of budget support from the
United States and the Gulf Cooperation Council — to the tune of some $2 billion
per year. This makes it very difficult for Jordan to conduct its foreign policy
in any manner that deviates from the strategic interests of it major backers.
This in turn only increases the potential internal tensions between masses of
low-income citizens who resent their country following closely the dictates of
conservative or militaristic foreign donors, and their own government that has
few real options in this respect.
In the short run, Jordanians always behave like all other human beings, in that
they will subdue any political misgivings they may have in favor of the two
immediate needs that we see in action today: the emotional and political need
to assuage their anger and bereavement at the Kasasbi killing, and their
government’s need to secure foreign aid to keep the economy going and maintain
jobs and income for millions of citizens.
In the longer run — one day when that generous foreign aid may slow down, or
internal socio-economic and political marginalization stresses become too
intense — the current blend of a strong leadership, able military, and
emotionally supportive citizenry, but without any serious mechanisms of
political participation and credible accountability, may find it more difficult
to respond to the threats and opportunities of the day.
Jordan’s dilemma, which is on full display today, is that its strengths are
also its weaknesses.
Rami G. Khouri is published twice weekly in the Daily Star. He was
founding director and now senior policy fellow of the Issam Fares Institute for
Public Policy and International Affairs at the American University of Beirut.
On Twitter: @ramikhouri.
Copyright ©2015 Rami G. Khouri -- distributed by Agence Global