February 11, 2015
The
Houthis’ February 6 announcement that they will dissolve the Yemeni parliament
and set up an isnterim governing body has heightened Riyadh’s concerns about
Yemen’s political instability. For years, Riyadh has focused on preventing any
major shift in the balance of power on Yemen’s northern highlands, favoring the
Hashid tribal confederation, which includes Sanhan, the clan of former
President Saleh, and the once-powerful Ahmar family. As Hashid enjoyed top
military and security positions, contributing the lion’s share of middle
ranking and senior officers, Riyadh’s patron-client tribal network provided the
kingdom with unfettered access to the military establishment in Sanaa.
But
the Houthi takeover of Sanaa, the Ahmar family’s loss of influence, and damaged
ties with the Islah party—which
brings together a broad range of Yemen’s Sunni Islamists—left Saudi Arabia with
little influence in the Yemeni capital. Saudi Arabia has few options now but to
engage with the Houthis, who are currently the most cohesive political and
military force in Yemen. Riyadh is alarmed not just because this might impact
the regional Saudi-Iranian balance of power, but mainly because the Houthi
takeover has direct implications for the kingdom’s national security.
Saudi
Arabia is most concerned about security along its border—especially
following bloody clashes between Houthi fighters and Al-Qaeda militants. Since
the Houthis captured Sanaa in September and expanded their geographical control
in Dhamar, Bayda, Ibb, and Hodeidah, they have stepped up their clashes with Al-Qaeda
affiliated militants. Last October, in the Radaa district of Bayda, 160
kilometers (100 miles) southeast of Sanaa, the Houthis clashed fiercely with
Ansar Al-Sharia, the local arm of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), and
with Sunni tribes who allied themselves with Ansar Al-Sharia against the Houthi
fighters.
Further
intensification of the Houthi-Qaeda clashes will allow AQAP to reframe the
conflict as a Sunni-Shi’a one, increasing the appeal of radicalization among
Yemeni and Saudi Sunnis alike. This could spark sectarian violence in Yemen and
destabilize the kingdom’s southern provinces. AQAP’s leadership already
includes several Saudis who fled to Yemen after Saudi security forces largely
dismantled Al-Qaeda’s branch in the kingdom in a massive counterterrorism
campaign between 2003 and 2007. Moreover, a number of statements on jihadi
forums have framed the Houthi conflict as a Shi’a attack on Sunnis, using this
as a rallying point to increase their support bases. On September 23, two days
after the Houthi takeover of Sanaa, AQAP released a communiqué that described the
incident as an attempt “to complete the Shi’a project in Yemen.”
Further
clashes between AQAP and the Houthis, together with the paralysis of the Yemeni
state, could easily turn the country into a magnet for foreign jihadi fighters
leaving the Iraqi and Syrian fronts. These fighters can provide AQAP with an
influx of experienced militants who also have a profound antipathy toward
Riyadh and Shi’a communities.
With
threats on its northern Iraqi border and, now, on its southern Yemeni border,
Saudi Arabia sees its relationships in Yemen as an increasingly important
protective measure. In response to the unrest in Yemen that dates back to the
2011 Arab uprisings, Saudi Arabia has increased military checkpoints and
patrols on its border with Yemen and accelerated work on their high-tech, 1,770
kilometer (1,100 mile) border fence, which will stretch from the Red Sea in the
west to Oman in the east. The kingdom’s attempt to physically insulate itself
from the chaos engulfing its northern and southern
neighbors has made it the largest border fence market in the world.
Yet
while Riyadh focuses on strengthening its border security, its regional
competitor, Qatar, is already
communicating with the Houthis. During a meeting in Washington with the Qatari
Foreign Minister, Khalid Al-Attiyah, U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry said he was grateful
for the “many ways in which Qatar, the emir, and Dr. Attiyah have made
themselves available in order to be of assistance.” He praised the Qataris for
aiding U.S. policymakers in responding to recent developments in Yemen.
In
the short term, Riyadh has too much on its plate to pursue a more active role
in Yemen. The kingdom is focusing on fortifying its border with Yemen, leaving
the complex political game to the United Nations and the Gulf Cooperation
Council. But in the long term, Riyadh may ultimately have little choice but to
open direct lines of communication with the Houthis.
This article is reprinted
with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online at:
http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/02/10/saudi-troubles-in-sanaa/i1z8
Khaled Fattah is an
independent consultant and expert on Yemen and state-tribe relations in the
Middle East.