May 20, 2015
The Democratic Left Federation (DLF)—a
union comprising three radical leftist Moroccan parties: the United Socialist
Party (PSU), the Democratic Socialist Vanguard Party (PADS), and the National
Ittihadi Congress (CNI)—announced
last year that it would enter the upcoming local and parliamentary elections in
Morocco. Despite this initial announcement, many doubted they would
participate, as the existing political parties law forbade unions from running
on union lists. But on May 15 the Council of Ministers approved
the revised version the DLF had demanded, allowing party unions to participate
in elections on joint lists. Yet while this ends these radical leftist parties’
boycott of Moroccan elections at the moment, their participation is unlikely to
ensure significant gains.
The traditional parties on the far
left, with the exception of the CNI, had previously refused to participate in
the early elections held on November 25, 2011, the first after Morocco adopted
new constitutional amendments. PADS and PSU, along with the Democratic Way
party, boycotted because they believed that the new constitution would result
in a subservient government and that nothing has changed in regards to
elections. The Democratic Way, the most extreme of the radical leftist parties,
has remained firm in its stance,
claiming participation would grant legitimacy to a process it views as
fraudulent. Yet while most of these parties’ reasons for boycotting the
political process in 2011 have not changed, the DLF has reconsidered its
position and will take part in elections. It now believes the moment is crucial
and that a permanent boycott would leave leftist seats vacant—to be filled by a
sham parliamentary opposition led by coopted parties.
Although the birth
of the DLF in January 2014 initially renewed hopes that leftist forces might
unify in Morocco, this alliance may have been intended to differentiate these
political forces from the Democratic Way and its positions, which the DLF views
as nihilist. Some fear that this alliance is merely an electoral gambit driven
by these parties’ fear of being isolated if they do not maintain their boycott
on institutional participation. In the context of the so-called democratic
struggle (in both the institutional and popular sense), ending their boycott is
ideologically consistent. The choice to boycott was a tactical and provisional
one, not a permanent choice—these parties previously participated in some
elections and boycotted others.
Yet while the DLF is in agreement
regarding the need to end their boycott, there may not be a consensus among
these parties’ bases about what they want from the alliance and the
participation. After the 2011 election, PSU and PADS have come to rethink their
boycott, which left them further isolated and detached. The DLF parties are
hoping participating in the elections will reconnect them with citizens and
serve as a means to explain their choices, programs, and plans. Yet
participation also runs the risk of exposing the weakness of these parties. The
parties remain mired in organizational problems, they have not built any social
base that can support them in elections, and failure to win enough seats for a
parliamentary team will only widen their internal divisions. After boycotting
the elections for so long, few believe in and support them, and their chances
of winning enough seats remain very small. Furthermore, because their positions
and views are not in line with those of the reformist leftist parties, they are
unlikely to operate and coordinate with other parties. Even if they obtain a
few seats, the DLF would be further isolated and lose influence to the larger
leftist parties. Supporters of this view feel the parties should prioritize
rebuilding networks and addressing internal problems before entering any
election.
But many within the three parties see
the elections as an important way to determine their real weight and support
among Moroccans. The DLF is not betting on immediate electoral success but
wants to use this year’s elections to build up popular support that could
enable it to obtain better results in future elections. Through participating,
the DLF would at least be able to find a foothold in the electoral scene,
mobilize the support of new groups, and win the sympathy of undecided voters,
thus forming a potential popular base.
However, these parties have yet to
provide clear explanations to this potential voter base for how participating
in elections will achieve the goals listed in their founding
charter—most notably transitioning to a parliamentary monarchy system,
building a democratic civil state, and achieving social justice. They have set
conditions for their participation, including
the release of all political prisoners, an end to the harassment of human
rights associations, the formation of an independent national authority to
oversee elections, and the preparation of new electoral lists. Although these
have not yet been achieved, nor are they likely to be before elections, the
general inclination within the DLF appears to support participation regardless.
Any current among the Moroccan far-left
factions that chooses to participate in the elections will face a number of
challenges, most notably how to translate its call for opposition and
resistance into electoral votes that will allow them to change the balance of
power. The DLF alliance knows this task is difficult, and they are unlikely to
exceed the six seats the three parties collectively secured in the 2007
parliamentary elections. And many within the DLF parties fear participating in
the elections will only entrench their status as a minority, while boycotting
renders them intellectual clubs—not political parties—that merely organize
seminars and symposia.
This article is reprinted
with permission from Sada. It can be accessed online at: http://carnegieendowment.org/sada/2015/05/19/moroccan-left-s-dilemma/i8qo
Imad
Stitou is Rabat-based journalist. On Twitter: @StitouImad.
This
article was translated from Arabic.